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Abstract 
 
The persistence of poverty in some parts of the society across the globe inspired recent studies in development 
economics to embrace the use of multidisciplinary tools and concepts to better understand the situation of the 
poor. This thesis employs one of the recent conceptual tools, the aspirations-failure framework, which links the 
situation of the poor and their (under)investment behavior to aspirations failure. Based on individual and 
household level data collected from a sample of farm households in rural Ethiopia, the thesis first 
econometrically examines the effect of social interactions on aspirations (with respect to income, wealth, social 
status and education). The findings are in line with the theory which suggests that aspirations are socially 
determined through observations and social interactions. In particular, results indicate that social network size is 
an important determinant of aspirations and especially that of women’s, attesting to the importance of widening 
the ‘aspirations window’ – a person’s cognitive world that shapes their aspirations.  
 
One of the channels in which aspirations may affect behavior is through their effect on risk aversion. The thesis 
finds that the ‘aspirations-gap’ (AG) – the difference between the aspired and present status – indeed relaxes risk 
aversion, and the association is non-linear. Results also indicate that the effect of AG on risk preferences is 
stronger for women. 
 
Social interactions may also enhance diffusion of innovations and productivity. Based on social networks data 
collected using ‘random matching within sample’ procedure, the thesis identifies strong evidence of network 
externalities in the adoption of row-planting and also in farm productivity. The novelty of the thesis is also the 
identification of aspirations (or AG) as one of the key determinants of farmer innovativeness or the adoption of 
innovation products such as chemical fertilizers. 
 
The main goal of the thesis is ultimately to try to understand the implications of aspirations by examining their 
interactions not only with the underlying drivers of well-being (such as the adoption of agricultural innovations 
and risk behavior) but also their interactions with the well-being outcomes themselves. The thesis uses various 
outcome indicators including income and consumption expenditure, various triangulating measures of food 
security, and subjective well-being defined in terms of life satisfaction and happiness. In nearly all outcome 
indicators, the thesis finds suggestive evidence that aspirations are important predictors of household well-being 
in rural Ethiopia.  
 
The overall findings of the thesis clearly demonstrate that beyond the resource-related deprivations, low 
aspirations (or aspirations failure) also play a role in rural households’ decision-making in Ethiopia, with 
consequences on well-being outcomes. Targeting the determinants of aspirations may therefore be a useful 
policy strategy. This is because moderately raised aspirations may also help improve the effectiveness of other 
policies aimed at improving the adoption of agricultural innovations and well-being outcomes in rural Ethiopia. 
The key messages of this study can be seen as support for the recent call of the World Bank for a new set of 
development approaches, “viewing people more fully and recognizing that a combination of psychological and 
social forces affects their perception, cognition, decisions, and behaviors”, as formulated in the world 
development report of 2015. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Entwicklungsökonomische Studien greifen immer häufiger auf multidisziplinäre Methoden und Konzepte 
zurück, um ein besseres Verständnis über die anhaltende Armutssituation in Teilen der Welt zu erhalten, greifen. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit verwendet ein solches Konzept, das aspirations-failure framework, das die Situation der 
Armen und ihr Investitionsverhalten mit dem „aspiration failure“ verknüpft. Anhand von Individualdaten und 
Haushaltsdaten von landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben in Äthiopien wird der Effekt von sozialen Beziehungen auf 
Aspirationen (in Bezug auf Einkommen, Wohlstand, sozialer Status und Bildung) ökonometrisch analysiert. Die 
Theorie besagt, dass Aspirationen gesellschaftlich bedingt sind, beispielsweise durch gegenseitige Beobachtung 
und durch soziale Interaktionen. Die ökonometrischen Ergebnisse bestätigen dies. Tatsächlich deuten die 
Ergebnisse an, dass die Größe der sozialen Netzwerke eine wichtige Determinante für Aspirationen 
insbesondere von Frauen ist. Auch die Relevanz des aspiration window wird bestätigt – dies ist die individuelle 
kognitive Welt, die Aspirationen formt. 
Ein Wirkungskanal, durch den Aspirationen das individuelle Verhalten beeinflussen können, sind die Effekte auf 
das Risikoverhalten. Die Analyse macht deutlich, dass der aspiration-gap – die Differenz zwischen angestrebten 
und gegenwärtigen Status – das Risikoverhalten in einer nichtlinearen Weise beeinflusst. Die Ergebnisse deuten 
auch an, dass der Effekt des aspiration-gap auf die Risikopräferenz bei Frauen stärker ausgeprägt ist als bei 
Männern. 
Darüberhinaus können soziale Interaktionen die Verbreitung von Innovationen und die Produktivität fördern. 
Die Analyse von sozialen Netzwerken, die die Methode „random matching within sample“ nutzt, zeigt einen 
starken Einfluss von Netzwerkexternalitäten auf die Adoption von Sätechniken sowie auf die landwirtschaftliche 
Produktivität. Entsprechend trägt diese Arbeit maßgeblich zur wissenschaftlichen Diskussion bei, indem 
Aspirationen (und deren Lücke) als Schlüsselvariable für die Innovationsfähigkeit der Bauern identifiziert werden 
und diese die Adoption von innovativen Produkten wie zum Beispiel chemischen Düngemitteln erklären 
können. 
 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Implikationen von Aspirationen zu verstehen. Dazu werden die Interaktionen 
mit den grundlegenden Determinanten des Wohlbefindens untersucht (beispielsweise die Adoption von 
landwirtschaftlichen Innovationen und das individuelle Risikoverhalten) und die Interaktionen mit den direkten 
Folgen des jeweiligen Wohlbefindens. Verschiedene Outcome-Indikatoren werden verwendet, wie unter 
anderem Einkommen und Konsumausgaben, verschiedene triangulierte Food Security Indikatoren, sowie 
subjektives Wohlbefinden, das als Zufriedenheit und Glücksempfinden definiert ist. Für fast alle Outcome-
Indikatoren wird ein Einfluss von Aspirationen auf das Wohlbefinden von ländlichen Haushalten in Äthiopien 
gefunden. 
 
Diese Arbeit zeigt auf, dass neben Ressourcenengpässen insbesondere auch nicht vorhandene Aspirationen (oder 
das Scheitern von Aspirationen) eine entscheidende Rolle im Entscheidungsverhalten von ländlichen Haushalten 
in Äthiopien spielen, mit entsprechenden Konsequenzen für das Wohlbefinden. Folglich kann es eine 
erfolgreiche Policy Strategie sein, die Determinanten von Aspirationen zu berücksichtigen. Mit leicht gehobenen 
Aspirationen könnte nämlich die Effektivität von Policies verbessert werden, die eine Steigerung der 
Adoptionsrate von landwirtschaftlichen Innovationen bewirken sowie das Wohlbefinden im ländlichen Raum 
Äthiopiens verbessern. Die zentrale Aussage dieser Arbeit steht somit im Einklang mit dem im World 
Development Report 2015 veröffentlichten Aufruf der Weltbank für einen neuen Entwicklungsansatz: „viewing 
people more fully and recognizing that a combination of psychological and social forces affects their perception, 
cognition, decisions, and behaviors“. 
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1. NTRODUCTION 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Despite progress, poverty persists across the developing world. The latest estimates put the share of the world 
population living under $1.90 or less per-day1 at about 12.8 percent (or around 900 million people in 2012, and a 
projected 700 million in 2015) (World Bank Group, 2016). The same report puts 1.6 billion people as 
multidimensionally2 poor in 2015. Until recently, the literature in development economics on poverty focused on 
income and consumption and to a lesser extent on social indicators such as life expectancy, under-five mortality, 
inadequate access to services including education, health, water and sanitation, etc. It is nowhere more evident 
than the World Bank’s influential publication with special issues on poverty, the world development report, of various 
years (1978, 1980, 1990, 2000/01) that the concept is analysed almost exclusively along these dimensions, which 
are also referred to as “external” constraints. 
Along this line of thought, recent studies aimed at understanding the causes of poverty persistence find that poor 
households frequently underinvest even when returns are high (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Such findings have 
motivated researchers to employ multidisciplinary tools and concepts for a better understanding of the situation 
of the poor. Consequently, some studies find evidence that poverty actually depletes mental resources or 
impedes cognitive capacity (e.g. Mani, et al., 2013) and this might lead people to making decisions based more 
heavily on “automatic thinking (which considers what automatically comes to mind and is effortless, associative 
and intuitive) rather than deliberative thinking (which considers a broad set of relevant factors and is effortful, 
based on reasoning, and reflective)” (Kahneman, 2003 and World Bank, 2015a: p.6). This in turn may result in 
sub-optimal outcomes, such as poor material well-being. Relatedly, other studies suggest that poverty depletes 
the ability to self-control on unwanted thoughts such as unwise spending, or activities that are harmful to health, 
or behaviors in general that can perpetuate a disadvantaged state (Vohs, 2013). These imply that poverty or a 
deficit in material resources cannot be understood in isolation to the context in which decisions are made (World 
Bank, 2015a).  
An alternative, but closely linked, explanation to the (under)investment behavior of the poor is related to the lack 
of aspirations or aspirations failure (Appadurai, 2004 and Ray, 2006). According to this theory, poverty limits the 
people’s ‘capacity’ to aspire (Appadurai, 2004) by creating mental models that uniquely diminish the significance 
of some features of the environment while magnifying others (Bernard et al., 2008). Ray (2006) extends this view 
and argues that poverty stifles dreams and this may result in a self-sustaining trap of poverty and the failure of 
aspirations. Yet, whether aspirations failure is a cause or a consequence of poverty is inconclusive. Dalton et al. 
                                                          
1 A revised international poverty line based on 2011 prices 
2 According to World Bank Group (2016), multidimensional poverty index (MPI) is used to measure the incidence and 
breadth of those who are deprived in multiple dimensions including health, education, and standard of living. These 
dimensions are measured using 10 indicators: child mortality and nutrition (for health); years of schooling and school 
attendance (for education); and cooking fuel, toilet, water, electricity, floor, and assets (for living standards). Each dimension 
and each indicator within a dimension is equally weighted. For each of the indicators a deprivation cutoff is set. 
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(2014), for example, theoretically show that while both the rich and the poor may share the same preferences and 
also behavioral bias in setting aspirations, poverty exacerbates the effects of this behavioral bias leading to 
behavioral poverty traps and the failure of aspirations, ultimately affecting their effort choices as a result. This 
implies that internally constrained people may not only fail to create opportunities for themselves, but also fail to 
use them when they are available (Bandura, 2009) albeit with some cost, for example, insurance, credit, 
information (Bernard et al., 2008), innovations and innovation products, etc.  
Further, Appadurai (2004) and Ray (2006) postulate that aspirations are formed socially, through comparisons 
and by learning from ‘relevant others’, or what Ray (2006) refers to as the aspirations window – an individual’s 
cognitive world from which the individual draws their aspirations. Yet, a related literature also suggests that 
social interactions generate knowledge externalities, such as the adoption of agricultural innovations (e.g. Conley 
and Udry, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; and Foster and Rosenzweg, 1995). With the exception of a few 
studies (such as Thomson et al., 2015; Bernard et al., 2014, 2012; Kosec et al., 2012; Macours, and Vakis, 2009), 
empirical test of the aspirations failure theory, particularly in the context of agriculture, is largely lacking. More 
specifically, there is little empirical evidence examining the formation of aspirations and the channels in which 
aspirations might be related to well-being outcomes and their determinants including risk behavior and the 
adoption of agricultural innovations. This study contributes to the literature by examining the following research 
questions. 
 
1.2. Research questions 
In view of the aforementioned problem statement and the research gaps in the literature, the thesis attempts to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. How might social interactions shape aspirations?  
2. How do social networks affect the adoption of agricultural innovations and farm productivity?  
3. How might aspirations affect risk and time preferences? 
4. How do aspirations affect the adoption of agricultural innovations? 
5. How do aspirations affect well-being outcomes such as income, food security, and subjective well-being? 
 
1.3. Overview of the data and methodology  
The data comes from a household survey carried out between January and March 2014 in Ethiopia. The survey 
builds upon an existing sample of agricultural households surveyed in 2006 and again in 2010. The sampling 
method is fully described in chapter two. But in general, the study is based on 379 farm households who reside 
in three study sites which are shown in Figure 1.1. Each study site comprises of two neighbouring districts with 
similar characteristics including the crops grown. The study sites are: Bakko-Sibu Siree, Adaa- Lume, and 
Hettosa-Tiyyo. The latest survey differs from the previous two waves for it has collected information on 
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aspirations and social networks. Both the household head and the spouse were separately interviewed about their 
aspirations and future expectations using four indicators including: income, wealth, social status and children’s 
education. Based on these four indicators, an aggregate aspirations index and aspirations-gap are calculated using 
the formulas described in chapter 2. Additional data on aspirations was also collected using qualitative interviews. 
The data on social networks was collected based on two techniques: “self-reported networks” and “random 
matching within sample.” Details on social networks are given in chapter 3. Further, the survey collected other 
individual and household level socio-economic information including on production and inputs, assets, income, 
consumption expenditure, food security and other indicators of well-being outcomes. Econometric techniques 
are the main method of analysis. The thesis, however, relies mainly on the 2014 data as the variables of interest 
(i.e. aspirations and social networks) are missing in the preceding surveys. The data from the previous two waves 
are used to show trends on key outcome indicators and some of these lagged values are also used as identifying 
instruments. 
 
Figure 1.1. Location of the study sites and the capital of Ethiopia.3   
 
                                                          
3 The map was generated using ArcGIS software based on GIS data accessed, on march 03 2016, from http://www.diva-
gis.org/gdata  
 4 
 
1.4. The conceptual framework 
Figure 1.2 schematically presents the overall conceptual framework that guides the thesis. According to this 
framework, which is conceptualized based on the existing literature, policies and institutions determine the 
formation of material and human capital, and other well-being outcomes. The nature of distribution of these 
outcomes in the society jointly with cultural factors and social interactions may give rise to either aspirations or 
aspirations failures. According to the literature, while people from all walks of life may exhibit some form of 
behavioral bias towards their own potential, poverty can exacerbate the effects of this behavioral bias and this 
may lead to behavioral poverty traps. Consequently, people who are in behavioral poverty traps may fail not only 
to exploit their potential or create opportunities for themselves, but also to make use of available opportunities. 
Thus, in the absence of policy interventions targeting those behavioral biases, the poor may remain in a self-
sustaining trap of poverty and the lack of proactive behavior. This shows a two-way link between aspirations and 
well-being outcomes.  
Aspirations may affect well-being outcomes through direct and indirect channels. First, aspirations are assumed 
targets or reference points - they are motivators. Hence they may directly influence forward-looking behavior 
such as investment in agricultural innovations. On the other hand, since getting return from such investments 
requires patience and risk-taking, aspirations can enhance such behavior and motivate people to minimize time 
discounting and risk aversion. In this context, finding ways of raising the aspirations of the poor may be of 
paramount importance for enhanced aspirations may improve not only forward-looking behavior such as the 
adoption of agricultural innovations but also the effectiveness of other policies such as those promoting 
agricultural innovations. 
Further, the literature on social networks suggests that economic agents embody various knowledge and 
information and hence interactions among them can generate knowledge externalities. Social networks are the 
channels for such interactions and social learning; and these channels provide the linkage with the formation of 
aspirations and wealth as well as with risk and innovation behavior.   
In summary, the framework highlights the channels in which aspirations might be linked to various outcomes 
and behavior. It also shows the potential interventions that may break poverty traps, either by simply raising the 
aspirations of the poor or jointly with mechanisms that raise the wealth of individuals and/or by reducing the 
cost of effort (e.g. the cost of innovations) the poor face. In the light of this framework, the thesis answers the 
research questions identified from the research gap in the literature. 
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Figure 1.2. The conceptual framework 
Source: Own conceptualization based on the reviewed literature 
 
1.5. Organization of the thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is organized in five chapters. In the next Chapter we empirically examine the social 
drivers of aspirations in rural Ethiopia. Since the ultimate goal of the thesis is to examine the impact pathways 
from aspirations to well-being, we proceed, in the same Chapter, by investigating how aspirations might be 
linked to time and risk preferences, two widely established determinants of well-being through their effect on 
effort choices such as the adoption of agricultural innovations. Yet knowledge externalities are also generated 
from social interactions. Hence, we examine in Chapter 3 if that is actually the case by studying the effect of 
social networks on the adoption of row-planting (a recent innovation in Agriculture in Ethiopia) and farm 
productivity. We extend our study on the determinants of agricultural innovations in Chapter 4, with a special 
focus on the effect of aspirations. In doing so, we relate aspirations with the adoption of various agricultural 
technologies and improved practices. Since aspirations also directly affect well-being, we examine, in Chapter 5, 
the links between aspirations and well-being outcomes including income and expenditure, various dimensions of 
food security, and subjective well-being. We present summary of the main findings and conclusions of the thesis 
in the last Chapter where we also highlight the limitations of the study. 
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2. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, ASPIRATIONS AND TIME AND RISK 
PREFERENCES IN RURAL ETHIOPIA  
 
 
Abstract 
Despite increased development efforts, the persistence of poverty in some parts of the society across the globe 
require an increased use of multidisciplinary tools and concepts for better understanding of the problem. One of 
the recent conceptual tools that has gained increased attention include the aspirations-failure framework linking 
the situation of the poor and their (under)investment behavior to low aspirations (or aspirations failure). Based 
on this conceptual framework, this Chapter empirically examines the effects of social interactions on aspirations 
(with respect to income, wealth, social status and education), and of aspirations on time and risk preferences in 
rural Ethiopia. Findings in this study are in line with the theory which suggests that aspirations are socially 
determined through observations as well as social interactions. Further, results indicate that social network size is 
an important determinant of aspirations, attesting to the importance of widening the aspirations window. The study 
also reveals evidence that aspirations-gap (AG, i.e. the difference between current and aspired status) affects risk 
behavior non-linearly. Across gender, results show that the effects of social interactions on aspirations and of 
aspirations on risk preferences are larger for females. Findings in this Chapter imply that policies aimed at raising 
the aspirations of the poor may benefit from social interactions, and hence any such efforts may use as well as 
invest on social networks and reap the corresponding multiplier effects. Further, strategies that empower women 
and particularly that help widen their aspirations windows may earn the highest impact for wider aspirations 
windows may increase their aspirations-gap which in turn may relax their risk aversion. 
 
Key words: Social interactions, aspirations, risk preferences, Ethiopia 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Despite progress, poverty persists across the developing world. A synthesis of several studies across continents 
finds that poor households frequently underinvest even when returns are high (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). This 
puzzle has inspired the research community and other actors to increasingly explore the use of multidisciplinary 
tools and better understand poverty and other development challenges. For example, the World Bank’s flagship 
publication, world development report 2015, entitled Mind, Society, and Behavior is a recent evidence of attempts broadly 
exploring the issue using multidisciplinary approach. Earlier studies in social psychology such as Bandura (1977) 
and Bandura et al. (1977) showed how perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes might be related and how 
might behavior be altered by changing the level and strength of self-efficacy. These and related literature in other 
social sciences lend conceptual tools for the study of poverty and well-being outcomes.  
One of the concepts that has gained recent attention in development economics is the aspirations failure 
framework, following Appadurai (2004) and Ray (2006), which links the situation of the poor and their (under) 
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investment behavior to low aspirations (or aspirations failure).4 According to Appadurai (2004), Dalton et al. 
(2014) and Ray (2006), “internal” constraints such as the lack of aspirations and other psychological factors could 
reinforce “external” constraints (or material deprivation) and this may lead to a self-sustaining trap of poverty 
and the lack of proactive behavior. Further, some empirical studies find that internal factors such as aspirations 
and risk behavior could pass on intergenerationally (De Paola, 2013; Dercon and Singh, 2012). These imply that 
finding ways of enhancing the aspirations of the poor could be a powerful tool to break cyclical poverty traps 
and other development challenges.  
Aspirations are assumed targets or reference points (Payne et al, 1980). Thus, they are motivators that may 
directly influence investment or forward-looking behavior. Yet, Genicot and Ray (2014) argue that aspirations 
encourage investment to the extent that they are moderately above an individual’s standard of living, that is 
“large enough to incentivise but not so large as to induce frustration” (p.1). Put differently, the difference 
between the aspired and achieved outcomes- also referred to as the aspirations-gap– affects future oriented 
behavior (Ray, 2006). So, when this gap is either too narrow or too wide may lead to aspirations failure or exit, 
for the former the reward is considered too small for the effort; and for the latter the relative gap will remain 
large regardless of the amount of effort put in (Ray, 2006).  
Aspirations are socially determined, through observations and comparison of own outcomes with that of others’ 
in the reference group (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006), and by the existing income distribution (Genicot and Ray, 
2014; Stark, 2006). Relatedly, Akerlof’s (1997) discussion on social distance and interactions highlights the 
importance of one’s initial condition for social decisions that affect behavior and eventually economic decisions. 
In this context, we empirically examine the importance of social interactions on aspirations. Beside the direct 
motivation effects, the other hypothesised channels through which aspirations may affect forward-looking 
behavior is through their effects on minimising time discounting and risk aversion – two widely identified drivers 
of poverty and well-being outcomes. We empirically test these hypotheses. The remainder of this Chapter is 
organized as follows. The next section presents the background and review of the related literature followed by 
section 2.3 which presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 presents the empirical strategy. Results 
are discussed in section 2.5, and section 2.6 concludes the Chapter.   
 
2.2. Background and literature review  
Individual behavior is influenced by the social environment, also referred to as ‘culture’ – a set of shared beliefs, 
symbols and customs (Goodenough, 1999). According to Goodenough (1999), culture consists of cumulated 
knowledge and experience involving participant observations and interactions. These may affect behavior, for 
example by expanding the participant’s ‘capacity to aspire’ since the “ideas of the future, as much as of those 
                                                          
4 Citing the dictionary definition of aspiration as “a desire or ambition to achieve something”, Bernard et al (2011) note that 
simple wishes are different from aspirations for the later implicitly requires to exert some effort to realize the desired aim or 
target. 
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about the past, are embedded and nurtured” in culture (Appadurai, 2004, p.59). In other words, the social 
environment shapes behavior partly because people compare their outcomes and achievements not only to their 
own past level, but also the average achievements of relevant others – in what Ray (2006) referred to as the 
aspirations window – “an individual’s cognitive world, her zone of ‘similar’, ‘attainable’ individuals (in terms of their 
life styles, their social and political norms, and their economic well-being), and from which the individual draws 
her aspirations”(p. 2). Consequently, individuals react by investing in own self-improvement (Genicot & Ray, 
2014). Yet, these investments are subject to risk - a situation where outcomes are not known with certainty due 
to: “the inability to control and/or measure precisely some causal factors of events, the limited ability to process 
information, and the costly nature of obtaining and processing information” (Chavas, 2004, pp. 5-8).  
Due to the presence of risk and uncertainty, people tend to adapt to their personal histories and/or tend to 
conform with others for the behavior of others conveys information and also because there could be a direct 
benefit from aligning with others regardless of whether they are making best decisions (Easley and Kleinberg, 
2010). In this regard, Ray (2006) discusses three pathways in which group action may influence individual 
behavior, by acting as: “internal conveyors of information (e.g. motivation drawn from education experience of 
neighbors), external conveyors of information (e.g. as lobbying force), and coordination devices (e.g. savings 
group in which peers’ savings behavior may motivate individuals to save)’’ (pp.10-11). Relatedly, Thaler and 
Sunstain (2009) summarize social influences into three groups: information, peer pressure, and priming- 
“mysterious workings of the automatic system of the brain…and uses… certain information that immediately 
comes to mind” (p. 69). Thus, according to Thaler and Sunstain, the power of social influences can help promote 
policy using nudges5. A typical example in this regard is the Grameen Bank model, also referred to as social 
business, which combines social mobilization and banking services.6 According to Esty (2013) and Rouf (2011), 
this group based financial service empowers women, builds their confidence and motivation through its 
education program. For example, prior to taking out loans, recipients are required to make 16 Decisions8 that 
affect their lives. They are also required to hold regular peer group discussions so that they would build 
supportive friendships and share information and tips that proved key to the success of their business ventures 
(Esty, 2013). To sum up this section, the theoretical literature suggests that social interactions affect individual 
behavior, including aspirations. Next, we briefly review some empirical literature on the effects of social 
interactions on aspirations and of aspirations on time and risk preferences.  
                                                          
5
 Thaler and Sunstein (2009), for example, offer four different strategies that might influence behavioral change. These 
include putting restrictions, offering incentives, persuasion or provision of information, and nudging (or making it easy for 
people to accomplish the desired choice).   
6 According to the information available on the Grameen Bank website, the Bank tries to bring about socio-economic 
transformation through provision of collateral-free, group based credit to the poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh. Its 
operating principle is based on mutual trust, accountability, participation and creativity. The issues included in the 16 
Decisions range from socio-economic to environmental development that affect the lives of the poor.  
http://www.grameen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=109&limit=1&limitstart=15 
Accessed on April 30, 2016 
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2.2.1. Social networks and aspirations 
The existing literature argues that the existence of various reference groups and/or networks along with the 
availability of information and differential economic opportunities may trigger feelings of relative deprivation, 
envy, or increased self-efficacy and aspirations. In this context, in India, Beaman et al. (2012) find that, even in 
the absence of change in labor market opportunities, exposure to female leaders in local government raised both 
the aspirations and educational attainment of girls. The role model effect was argued to be the most important 
channel in changing aspirations, which Macours and Vakis (2009) also find in poor rural areas in Nicaragua. 
Using a short term training and cash transfer program aimed at increasing households’ investments, Macours and 
Vakis (2009) find a positive impact of social interactions on aspirations. The authors find stronger results 
particularly where program beneficiaries lived closer to group leaders who were also recipients. Similarly, using a 
randomized control that varies the intensity of treatment, i.e. number of people invited to watch inspirational 
videos, by village, Bernard et al. (2014) show that such simple interventions could help change people’s behavior 
such as aspirations. On the other hand, based on a survey data collected from rural Nepali women, Thompson et 
al (2015) find evidence that peers’ readily observable assets drive one’s own wealth aspirations. 
 
Empirical studies examining the social aspects of aspirations formation are quite few. The studies reviewed here, 
with the exception of Thompson et al (2015), rely on randomized experiments that exogenously vary group 
composition and/or partial interventions that directly affect only some peers within a group. These allowed the 
studies to account for the common problems of identification which may arise due to the endogenous formation 
of networks and/or simultaneity bias (Manski, 1993). The commonality of these studies is that they show the 
power of social interactions in influencing individual behavior such as aspirations. The underlying reason or 
pathways for behavioral change might actually lie along the interactions between aspirations and risk preferences, 
which is reviewed next. 
 
2.2.2. Aspirations and risk preferences 
Aspirations and risk preferences are related for the latter depend on the values of possible outcomes relative to 
the levels of aspired ones (March, 1988). As a consequence, some risk averse behavior may result from the 
human tendency to focus on targets and from the adaptation of those targets to experience rather than from a 
fixed trait of risk aversion (March, 1988). Further, both aspirations and risk preferences are influenced by the 
behavior of others in the reference group (Knudsen, 2008; March, 1988). For example, in a population of 
decision makers with aspirations that adapt to the median wealth, March (1988) argues, success relative to others 
in the population produces a preference for relatively low risk alternatives, while failure relative to others leads to 
a preference for risky alternatives. This, according to March, is driven by a preference for relative stability in 
wealth. Knudsen (2008) extends the work by including the case of multiple reference groups and shows that 
social interaction and relative comparisons are dominant drivers of performance and that the presence of various 
reference groups provides more important bases for variable risk strategies than the decision maker’s own 
situation. 
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By defining the aspiration level as an assumed target or reference point, Payne et al (1981) extend earlier work by 
Payne et al (1980) that tested the importance of the aspiration level in the analysis of risky choice behavior. The 
studies relate pairs of gambles to an assumed target or reference point. The authors vary target levels in a series 
of experiments while holding gamble outcomes constant. They find evidence of aspirations effect on risky choice 
behavior – that people tend to choose the riskier alternative if the outcomes are below some target level (or 
involve losses) than they are if the outcomes are above some target or aspiration level (or involve gains). These 
findings are in line with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) finding of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for 
loses of high probability; and, risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for loses of low probability. This tendency 
of decision making also referred to as “loss aversion” may arise for losses heart much more than gains make one 
happy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).  
One of the recent studies that use lotteries or gambling games to measure individual risk attitudes include Yesuf 
and Bluffstone (2009). The authors examine the attitudes of Ethiopian smallholder farmers toward risk when 
faced with new agricultural technologies. They find that households are more sensitive to potential losses than 
they are to gains. Based on experimental evidence, they find that households that stand to lose as well as gain 
from adopting a new technology are significantly more risk averse than those that face potential gains only. 
Risk preferences, on the other hand, may not only affect outcomes of a person and their household, but also 
pass on intergenerationally. For example, using data from a sample of Italian students, De Paola (2013) tests and 
finds evidence of intergenerational transfer of risk behavior. The study finds that students whose fathers were 
employed in the public sector are more risk averse, while students whose fathers were entrepreneurs have a 
higher propensity to take risks. Relatedly, using panel data from a cohort study of 12,000 selected children (ages 
8, 12 and 15 year) and their parents across Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam, Dercon and Singh (2012) test if 
there is evidence of transmission of aspirations from parents to children. Controlling for other family 
characteristics, the authors find a positive and strongly significant link between parental and child aspirations in 
terms of aspirations for education.  
In summary, the existing literature suggests that aspirations are formed not only from own outcomes (e.g. 
education, wealth, etc.), the production of which are already subject to risk, but also the outcomes of the 
reference groups or “networks.” This needs empirical test. On the other hand, aspirations are motivators which 
may directly affect forward-looking behavior. The other channels that aspirations are hypothesised to affect 
forward-looking behavior is through their effect on risk and time preferences. Hence, in this Chapter, we look at 
the effect of social interactions on aspirations, and of aspirations on risk and time preferences. 
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2.3. Data  
2.3.1. Sampling and measurement issues  
The data comes from a household survey carried out between January and March 2014 in Ethiopia. The survey 
builds upon an existing sample of agricultural households surveyed in 2006 and again in 20107 in Oromia region 
under an NGO project that promoted agricultural innovations and which ended in 2010. The original survey 
used a mix of purposive and random sampling procedures to select 390 households from three study sites 
(Aredo, et al. 2008). The primary sampling unit consisted of a pair of neighboring districts or woredas which had 
been chosen based on the density of cultivation of the major crop and on the presence of active farmers’ 
cooperatives. At the second stage, kebeles (sub-districts) which had active farmers’ cooperatives were selected. 
Using the number of participating households within a cooperative as a sampling frame, households were 
randomly selected. The total sample size at each research site is summarized in Table 2.1.   
Table 2.1.  Geographic distribution of the sample  
 Bakko- Siree site  Lume-Adaa site Hettosa-Tiyyo site Sample size 
District  Bakko Sibu Siree Lume Adaa Hettosa Tiyyo Total 
Sample size at baseline (2006/07) 65 65 65 65 65 65 390 
Sample size (2014) 64 63 63 64 62 63 379 
 
In the latest survey, 11 out of the total of 390 households from the baseline dropped out of the survey for 
various reasons, including death, relocation to another area and unavailability for the survey interview. Further, 
due to incomplete data, four more households were excluded from the analysis. Hence, this study is based on 
375 households. Nevertheless, when compared against the full sample, the households that dropped out of the 
analysis did not show any statistically significant baseline difference with regards to key indicators such as 
income, wealth, and landholdings. This implies that sample attrition is not systematic. Further, since the latest 
survey included individual level data (i.e. for the household head and the spouse separately), the sample size for 
individual level analysis is 675. The sample size at individual level is less than twice the number of households. 
This is because some households are single headed and in others only one of the two spouses were available for 
interview.  
2.3.1.1. Defining social networks 
Earlier studies on the social drivers of individual behavior, for example in terms of technology adoption, defined 
reference groups based on membership to a village, clan or a group defined by other social and cultural 
boundaries (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; and Isham, 2002). One of the underlying 
assumptions is that the outcomes and behavior of all individuals that form the group affects the member’s 
behavior. Yet, this may not be necessarily the case for individuals may look up and draw inspiration only from 
those who are doing better or from others who are outside the defined network. However, the advantage of, for 
example, defining the village as a reference group is that it may not only ensure the exogeneity of networks, but 
                                                          
7
 The analysis in this Chapter relies mainly on the 2014 survey for the main variables of interest (i.e. aspirations, networks, 
risk and time preferences) are missing in the preceding surveys. Yet, to ensure exogeneity, we make use of lagged values of 
some explanatory variables. 
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also capture the influence of multiple reference groups that may exist in the village. On the other hand, more 
recent studies rely on individual level links reported by the respondent either in or out of a sample (e.g. Maertens 
and Barrett, 2013; Conley and Udry, 2010). While these approaches may allow respondents to name people in 
their cognitive window, whom they closely interact with and compare themselves with, the technique may suffer 
from a truncation bias especially if respondents are allowed to name only a certain number of links while in fact 
their true networks are much wider (Maertens and Barrett, 2013).  
 
In this study we employ both approaches, taking the village (or kebele) as a reference group, as well as individual 
links reported by the respondent. For the latter, we employ a ‘random matching within sample’ technique where 
each respondent is matched with six randomly drawn individuals from the sample. Then, conditional on 
knowing the match, we construct networks by eliciting the details of the relationships between the individual and 
the match. This technique could help minimize the endogeneity of networks. This is because the matches listed 
to the respondent are exogenously determined (by the researcher). Out of the 6 people listed to the respondent, 
the number of matches known to the respondent ranged from 1 to 6 people, with the average of 4.3 people. 
Across gender, female respondents knew 4.1 people and males knew 4.5 people, on average.  
  
2.3.1.2. Measuring aspirations  
Individuals may set different goals in life, which makes aspirations multidimensional. Aspirations are also 
dynamic that they tend to change in light of new experiences, choices and information (Leavy and Smith, 2010). 
Further, since aspirations are attitudinal in nature, measurement errors could easily arise due to “anchoring, 
wording and scale dependence; respondent role playing and instability over time or over respondents’ moods” 
(Bernard and Taffesse, 2014. p.190). Against this backdrop, however, what is suggested in the literature is that 
useful information could still be collected as long as extra care is taken during the design and implementation of 
surveys.  
For this study, we employ the survey instrument developed and tested for validity and reliability by Bernard and 
Taffesse (2014). To capture aspirations in four dimensions, the survey asks individuals a series of five questions 
regarding their income, wealth, social status and children’s education. Specifically, the questions ask:  
(1) “What is the level of […] you have at present?”  
(2) “What is the level of […] that you would like to achieve?”  
(3) “What is the level of […] that you think you will reach within ten years?”  
(4) “What is the maximum level of […] that a person can have in your village?”  
(5) What is the minimum level of […] that a person can have in your village?”8  
 
                                                          
8 Wealth (or current value of assets) and income (annual income from agriculture and non-agricultural activities) were asked 
in terms of Ethiopian Birr (The official exchange rate during the time of the survey was 1 USD= 19 ETB); Children’s 
education in terms of levels/grades of education; and, social status in terms of the percentage of people in that village that 
ask for the individual’s advice on some important decisions. 
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Questions regarding own current level, village maximum and village minimum are intended to serve as a 
benchmark against which respondents would state their aspired level. The question on the expected level is 
intended to guide respondents in differentiating their aspirations from their expectations. To ensure that 
respondents understood the questions and did not state their simple wishes when we asked their aspirations9, 
special care was applied during interviews, including by probing and checking for consistency across responses. 
For example, after further clarification of the concept and definitions, respondents were allowed to change their 
responses if they thought that they had given “incorrect” responses.  
 
In addition, since each dimension of aspirations may mean different things for different people (Leavy and 
Smith, 2010), the weight or relative importance respondents place on each of the four dimensions was captured 
as explained next. First, respondents were given 20 beans and a piece of paper that pictured four squares. Each 
square is labelled with one of the four dimensions of aspirations (i.e. income, wealth, social status or children’s 
education). Then, respondents were asked to distribute all the 20 beans in the four squares according to their 
own assessment of the dimension’s significance for them. The instructions were clear. For example, it was 
explained that no bean in a square means the respondent does not attach any importance to that particular 
indicator and, many beans in a square means the respondent attaches a significant importance to it. In what 
follows, we explain how the subjective weights given by the respondents are used in the calculation of an 
aggregate aspirations index. 
 
As noted earlier, individuals aspire to achieve different things depending on their experiences and information 
set that they have. Hence, relying on any single indicator may not suffice to measure aspirations. Yet, these four 
indicators are believed to be strongly correlated to each other and to many targets a person might want to 
achieve in their life. In this context, the aggregate index is believed to capture a broad array of life targets and 
serve as a strong proxy for measuring aspirations. Consequently, we calculate an aggregate index following 
Beaman et al.(2012), Bernard and Taffesse (2014) and Kosec et al(2012). The index is constructed by first 
normalising10 each dimension (i.e. by removing the average level for individuals in the same district, and then 
dividing this difference by the standard deviation for individuals in the same district) and multiplying the result 
by the weight each individual gives to each of the four indicators. Summing across the weighted average of the 
four normalized outcomes provides an aggregate aspirations index.  
 
The calculation of the aggregate aspirations index (𝐴𝑖) can be represented as: 
𝐴𝑖 = ∑ (
𝑎𝑛
𝑖 −𝜇𝑛
𝑑
𝜎𝑛
𝑑 ) . 𝑤𝑛
𝑖4
𝑛=1                                                                                 (1) 
Where: 
                                                          
9 Simple wishes are different from aspirations for the latter entails action to achieving them 
10
As noted before, attitudinal measures such as aspirations are likely to be measured with errors, normalization would help 
to smooth out errors at individual level. Further, normalization also makes individual indicators unit free, a  prerequisite for 
aggregation 
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𝑎𝑛
𝑖  is the aspired outcome of individual 𝑖 on dimension 𝑛 (income, assets, education, or social status).   
𝜇𝑛
𝑑 is the average aspired outcome in district 𝑑 for outcome 𝑛.   
𝜎𝑛
𝑑 is the standard deviation of aspired outcomes in district 𝑑 for outcome 𝑛.  
𝑤𝑛
𝑖  is the weight individual 𝑖 places on dimension 𝑛. 
The aspirations-gap 
The aspirations-gap is the difference between the aspired outcome and current level, for each of the four 
dimensions. The multidimensional aspirations-gap index (𝐴𝐺𝑖) is calculated by dividing the aspirations-gap with 
the aspired outcome, weighted by dimension and summed over the four dimensions. This can be represented in 
the following equation: 
𝐴𝐺𝑖 = ∑ (
𝑎𝑛
𝑖 −𝑦𝑛
𝑖
𝑎𝑛
𝑖 ) . 𝑤𝑛
𝑖4
𝑛=1                                                                                 (2) 
Where: 
 𝑎𝑛
𝑖  and 𝑤𝑛
𝑖  are as defined before. 
 yn
i  is what is presently possessed by individual 𝑖 for outcome 𝑛     
 
Qualitative approach to measuring aspirations  
To supplement the quantitative measurements of aspirations discussed earlier, our survey included two simple 
and open ended questions which were used in (Ibrahim, 2011). These questions ask: (1) “What are the three 
most important things that you wished to achieve in life but couldn’t?” (2) “Why couldn’t you achieve them?”  
These questions are intended to capture the “aspired but unfulfilled capabilities” (Ibrahim, 2011). Further, as 
argued by the author, this approach not only allows the respondents to list which aspirations they had (or have), 
but it also helps explore why they have failed to achieve these aspirations. Summary results of the interviews are 
discussed in the descriptive statistics section. 
2.3.1.3. Measuring risk and time preferences 
Since Binswanger (1980), several studies have conducted experiments or used lotteries to measure individual risk 
attitudes. Following suit, we adopt the same survey instrument as Bernard et al (2014) that followed Binswanger 
(1980). Two sets of questions are used to elicit risk preferences, based on hypothetical decisions. The questions 
ask respondents to choose what they would prefer from each of the two choice sets: (a) five lottery choices with 
payouts determined by coin toss, and (b) risk choices about the selling price of a bag of maize. In both cases, 
payouts are ordered from most to least risk averse (see Table 2.8).  
Time preferences or measures of impatience are also included in the survey. On a hypothetical state, respondents 
were asked to choose between a gift of “100 ETB today or 125 ETB in one month,” then, “100 ETB today or 
150 ETB in one month.” The two offers were repeated by changing the waiting time to one month and two 
months, respectively. Now, referring to the first choice, if people are very patient, they should choose to wait for 
125 ETB in one month, and the variable takes on a value of 0. Otherwise, the variable takes on a value of 1 if 
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people are impatient. The same logic applies to the remaining choices. Discount rates are then calculated by 
summing over the four outcomes. Hence the time preference variable is increasing in impatience and ranges 
from 0 to 4. 
 
2.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
2.3.2.1. Aspirations and Aspirations-gap 
Table 2.2 presents the level of aspirations by gender of the respondent along with corresponding mean 
comparison test. In general, males reveal higher level of aspirations in all dimensions and the mean differences 
are statistically significant.  
Table 2.2. Aspirations level the respondent would like to achieve 
 
Male (N=329) Female(N=346) 
diff = Mean(Males’) 
- Mean(Females’) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Pvalue 
Income 202,325 277,956 125,833 210,791 0.0001 
Assets 495,930 731,861 240,052 458,001 0.0000 
Social status 94 15 87 20 0.0000 
Children's education 15 3 14 3 0.0048 
Note: Income and Wealth are measured in terms of Ethiopian Birr, Children’s education in terms of levels/grades of education; and, 
social status in terms of the percentage of people in that village that ask for the individual’s advice on some important decisions 
 
Table 2.3 gives the descriptive statistics of the weights respondents attach to each of the four dimensions of the 
aspirations measures. In a decreasing order, the average weight respondents give is 30% to income, 26% to 
children’s education, 24% to assets, and 20% to social status. In some cases, children’s education receives the 
maximum possible weight and the weight also exhibits the highest dispersion in the data followed by the weight 
respondents attach to income. We use these weights to calculate the aggregate aspirations index which along with 
individual indices is presented in Table 2.4. Across gender, males reveal statistically significantly higher 
aspirations than females. Descriptive statistics further suggest that aspirations increase with the increase in age, 
education, and wealth. This is also true for the individual aspiration indices in most of these socio-economic 
groups. 
Table 2.3. Mean of relative importance (or weights) respondents attach to the four dimensions of aspirations 
measures  
(Out of the total score of 20), (N=675) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Income 6.00 2.10 0 15 
Assets 4.71 1.43 0 10 
Social status 4.09 1.59 0 11 
Children’s Education 5.23 2.18 0 20 
     
 
30% 
24% 
20% 
26% 
Income
Assets
Social status
Children’s 
Education 
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Table 2.4. Average aspirations11 index and its components by socio-economic groups†  
  
Normalized aspirations (mean), unweighted 
(N=675) 
Aggregate 
aspirations 
index (Mean)  Income Asset Social status 
Children's 
Education 
Whole sample (Std. Dev. in parenthesis) .021 (0.613) 0.0003 (0.050) 0.0001 (0.050) -0.0005 (0.05) 0.0033 (0.042) 
By Sex      
Female (Std. Dev. in parenthesis) -0.147 (0.571) -0.007 (0.043) -0.010 (0.036) -0.009 (0.056) -0.003 (0.045) 
Male (Std. Dev. in parenthesis) 0.198 (0.606) 0.008 (0.056) 0.011 (0.059) 0.009 (0.041) 0.010 (0.039) 
diff = Mean(Male) - Mean(Female), (P value) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Age group      
15-35 -0.16 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.014 
36-55 0.078 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.01 
>55 0.081 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006 
Grade of education completed     
0 -0.101 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 
0-4 -0.054 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.002 
5-8 0.108 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 
>8 0.307 0.015 0.026 0.008 0.01 
Wealth quintile      
Q1 -0.222 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.005 
Q2 -0.067 -0.012 -0.006 0.004 0.004 
Q3 0.028 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.002 
Q4 0.062 0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.005 
Q5 0.274 0.018 0.019 0.008 0.009 
†Descriptive statistics on aspirations by ethnicity and religion is not included because of the limited variation in the data. This is because 
the study households were drawn from only one region and hence about 81 percent of them belong to one ethnic group, Oromo, while 
the remaining belong to three other ethnic groups. Similarly, Christians made up about 95 percent of the respondents while the remaining 
were Muslims.    
Having narrow or too-large aspirations-gap may lead to aspirations failure (Ray, 2006). Descriptive statistics on 
the aspirations-gap index is presented in Table 2.5. The data shows that males have a higher aspirations-gap in 
the aggregate index and in all individual dimensions except for the aspirations-gap on social status. Mean 
differences between males and females are statistically significant in all the aspirations-gap indices except for the 
aspirations-gap on income. 
Table 2.5. Aspirations-gap index  
(N=675, Mean=1.142 and Std. dev. = 1.553) 
 
Male Female 
diff = mean(Males’) - 
mean(Females’) 
 
Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev P-value 
Asp gap index 1.358 1.784 0.937 1.264 0.0004 
Asp gap on income  0.171 0.087 0.163 0.084 0.2305 
Asp gap on assets  1.253 3.992 0.645 1.863 0.0108 
Asp gap on status  0.061 0.051 0.073 0.049 0.0015 
Asp gap on education  0.126 0.097 0.111 0.080 0.0284 
 
Recall that aspirations window shapes aspirations and this window enlarges with the finding of new information and 
experience. This may happen, for example, when individuals are exposed to media and information, and 
experienced some travel and living outside residence. According to Table 2.6, on average, males have statistically 
                                                          
11
 Negative sign indicates that the average outcome of a certain group for a specific indicator is below the average outcome 
of that indicator for the total sample in the same district 
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significantly larger exposure to media and information, and have more travel and living experience outside 
residence12. 
 
Table 2.6. The aspirations window: average exposure to media and average mobility indices  
(Mean, N=675) 
 Full sample Mean by gender t-test: mean(male)- 
mean(female) 
(P-value)  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Male Female 
Exposure to media index 11.74 2.78 3 15 12.57 10.94 0.0000 
Mobility index 11.65 1.87 5 17 11.98 11.33 0.0000 
 
Lastly on aspirations, Table 2.7 presents summary statistics from the qualitative interviews regarding unfulfilled 
aspirations and the corresponding reasons. These summary results vindicate at least three of the four indicators 
proposed by Bernard and Taffesse (2014) and employed in this study. For example, the top three (about 87% of 
the responses) unfulfilled aspirations respondents listed are associated with wealth and education, and the major 
one reason (about 61%) for the unfulfilled aspirations is lack of money or income. Other important major 
reasons for unfulfilled aspirations include the absence of institutions nearby (including schools, hospitals) and 
limited access to utilities (See Table 2.7 for details). 
 
Table 2.7. Unfulfilled aspirations and major reasons behind 
 Q.1. What are the three most important things that you wished to achieve in life but couldn’t? Share  
1 Expand productive asset holdings (including livestock, agricultural tools and machinery, access to more farm land) 30% 
2 Improve living standard, own more consumer durables (such as non-productive assets such as modern housing, furniture, television, 
cell phone….transport vehicle) 
39% 
3 Start or expand own business, engage in other non-farm income generating activities (such as kiosk, trading, restaurant business…) 5% 
4 Improve own level of education or that of children or other family members 17% 
5 Move to towns, migrate to foreign countries for better opportunities 1% 
6 Use modern care to maintain own health or that of other household members,  1% 
7 Use more farm inputs such as fertilizer, chemicals, improved seed; increase yield; use irrigation, 4% 
8 Keep savings at the bank 1% 
9 Others (throwing a party when a child marries, becoming an athlete, maintain marriage, obtain a civil service position, hire labor) 2% 
 Q.2. Why couldn’t you achieve them?  
1 Lack of money, high cost of living, 61% 
2 Lack of education, lack of knowledge, lack of interest 6% 
3 Lack of institutions nearby such as schools, hospitals,  14% 
4 Illness or death of family member, lack of medical treatment, death of cattle 4% 
5 Poor governance, lack of support, lack of access to utilities (such as clean water, electricity,...) 7% 
6 Lack of time, load of family responsibilities  2% 
7 Lack of access to resources such as land, credit facility, fear of incurring loss 4% 
8 Adverse change in climatic conditions  1% 
9 Others (will of God, marriage at early age, lack of labor, lack of market) 2% 
 
                                                          
12 Average exposure to media is calculated by summing over the responses for three questions that ask: “How often do you 
listen to the radio?”, “How often do you watch television?”, “How often do you use a mobile/cell phone?” Responses were 
coded as follows: 5=every day, 4=At least once a week, 3=At least once a month, 2=At least once a year, 1= Never. 
Similarly, average mobility or travel and living experience outside residence is calculated based on responses for five 
questions that ask: “How often do you go to nearest town?”,  “How often do you travel outside the kebele within the 
woreda?”, “How often do you travel outside the woreda?” Responses were coded similar to exposure to media. Yet, the two 
more questions include: “Have you ever lived for more than 6 months outside this kebele?” and “Have you ever lived for 
more than 6 months outside this woreda?” Responses were coded as 1=Yes, 0 otherwise.  
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2.3.2.2. Risk and time preferences 
Based on the respondents’ stated preferences, Table 2.8 shows the share of people that belong to each risk 
aversion class, listed in a decreasing order of risk aversion. Based on the lottery measure, the distribution of risk 
aversion in the sample seems to follow a u-shaped graph that depicts an almost equal share of the people at the 
two extreme ends of risk aversion class. In contrast, the market based risk measure reveals a higher share of the 
people in the extreme risk aversion class and the share of people continuously decline with the decrease in risk 
aversion (or a preference for risk loving). Disaggregating the distribution of risk aversion by gender closely 
follow the overall trend which is u-shaped with the lottery based measure and continuous decline for the market 
based measure (Figure 2.1). In both measures, however, the share of women in the extremely risk averse class are 
much greater than the share of women in the least risk averse class while the opposite is true for men.  
 
Table 2.8. Risk preferences based on lottery choices and selling price of a bag of maize  
(in Ethiopian Birr, hypothetical payouts) (N=675) 
a. Lottery choices (N=675)  b. Selling price of maize (N=675) 
Lotter
y 
Head 
(ETB) 
Tails 
(ETB) 
Expecte
d value 
Choice 
in %  
Risk aversion class 
Market 
Price 1 
(ETB) 
Price 2 
(ETB) 
Expecte
d value 
Choice in 
%  
1 2.5 2.5 2.5 27 Extreme 1 250 250 250 30 
2 2 4 3 15 Intermediate 2 200 400 300 22 
3 1.5 5 3.25 15 Moderate 3 150 550 350 16 
4 1 7 4 15 Slight-to-neutral 4 100 700 400 17 
5 0 10 5 28 Neutral-to-preferred 5 0 1000 500 15 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The share of population in Each Risk Aversion Class by sex, (%) 
a. Lottery b. Market price 
  
 
 
The descriptive statistics on time preferences are presented in (Table 2.9). Individuals are listed according to 
their discount factor that goes from extremely patient to extremely impatient. We find that the share of people 
who are extremely impatient is 44 percent while those extremely patient constitute 32% followed by the middle 
that constitutes about 15%. The shares of people across different levels of discount factors do not change 
significantly when the data is further disaggregated by gender or by the aspirations profile.   
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
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Intermediate
Moderate
Slight-to-neutral
Neutral-to-preferred
Female Male
0 10 20 30 40
Extreme
Intermediate
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Slight-to-neutral
Neutral-to-preferred
Female Male
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Table 2.9. The share of population by discount rate and aspirations, (%)   
Discount factor 
Full 
sample 
Female 
(N=327) 
Male 
(N=346) 
Low 
Asp 
High 
Asp 
0 (very patient) 32 32 31 32 31 
1 6 4 8 9 4 
2 15 15 15 16 14 
3 4 2 5 4 3 
4 (very impatient) 44 47 41 40 48 
 
2.3.2.3. Aspirations and risk and time preferences 
The aggregate aspirations index could be used to classify people into low-aspirations and high- aspirations group 
by comparison to the corresponding district average. Accordingly, results suggest that about 46% of respondents 
reveal aspirations lower than the district average. In terms of gender, about 29% of males and 64% of females 
reveal low aspirations. Based on this definition of aspirations profile, we cross tabulate aspirations with risk 
aversion, and aspirations with discount rate. According to Figure 2.2a, there is a negative relationship between 
aspirations and risk aversion and this relationship is more prominent particularly at the two extreme ends of the 
risk aversion class, when lottery based risk measure is used. The direction of the relationship also holds for the 
first four risk aversion class when market based measure of risk aversion is used (Figure 2.2b). These descriptive 
statistics provide preliminary evidence on a positive relationship between higher aspirations and less risk aversion 
behavior. In contrast, we do not find a clear trend on the relationship between aspirations and time discounting 
(see Figure 2.3). For example, from those people who revealed to be extremely impatient, the share of people 
with high aspirations is larger than those with low aspirations. In contrast, the opposite is true for the remaining 
impatience categories. 
 
Figure 2.2. The share of population in each risk aversion class by aspirations (%), (N=675) 
a. Lottery b. Market price 
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Figure 2.3. The share of people by discount rate and aspirations status    
   
 
2.3.2.4. Other descriptive statistics  
Table 2.10 presents the general overview of sample households on their socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. The data suggest that nearly half of the respondents were males. The average age and schooling 
attainment of respondents was about 47 years and 3.75 years, respectively. The average family size was about 7 
people with a 0.37 dependency ratio. The total value of asset holdings has grown between 2006 and 2014 but the 
agricultural land holdings has decreased during the same period, on average. Further, during the 12 months prior 
to the survey, about 9 percent of the households, on average, had experienced negative shocks related to 
weather, price, or illness of family members or livestock. Households are located at a radius of around 20 
minutes’ walk to the nearest asphalt road or to the farmers’ training center. Other service centers such as the 
output market, the cooperative office, the nearest input dealer, the district town and the nearest micro finance 
institution are all located in the range of, on average, 33 to 90 minutes of walk one way trip. 
 
 
Table 2.10. Descriptive statistics on demographics and household endowments  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male (dummy) 674 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age (years) 674 46.27 13.15 20 88 
Education (level/grade) 674 3.75 3.90 0 16 
Household size 375 6.76 2.36 1 16 
Dependency ratio 375 0.39 0.21 0 1 
Land size in ha (2006) 373 2.87 1.77 0.02 13.06 
Value of assets (2006) in ETB 375 11681 11858 21 160809 
Land size in ha (2014) 373 2.18 1.43 0 8.25 
Value of assets (2014) in ETB at 2006 prices 375 19651 20999 69 209660 
Too much rain or flood (dummy) 375 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Livestock diseases (dummy) 375 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Large increases in input prices (dummy) 375 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Death or loss of livestock (dummy) 375 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Illness of head/spouse (dummy) 375 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Illness of other family member (dummy) 375 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Average distance (in minutes) to:      
Market 375 64.42 47.81 1 270 
Cooperative office 375 33.44 31.91 1 240 
Input dealer 375 72.10 51.44 2 270 
Farmer training center 375 22.55 23.01 1 250 
Asphalt road 375 18.79 18.46 0 120 
Micro finance institution 375 89.95 48.63 5 300 
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2.4. Empirical strategy  
This section outlines the estimation strategies used to address the two research questions. First, we examine the 
social interactions effect on aspirations. The basic regression model is specified as follows:    
 
Aij = βy−ij + xijλ + δj + εij    (3) 
 
Where  𝐴𝑖𝑗 denotes the aspirations outcome for individual 𝑖 whose reference group is 𝑗; 𝑦−𝑖𝑗 denotes the 
average outcome of 𝑖’s reference group 𝑗; 𝑥𝑖𝑗 denotes a vector of 𝑖’s observable characteristics; 𝛿𝑗 denotes the 
location fixed effects and controls for unobservables common to all at the village and/or district level; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is 
a time-variant unobserved component of individual 𝑖. We estimate various versions of this model. According to 
the theory, an individual’s aspiration to dimension 𝑛 is determined by the current average outcome of the 
reference group in that dimension, given other factors. For example, if 𝐴𝑖𝑗 represents person 𝑖’s aspirations to 
income, then 𝑦−𝑖𝑗 denotes the current average income of the reference group 𝑗. The basic equation can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑛 = βy−ij
𝑛
+ xijλ + δj + εij    (4) 
 
The basic assumption behind this specification is that the outcomes of all individuals that form the reference 
group are relevant to drive the aspirations of any given individual, regardless of their relative status compared to 
the individual. But this may not be necessarily the case for individuals may draw their aspirations rather from 
those who are richer or those who are doing better, which is referred to as upward looking aspirations (Genicot and 
Ray, 2014). Hence, we re-specify the model considering the average outcome of only those in the reference 
group who are doing better. The equation takes the following form: 
 
𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑛 = βy−ij
𝑛(𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑖)
+ xijλ + δj + εij   (5) 
 
We estimate both equations 4 and 5 based on different definitions of the “reference group” as well as various 
measures of aspirations. Reference groups may include individual level social networks, or more broadly all 
people who live in the same village (see more details in the results section). Yet, recall that, as discussed in the 
literature review, one’s aspirations are determined by own outcome in the past as well as present, the average 
outcomes of the reference group, access to information and the overall institutional environment. We control for 
these factors in the regressions. To tackle concerns related to reverse causality, we mainly use lagged values of 
those explanatory variables which are suspect, for past outcomes affect present level aspirations but not the 
other way round. Further, since the respondent and individuals in the reference group may have similar 
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characteristics, the residuals are likely to be correlated. Thus, we cluster the standard errors at the household and 
village level (i.e. two-way clustering) (Cameron et al., 2011; Petersen, 2009). 
 
Further, when 𝑦−𝑖𝑗 is defined as the aggregate aspirations index of the reference group, it presents more 
identification challenges for the same variable enters the model as a regressor and a regressand. The basic 
equation takes the following form: 
Aij = βA−ij + xijλ + δj + εij    (6) 
 
This specification may suffer from simultaneity bias or a reflection problem (Manski, 1993) for the behavior of the 
individual also affects the mean behavior of their reference group. According to Manski, (1993), a reflection problem 
arises wherein the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with: the mean behavior of the group 
(peer effects); the exogenous characteristics of the group (contextual effects); and, correlated effects wherein individuals in 
the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face similar 
institutional environments. The characteristics of the reference group which are exogenous to the individual 
could include their income, wealth and other outcomes excluding their aspirations. However, these 
characteristics of the reference group are essentially the ones from which the individual draws their aspirations. 
Thus, the effect of these factors could be measured jointly with the behavior of the group (i.e through  β). The 
correlated effects could be picked up by the location dummies (i.e. through δ).  
 
As a solution to the reflection problem, Manski (2000) suggests several strategies along with corresponding 
conditions. These include:  
(1) to use lagged values of the group behavior (i.e. 𝐴−𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) instead of contemporaneous value (𝐴−𝑖𝑗). 
However, this cannot be applicable for this study since this study is based on cross-sectional 
observations on  𝐴.  
(2) to assume that “individual behavior varies in a specified nonlinear manner with group mean 
behavior.” But according to Manski (2000), this requires prior knowledge of the correct non-linear 
function.  
(3) to use “some feature of the group behavior other than the mean, such as the median.” Yet, this too 
requires prior knowledge of the “relevant feature of group behavior”, (Manski, 2000)  
(4) to use instrumental variables (IVs).  
 
We employ the fourth option, using instrumental variables estimation technique. Hence, we estimate the reduced 
form of equation (6):  
 
 Aij = β𝔸−ij + xijλ + δj + υi     (7) 
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Where 𝔸−ij denotes the predicted value of 𝐴−𝑖𝑗. We provide relevant discussion regarding the validity of the IVs 
in the results section. Next we outline the methods we use to examine the second research question - the impact 
of the aspirations-gap (AG) on risk and time preferences. 
 
To examine the effect of the aspirations-gap on risk preferences, we specify the following empirical model:  
 
Ri = α1(AGi) + α2(AG𝑖
2) + wiθ + δj + ζi   (8) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the risk preferences of individual 𝑖, AGi denotes the individual’s aspirations-gap index, wi 
denotes all exogenous explanatory variables and 𝛿𝑗 denotes location fixed effects and ζi denotes the random 
error. According to Ray (2006), the aspirations-gap affects forward-looking behavior nonlinearly i.e. narrow and 
very large aspirations-gaps are detrimental while a moderate aspirations-gap is conducive. Thus, to capture this 
non-linearity, we include the square term of the aspirations-gap index (AG𝑖
2). This non-linear effect could also be 
examined using alternative specifications. For example, individuals could be grouped into three categories13 
depending on their aspirations-gap. These groups include narrow AG, moderate AG and very-large AG. Hence, 
by leaving out the moderate AG as a reference category, we control for two dummies that represent narrow-AG 
and wide-AG. Accordingly, the model takes the following specification: 
 
Ri = α1(NARROW AG)i + α2(WIDE AG)i +wiθ + δj + ζi  (9) 
 
By the same token, the AG effect on time preferences (TPi) could be examined using equations (8) and (9) after 
including the indicator of risk preferences (Ri) and the interaction term between risk and AG in wi as 
explanatory variables. Thus,  
  
TPi = ϕ1(AGi) + ϕ2(AG𝑖
2) + ziψ+ δj + ξi   (8’) 
TPi = ϕ1(NARROW AG)i + ϕ2(WIDE AG)i + ziψ+ δj + ξi  (9’) 
 
Where zi denotes the remaining explanatory variables including risk preferences and ξi denotes the random error 
term. Since the aspirations, risk and time preferences are all perception indicators, it is difficult to find IVs that 
could affect one but not the other. Hence, to check the robustness of the findings, we use quasi-experimental 
methods which we discuss later in the results section. 
 
                                                          
13
 To classify individuals in three groups according to their levels of aspirations-gap index (or AGi) (i.e. narrow, moderate or very-large), 
we employ the formula used in (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) in their categorization of individuals into three relative poverty status as poor, 
moderate and rich. Accordingly, the level of aspirations-gap of an individual is considered to be: Narrow (if AGi is < 75% of sample 
average); Moderate (if AGi is between 75% and 125% of sample average); Very-large (if AGi is > 125% of sample average). Alternatively, 
one could use terciles of AGi that divide individuals into equal groups and define the first and last tercile as having narrow and very large 
AG.  
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2.5. Results and discussion 
2.5.1. The effect of social interactions on aspirations 
We examine the social interactions effect on aspirations in two parts. First, we define the aspirations window (or the 
reference group) as social networks which we construct using “random matching within sample” technique. 
Individuals who belong to a network interact with their counterparts, for instance by sharing information and 
advice, or supporting each other when needed. These interactions may help shape individual behavior. In this 
context we examine the social interactions effect on aspirations from a “very close cognitive window” or in what 
Genicot and Ray (2014) referred to as “local aspirations with population neighborhoods” (p.6). In reality, 
however, individual networks are much broader and the literature also suggests the existence of multiple 
reference groups. Since it may not be possible to know all relevant reference groups for each individual, treating 
residents of a certain geographic location as a reference group could help capture more than one reference 
group. Hence, in our second approach, we define village as a reference group even though individuals who 
belong to the same village may not necessarily know each other or may not have close relationships. Yet, lack of 
acquaintance or individual relationships amongst each villager does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of some 
from their cognitive windows. This is because, individuals could still compare their status even from the distance 
by observing tangible wealth indicators such as livestock holdings, housing structure, etc - which all would help 
shape one’s aspirations. 
 
2.5.1.1. Social networks as a reference group 
We begin by looking at the social interactions effect on aspirations using individual dimensions (i.e. income, 
wealth, social status and children’s education). Results in Table 2.11, columns 1 to 8, show that, after controlling 
for own socio-economic characteristics, experience of various shocks and the location fixed effects, there does 
not seem to be a statistically significant relationship between one’s aspirations and the average present outcome 
of the reference group in any of the four individual components. The basic assumption behind this specification 
(equation 4) is that the present outcomes of all individuals that form the reference group are relevant to drive 
one’s aspirations, regardless of their relative status compared to the individual. Yet, this may not be necessarily 
the case for individuals may draw their aspirations rather from those who are richer or who are doing better, 
which is referred to as “upward looking aspirations” (Genicot and Ray, 2014, p.6). Hence, we re-estimate the 
model (equation 5) considering the average outcomes of only those in the reference group who are doing better. 
As Table 2.12, columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 suggest, in deed there is a statistically significant relationship between a 
person’s aspirations (in all dimensions) and the corresponding average outcomes of the reference group. Yet, 
when self-reported present outcomes (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) are controlled for, some of the coefficients that 
proxy for the social interactions effect lose their statistical significance or in some cases become negative. This 
lack of robustness may come about for many reasons including measurement error the effect of which could be 
minimized through standardisation of the individual dimensions and hence by using the aggregate aspirations 
index.  
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Table 2.11. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations 
(Using the average outcome of all in the reference group) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
Peers' Ave. income(ln) 0.00 -0.02 
     
             
 
(0.07) (0.04) 
     
             
Peers' Ave. V.assets (ln) 
  
-0.01 -0.05 
   
             
   
(0.06) (0.04) 
   
             
Peers' Ave. S.status (ln) 
    
0.15 0.10 
 
             
     
(0.11) (0.08) 
 
             
Peers' Ave. ch.education  
      
0.02 0.00    
       
(0.05) (0.04)    
Network size 0.09*** 0.03* 0.03 0.01 0.02*** 0.01** 0.10* 0.12**  
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06)    
Other ‘internal’ factors  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 635 633 635 633 635 633 635 633    
R-squared 0.213 0.579 0.263 0.586 0.092 0.393 0.13 0.262 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 1 .   
 
Table 2.12. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations 
(Using the average outcome of those who are richer than the respondent) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
         Ave. of Peers' above Ave. income(ln) 0.606*** 0.082** 
     
             
 
(0.048) (0.035) 
     
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. V.assets (ln) 
 
0.493*** 0.000 
   
             
   
(0.085) (0.075) 
   
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. S.status (ln) 
   
0.586*** -0.033 
 
             
     
(0.154) (0.112) 
 
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. ch.education  
     
0.266*** -0.198**  
       
(0.077) (0.078)    
Network size 0.047 0.008 0.033 0.019 0.018*** 0.013* 0.190 0.135    
 
(0.029) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.120) (0.102)    
Other ‘internal’ factors No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 510 508 481 481 476 474 456 455    
R-squared 0.309 0.496 0.303 0.518 0.177 0.380 0.166 0.297 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 2. 
 
Hence, we regress the aggregate aspirations index on the average aspirations index of the reference group and 
other controls (equation 6). As before, results in Table 2.13, columns 1 to 3, suggest there is no evidence of a 
statistically significant social interactions effect when the group average outcome is calculated by including all 
individuals in a network regardless of their relative position to the individual. However, when we consider only 
those who have higher aspirations index than the individual, we find a positive and statistically significant social 
interactions effect on aspirations (columns 4 to 6). Results are robust to different specifications and this perhaps 
suggests that using the aggregate aspirations index may better proxy for one’s overall aspirations than using 
individual dimensions of aspirations. This may also reflect the secondary effect of social interactions on 
aspirations besides those derived from the pure observation of peers’ outcomes. Nonetheless, these results could 
still suffer from reflection problem (Manski, 1993) for the behavior of the individual could also affect the mean 
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behavior of the reference group or network that the individual belongs to. The analysis that solves for a 
reflection problem and the discussion of other results including by gender group are deferred to the next section.  
 
Further, notice that the coefficient that indicates network size (or size of the reference group) is positive and 
statistically significant in most of the specifications (see Table 2.11, Table 2.12, and Table 2.13). This perhaps 
underlines the importance of having a wider reference group for stronger social interactions effect. This will be 
checked in the next section that examines the effect of social interactions on aspirations by taking village as a 
reference group.      
 
Table 2.13. The effect of social interactions on aspirations: social networks as reference group 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
Asp. Av. Asp. Av. Asp. Av. Asp. ab. Av. Asp. ab. Av. Asp. ab. Av. 
Peers' Ave. Asp.index -0.030 -0.025 -0.047 
  
             
 
(0.090) (0.083) (0.075) 
  
             
Av. of Peers' above av.Aspindex 
   
0.436*** 0.425*** 0.370*** 
    
(0.058) (0.054) (0.043)    
Network size 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.027* 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)    
Other ‘internal’ factors No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Own present outcomes No No  Yes No No  Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 635 633 633 519 518 518    
R-squared 0.196 0.238 0.328 0.418 0.431 0.492 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 3.  
 
 
2.5.1.2. Village as a reference group 
Following the same procedure as in the preceding section, we regress each individual component of aspirations 
on the corresponding village level (average) outcome and other controls. As columns 1 to 8 in Table 2.14 show, 
we find a positive and statistically significant social interactions effect in all but the aspirations to education. 
These results seem to confirm what has been implied toward the end of the previous section - that having a 
wider reference group could provide stronger social interactions effect. In order to check for evidence of upward 
looking aspirations, we re-estimate the model considering the average outcomes of only those who are doing 
better than the village average as a reference group. As results in Table 2.15 (columns 1 to 8) show, the 
magnitude of the coefficients that indicate the effect of social interactions has increased in all four dimensions of 
aspirations. In contrast, we find a negative but not statistically significant social interactions effect on aspirations 
to education. While this evidence of negative social interactions effect on aspirations to education may well be 
interpreted in terms of frustration (or envy) when the gap between the aspired and current level of children’s 
education is very large, it may also be associated with other factors such as measurement error. Further, since 
these individual components of aspirations may mean differently across people, the aggregate aspirations index 
may be preferred for better inference since it accounts for the weight each individual attaches to each of the four 
indicators.  
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Hence, we re-estimate the model (equation 6) using the aggregate aspirations index on the village level aggregate 
aspirations index and other controls. Surprisingly, as Table 2.16 (columns 1 to 3) show, there seems to be no 
statistically significant social interactions effect of aspirations. Yet, when we consider only those people with 
aspirations index greater than the village average as a reference group, we find a positive and statistically 
significant social interactions effect, showing evidence of upward looking aspirations (columns 4 to 6). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out before, this specification may still suffer from reflection problem for the same indicator 
enters regressions both as a dependent and explanatory variable. Hence, to correct for the potential endogeneity 
bias that might arise due to this simultaneity, we re-estimate the model (equation 7) using two-stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS) (or instrumental variables estimation) technique. Yet, finding instruments which are related to 
the endogenous variable, i.e. the average level of aspirations of other people in the village, but which are 
exogenous to the individual’s aspirations level is not easy. After extensive search in the data, we find three 
instrumental variables which pass the statistical tests for a valid instrument (i.e. relevance and exogeneity)14. 
Apart from satisfying the requirements of statistical tests, however, instruments should also be theoretically 
plausible. The three instruments we use are two indicators of subjective well-being measured in the past (i.e. 
during 2006 survey) and an index of the father’s level of involvement in the past in different institutions. Next 
we discuss how these instruments were measured and also their theoretical relevance in some detail.  
 
Table 2.14. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations 
(Using average outcome of all in the reference group) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
         Vill. ave. income(ln) 0.000*** 0.000** 
     
            
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
     
             
Present income(ln) 
 
0.890*** 
     
             
  
(0.04) 
     
             
Vill. ave. v.assets(ln) 
  
0.000** 0.000* 
   
             
   
(0.00) (0.00) 
   
             
Present v.assets(ln) 
   
0.724*** 
   
             
    
(0.05) 
   
             
Vill. ave. s.status(ln) 
    
0.010*** 0.007*** 
 
             
     
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
             
Present s.status(ln) 
     
0.355*** 
 
             
      
(0.08) 
 
             
Vill. ave. ch.education 
      
0.131 0.130    
       
(0.15) (0.16)    
Present ch.education 
       
0.329*** 
        
(0.07)    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         R-squared 0.222 0.592 0.285 0.604 0.081 0.390 0.121 0.248 
Observations 665 663 665 663 665 663 665 663    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Several tests were conducted. The Stock and Yogo (2005) test of weak instruments was used for various specifications. The null 
hypothesis of weak instrument was rejected using either a minimum value of 10 as a rule of thumb for F statistic, or the minimum 
eigenvalue statistic to tolerate distortion for a 5% Wald test based on the 2SLS and LIML estimators. Instruments also satisfy Hansen’s 
test of over identification. See Appendix Table A2. 14 for various tests of instrument validity, including relevance and falsification test. 
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Table 2.15. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations 
(Using average outcome of those who are richer than the village average) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
Mean outcome above village average 
        
Income(ln) 0.566*** 0.204** 
     
             
 
(0.09) (0.08) 
     
             
Present income(ln) 
 
0.887*** 
     
             
  
(0.04) 
     
             
V.assets(ln) 
  
0.338*** 0.145* 
   
             
   
(0.09) (0.08) 
   
             
Present v.assets(ln) 
   
0.721*** 
   
             
    
(0.05) 
   
             
S.status(ln) 
    
0.502** 0.075 
 
             
     
(0.25) (0.20) 
 
             
Present s.status(ln) 
     
0.356*** 
 
             
      
(0.09) 
 
             
Ch.education 
      
-2.991 -5.946    
       
(4.07) (4.92)    
Present ch.education 
       
0.339*** 
        
(0.08)    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 665 663 665 663 665 663 665 663    
R-squared 0.231 0.593 0.290 0.604 0.079 0.386 0.122 0.252    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.16. The effect of social interactions on aspirations 
(Based on average outcome of all in the reference group as well as those with more than village average) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
AvAsp1 AvAsp2 AvAsp3 AbovAv1 AbovAv2 AbovAv3 
Vill. ave. Asp. Index 0.32 0.24 0.08 
  
             
 
(0.29) (0.33) (0.30) 
  
             
Mean Aspindex Above village av 
   
0.54*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 
    
(0.10) (0.14) (0.13)    
Present income(ln) 
  
0.24*** 
  
0.23*** 
   
(0.02) 
  
(0.02)    
Present v.assets(ln) 
  
0.04 
  
0.04    
   
(0.03) 
  
(0.03)    
Present s.status(ln) 
  
0.20*** 
  
0.19*** 
   
(0.04) 
  
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
  
0.02*** 
  
0.02*** 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.01)    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 665 663 663 665 663 663    
R-squared 0.193 0.236 0.331 0.208 0.247 0.340    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 6.  
 
 
The two subjective well-being indicators were measured as follows. Fist, respondents were asked: “How does 
your household’s welfare compare with that of other households in the village?” The choices were “1=better 
than others”, “2=worse than others”, “3=not different from others.” We recode the values for “Not different 
from others” from “3” to “0” so that it could serve as a reference for individuals in that position may not be 
motivated to aspire for lack of a reference group with higher achievements.  We recode the values for “worse 
than others” from “2” to “-1” so that it would have a distinct effect from those who think they are “better than 
others.” The resulting values are -1, 0 and 1. The second subjective well-being indicator asks, “On a ten scale life 
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ladder where 0 represents the worst possible life and 9 represents the best possible life, where on the ladder do 
you feel you personally stand at present?” Responses were coded from 0 to 9. Now, since an individual may 
aspire for a better outcome or may fail to do so depending on their own perception about their well-being in 
comparison to others, subjective well-being contributes to aspirations formation. Hence, it is relevant. But again, 
since subjective well-being is a perception which is internal to the individual, it is unlikely to be known by other 
people and hence this cannot directly influence the aspirations of other people. In this case, subjective well-being 
can be considered exogenous not to mention that it was measured sometime in the past.  
 
The second identifying variable is the father’s role in the past in five different groups or institutions such as 
religious group, village committee, parental committee at school, iddir (funeral societies), iqqub (savings group), 
and cooperative. The question asks the level of the father’s involvement in terms of being “not a member”, 
“inactive member”, “active member” and “official leader” which were given values from 1 to 4, respectively. 
Summation of the values from the five groups gives an index, a summary measure of a father’s involvement in 
institutions. The level of involvement (e.g. membership or leadership position) in different institutions, 
particularly in the rural setting of a developing country, determines the level of exposure one may have to various 
pieces of information, ideas and opportunities which all would help shape one’s forward-looking behavior. Since 
parental behavior very much affects children’s behavior, we argue that the identifying variable is relevant and also 
satisfies the exogeneity assumption. Of course one may think of a scenario where the exogeneity assumption may 
collapse given that aspirations are socially determined. Nonetheless, we argue that the social effect of parental 
involvement in institutions on aspirations is theoretically weak due to decay, for the study subjects are adults 
whose average age is 46 years. With this in mind, next we discuss results from the 2SLS estimations.  
 
Results in Table 2.17 show that there is a positive and statistically significant social interactions effect on 
aspirations and this finding is robust to different specifications (columns 1 to 6). According to the results a 
standard deviation increase in the average aspirations index in the village15 is associated with a (0.59 × 0.078) = 
0.046 to (0.98 × 0.078) = 0.076 point increase in the individual’s aspirations index. This is a (0.046/0.613) = 
0.075 to (0.076/0.613) = 0.124 standard deviations increase in aspirations. Notice that the magnitude of the 
social interactions coefficient increases when we include more controls such as indicators of shocks experienced 
in the past that negatively affected the individual, and when we control for indicators of other internal factors 
such as internal locus of control, trust in others, risk and time preferences. This perhaps suggests that the effect 
of social interactions on aspirations is larger for people with strong personality traits. Further, the magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates is very much relevant for policy as it shows the power of social interactions in raising 
aspirations. In what follows, we provide a brief discussion regarding other factors that determine aspirations. In 
the interest of space, we restrict the discussion of results to the full sample and from the IV estimations 
technique. 
 
                                                          
15 The mean and standard deviation of the aspirations index of the individual are (0.021 and 0.613) and that of others’ in the village are 
(0.021 and 0.078).  
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Table 2.17. The effect of social interactions on aspirations 
(Using the average outcome of all in the reference group (IV estimates)) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6    
Vill. ave. Asp. Index 0.70* 0.76* 0.79** 0.98*** 0.81** 0.59*   
 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34)    
Male 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.11*   
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
Education level 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
HH size 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.07*   
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
V.of assets_2006 (ln) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.02    
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.03 0.04* 0.04* 0.04** 0.05**  
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Illness of other family 
  
-0.13*** -0.10** -0.10** -0.09**  
   
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)    
Locus of control 
   
0.18*** 0.16*** 0.11*   
    
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
Trust index 
   
0.03** 0.04*** 0.03*   
    
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    
Real PC expenditure2014(ln) 
    
0.14***              
     
(0.03)              
Present income(ln) 
     
0.22*** 
      
(0.02)    
Present s.status(ln) 
     
0.20*** 
      
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
     
0.02**  
      
(0.01)    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 649 649 649 647 647 647    
r2 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.32    
Standard errors (clustered at village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 7. 
 
According to Table 2.17, gender of the respondent is statistically significantly associated with high aspirations 
implying that being male is associated with aspirations that are about (0.11/0.613) = 0.18 to (0.23/0.613) = 0.38 
standard deviations higher than those of women (columns 1 to 6). Perhaps this is because existing customs and 
traditions could be more supportive of males to explore different opportunities including during childhood such 
as attending school, make travels to bigger cities, engage in more interactions outside the household, etc. The 
cumulative effect of all these would help broaden their aspirations window and hence their aspirations. We also find 
that a standard deviation increase in the level of education would lead to an increase in the aspirations index by 
(0.02 × 3.96) = 0.078 to (0.04 × 3.96) = 0.158 points (columns 1 to 6). This is about (0.078/0.613) = 0.13 to 
(0.158/0.613)= 0.26 standard deviations increase in aspirations. The magnitude of the effect is large given that 
the average aspirations index in the sample is 0.021. The reason could be that having some level of education 
may help in seeking out for new pieces of information and utilizing them, and increasing one’s analytical skills 
and ultimately their aspirations. In fact, since the average level of education in the study households is 3.75 years, 
this identified effect of having some more years of education on aspirations is in line with the wider evidence on 
the importance of primary education for various outcomes in developing countries (e.g. Banerjee and Dufluo, 
2011), and more specifically in Ethiopia on - farm productivity (e.g. Weir, 1999) and fertilizer adoption (Asfaw 
and Admassie, 2004).  
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Household size is also positively and statistically significantly associated with an increased aspirations index. This 
could be because, having larger family size may avail more labor power, a critical input to do farming which is a 
labor intensive sector and the main stay of the study households. In addition, having larger family size could also 
help diversify household livelihood strategies for adult family members could engage in other income generating 
activities which in turn would have a direct benefit in terms of increased aspirations. In fact, this argument is 
already supported by the fact that the dependency ratio in the household is negatively associated with aspirations. 
Further, we also find wealth status in the past to be statistically significantly associated with the aspirations index, 
which is again in line with expectations. This is because, as discussed in the theoretical literature (e.g. Ray, 2006, 
Appadurai, 2004; and Dalton et al, 2014), poverty imposes external constraints (e.g. lack of access to information 
or credit to acquire skills, etc) reducing the productivity of the poor and hence their “navigational capacity to 
aspire.” Further, this could illustrate how poverty impedes cognitive functions, as empirical evidence by Mani et 
al (Mani et al., 2013) show, and this may limit their aspirations. While it is possible that aspirations might lead to 
higher wealth (reverse causation), it is important to note that wealth measured in the past is considered (Table 
2.17, columns 1 to 4), which cannot be affected by present level aspirations. Yet, when we control for perceived 
level of present outcomes such as income, wealth, social status and children’s education (Table 2.17, columns 5 
and 6), the social interactions effect remains positive and statistically significant, confirming the robustness of 
findings. As a side note, a later chapter examines the effect of aspirations on current level outcomes such as 
income, food security and subjective well-being.  
 
As pointed out in the literature, aspirations are formed and developed in response to different environments and 
circumstances. In this context, out of the six types of shocks experienced16 and that we control for, we only find 
that illness of family members to be negatively and statistically significantly associated with the aspirations index. 
Perhaps, while wealth status could serve as a cushion against shocks of this nature in terms of the resource 
requirements (e.g. Yilma et al, 2014), it may not immune one from the depressing psychological effects that are 
detrimental to aspirations. Further, from factors that are “internal”17 to the individual, we find the “trust in 
others”18 and “internal locus of control (ILC)”19 indicators to be positively associated with the aspirations index 
                                                          
16
 Individuals were asked if they were negatively affected by a serious shock in the last twelve months. These specific shocks include: 
“Too much rain or flood, Livestock diseases, Large increases in input prices, Death or loss of livestock, Illness and disability of the 
breadwinner or wife, Illness of other family members.” Indicators were asked as binary choice (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
17 We control for indicators of internal locus of control, trust in others, time and risk preferences. We construct an index for internal locus of 
control from 14 statements (Levenson, 1981), which reflect the respondent’s perception that life outcomes are controlled by: (1) oneself 
(internality), (2) powerful people, (3) chance. Similarly, we construct an index of “Trust in others” from 2 statements which reflect the 
respondent’s sense of trust in the society. Time and risk preferences are measured as explained before. 
18 The actual set of statements used to measure trust were: (1) “Most people can be trusted” (2) “I would trust my neighbors to look after 
my field if I had to travel for two months.” The responses and corresponding scores are: 4 'strongly agree', 3 'agree', 2 'disagree', or 1 
'disagree strongly'. The scores from the two responses were summed and standardized to give “Trust” index. 
19 The actual set of statements used to measure ILC were: (1) Chance:  “To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental/chance 
happenings", “Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck happenings", “When I get what I want, it's 
usually/mostly because I'm lucky", “My experience in my life has been that what is going to happen will happen", “It's not always wise for 
me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune"; (2) Powerful others “I feel like what happens 
in my life is mostly determined by powerful people", “My life is chiefly controlled by other powerful people", “People like myself have 
very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of more powerful people", “Getting what I want 
requires making those people above me (people with higher status) happy with me", “In order to have my plans work, I make sure that 
they fit in with the desires of people who have power over me"; and (3) Internality: “When I make plans, I am almost 
certain/guaranteed/sure to make them work", “I can mostly determine what will happen in my life", “I am usually able to protect my 
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at less than 1 percent level of statistical significance. These two results are in line with expectations. For example, 
trust in others may increase one’s openness for interaction which might expose the individual to new information 
and opportunities, which are again key factors in determining aspirations. Similarly, having internal locus of control is 
perhaps the necessary condition for forward-looking behavior. This is because it is only when one thinks that life 
outcomes are controlled by oneself that one would aspire and put some effort to achieving them. In line with 
this, Ghosal et al, (2013) use a randomized control trial and show that aspirations could be enhanced through 
less costly interventions such as the provision of psychological trainings or what the authors referred to as 
“dream building.” 
 
2.5.2. The effect of social interactions on aspirations across gender 
It is possible that the analysis based on aggregated data may hide some facts, and results in this study seem to 
suggest just that. We examine the effect of social interactions on aspirations separately for male and female 
respondents. According to Table 2.18, the effect of social interactions is statistically significant only for female 
respondents. Results suggest that a standard deviation increase in the average aspirations index in the village20 is 
associated with a (0.87 × 0.078) = 0.068 to a (1.45 × 0.078) = 0.113 points increase in females’ aspirations index 
(columns 1 to 4). This is a (0.068/0.571) = 0.119 to (0.113/0.571) = 0.198 standard deviations increase in 
aspirations. As we showed in the descriptive statistics, males had statistically significantly larger exposure to 
media and information, and more travel and living experience outside their residence. This might broaden their 
aspirations window and hence their reference group could be wider than the village average. Thus, interactions 
or what happens at the village level may not substantially affect their aspirations. In contrast, females may have 
limited information set and less exposure outside their residence. Thus, having some form of social interactions 
at the village may just compensate and broaden their aspirations window and hence their aspirations. 
 
Table 2.18. The effect of social interactions on aspirations across gender (IV estimates) 
 Female  Male 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)    
Vill. ave. Asp. Index 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.45*** 0.87***  0.28 0.29 0.23 0.04    
 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.27)  (1.00) (0.89) (0.91) (0.87)    
Present income(ln) 
   
0.18***  
   
0.24*** 
    
(0.06)  
   
(0.04)    
Present v.assets(ln) 
   
0.02  
   
0.05    
    
(0.04)  
   
(0.04)    
Present s.status(ln) 
   
0.19***  
   
0.18*** 
    
(0.05)  
   
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
   
0.02***  
   
0.01    
    
(0.01)  
   
(0.01)    
Shocks experience No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive indicators No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 332 332 332 332  317 317 315 315    
r2 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.24  0.22 0.23 0.24 0.33    
Standard errors (clustered at village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 8.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
personal interests (I can usually look after what is important to me), “When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it", 
“My life is determined by my own actions". The choice of responses and corresponding scores were: 4 'strongly agree', 3 'agree', 2 
'disagree', or 1 'disagree strongly'. Responses were coded in such a way that high scores always indicate a more internal locus of control. 
The scores from the 14 responses were summed and standardized to give “internal locus of control” index. 
20 The mean and standard deviation of the aspirations index of females are (-0.148 and 0.571).  
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2.5.3. The effect of aspirations (gap) on risk and time preferences 
Recall that, beside the direct motivation effects, the other hypothesised channels through which aspirations may 
affect forward-looking behavior is through their effect on risk and time preferences. Hence, we set to examine if 
aspirations (aspirations-gap (AG)) affect risk and time preferences. To account for the non-linear effects of 
aspirations on forward looking behavior (Ray, 2006) – that moderate AG is conducive while narrow and very-
large AG are detrimental, the AG indicator enters regressions as a continuous variable along its square term, or 
dummy variables that represent narrow and very-wide or moderate21 aspirations-gap. We begin the discussion 
with simple mean comparison tests using the latter. According to Table 2.19, the mean value of risk loving (or 
reduced risk aversion) of individuals with moderate AG is higher than those with narrow or very-large AG for 
the whole sample and for females alone. The difference is statistically significant across the two indicators used 
to measure risk behavior (i.e. based on lottery and market price of maize). In contrast, we fail to find a 
statistically significant difference on the mean values of discount rate among individuals with moderate AG and 
others, for the full sample and for males. Females with narrow or very-large aspirations-gap seem to have 
statistically significantly higher discount factor by comparison to females with moderate AG.  
 
Table 2.19. Mean comparison of risk and time preferences by aspirations-gap‡ 
 
Narrow or Large AG 
(N=568) 
Moderate AG 
(N=100) 
t-test: mean difference 
(Moderate AG -Narrow/large 
AG) 
Whole sample (Mean, Std. Dev.)  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value 
Lottery (3.03, 1.58) 2.92 1.57 3.64 1.51 0.0000 
Market (2.65, 1.44) 2.58 1.43 3.02 1.44 0.0048 
Composite risk index (5.68, 2.71) 5.50 2.69 6.66 2.63 0.0001 
Discount factor (2.22, 1.75) 2.25 1.73 2.08 1.86 0.3759 
Female (N=306) (N=37) 
 Lottery (2.73, 1.60) 2.68 1.59 3.30 1.60 0.0257 
Market (2.50, 1.45) 2.43 1.45 3.03 1.38 0.0179 
Composite risk index (5.23, 2.77) 5.11 2.75 6.32 2.80 0.0116 
Discount factor (2.17, 1.73) 2.24 1.71 1.57 1.79 0.0262 
Male (N=262) (N=63) 
 Lottery (3.33, 1.51) 3.21 1.5 3.84 1.44 0.0026 
Market (2.81, 1.41) 2.76 1.39 3.02 1.49 0.1885 
Composite risk index (6.14, 2.57) 5.96 2.55 6.86 2.53 0.0127 
Discount factor (2.28, 1.78) 2.26 1.76 2.38 1.84 0.6375 
‡Note: risk aversion declines with the increase in risk aversion index 
 
Results from the multivariate analysis are presented from Table 2.20 to Table 2.23. After controlling for 
exogenous factors that might determine risk behavior, including experiencing various shocks in the past, along 
with indicators of relative wealth and other household characteristics, we find that the aspirations-gap is 
statistically significantly related to minimized risk aversion (or a preference for risk taking) behavior, when the 
lottery based risk measure is used (See Table 2.20, column 1)22. In this instance, a standard deviation increase in 
                                                          
21 As an alternative to Bandiera and Rasul (2006) approach, we used terciles to classify individuals into three relative groups according to 
their levels of aspirations-gap (i.e. narrow, moderate or very-wide). But, results from subsequent analysis did not differ from the 
alternative approach.   
22
 By summing over the two risk measurements, we construct a composite risk measure. Corresponding results from regressions (not 
reported) closely follow the results based on the lottery outcome. 
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the aspirations-gap23 index is associated with a (0.21 × 1.553) = 0.326 point increase in risk aversion index. This 
is a (0.326/1.58) = 0.206 standard deviation reduction in risk aversion, or about (0.326/3.03) = 11 percent 
increase over the mean risk aversion index of 3.03. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the 
square term of the AG indicator confirms the hypothesised non-linear effect of the AG on risk behavior: when 
the AG becomes extremely large, its effect on risk-taking behavior declines. To check this non-linearity further, 
we re-estimate the model (equation 9) controlling for two dummies that respectively proxy for narrow and very-
large AG instead of the continuous variable of the AG index and its square term (equation 8). By comparison to 
those with moderate AG, we find that individuals with narrow or very-large AG are statistically significantly 
more risk averse, on average, and results are robust across specifications and in line with the theory (Table 2.20, 
columns 5 to 8). According to these results, individuals with narrow AG, as opposed to those with moderate 
AG, have a risk aversion index in the range of 0.32 to 0.65 less points. This means that they have a risk aversion 
that is (0.32/1.44) = 0.22 to (0.65/1.58) = 0.41 standard deviations higher than those with moderate AG. The 
corresponding risk aversion of those with large AG is (0.38/1.44) =0.26 to (0.49/1.58) = 0.31 standard 
deviations higher than those with moderate AG. 
  
Table 2.20. The effect of aspirations-gap on risk aversion 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Lottery11 Lottery12 Market11 Market12 Lottery21 Lottery22 Market21 Market22    
Asp.Gap index 0.21* 0.18 0.08 0.05 
   
             
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
   
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap~x -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
   
             
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
    
-0.47** -0.49** -0.37* -0.38*   
     
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
    
-0.65*** -0.62*** -0.36** -0.32*   
     
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)    
Distance to services No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666    
r2 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 9. 
 
Uncertainty regarding future outcomes heavily influence time preferences. Hence, some people may prefer 
“shorter and sooner” reward to “larger and later” reward for their investment. The discount factor for the 
former group of people would be higher than that of the later. After controlling for indicators of risk behavior, 
the interaction term between risk and the AG, and other factors, we find that there is a positive and statistically 
significant non-linear effect (Table 2.21, columns 1 and 2) of the aspirations-gap on discount factor, implying 
that the increase in AG is strongly and non-linearly associated with impatience or a preference for shorter and 
sooner reward. Results, however, are not robust to different specifications. For example, neither of the two 
coefficients that proxy for narrow and very-wide aspirations-gap is statistically significantly associated with 
discount factor (Table 2.21, columns 3 & 4).  
 
 
                                                          
23 The mean and standard deviation of the aspirations-gap index are: (1.142 and 1.553) for the whole sample, (0.937 and 1.264) for 
females, and (1.358 and 1.784) for males. 
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Table 2.21. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
DisFact11 DisFact12 DisFact21 DisFact22    
Asp.Gap index 0.35** 0.38** 
 
             
 
(0.16) (0.16) 
 
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap~x -0.04** -0.04** 
 
             
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
  
0.32 0.35    
   
(0.27) (0.27)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
  
0.15 0.14    
   
(0.20) (0.20)    
Distance to services No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 666 666 666 666    
r2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 10. 
 
 
2.5.4. The effect of AG on risk aversion and discount factor across gender 
Difference in access to information and economic opportunities jointly with cultural factors might affect 
aspirations across gender groups differently. In fact, we have shown evidence in the descriptive statistics that 
males had higher levels of aspirations in each of the four dimensions of aspirations as well as in the aggregate 
index. This was further confirmed using regression analysis that after controlling for other factors, being male is 
significantly related to having higher aspirations (see Table 2.17, for example). While it may not be generally the 
case, this difference might as well be reflected in terms of the AG by males and females, which in turn might lead 
to differences in time discounting and risk preferences. Estimating the determinants of risk behavior separately 
for males and females results in a statistically significant coefficients of the AG and its square term only for 
females, suggesting evidence of the non-linear effects of the AG on women’s risk aversion behavior (Table 2.22, 
column 1). In this instance where the lottery based risk measure is used, a standard deviation increase in the 
aspirations-gap index is associated with a (0.37 × 1.264) = 0.47 increase in risk aversion index. This is a 
(0.47/1.60) = 0.294 standard deviation reduction in risk aversion, or about (0.47/2.73) = 17 percent increase 
over the mean risk aversion index of 2.73. This is consistent with the mean comparison test result which suggests 
that females with moderate AG had a statistically significantly higher index of risk loving (or minimized risk 
aversion) than females with narrow or very-large AG (see Table 2.19). Consistent to this, results from the 
alternative specifications show that having narrow AG is negatively and statistically significantly correlated to 
minimized risk aversion for both genders (Table 2.22, columns 3, 4 and 7). However, it is only for females that 
the result is robust across the two indicators of risk aversion (i.e. lottery and market risk).  
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Table 2.22. The effect of aspirations-gap on risk aversion across gender 
 
 Female  Male 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
LotteryF1 MarketF1 LotteryF2 MarketF2  LotteryM1 MarketM1 LotteryM2 MarketM2    
Asp.Gap index 0.37* 0.20 
  
 0.12 -0.03 
 
             
 
(0.20) (0.18) 
  
 (0.14) (0.13) 
 
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap index -0.05** -0.02 
  
 -0.01 -0.00 
 
             
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
  
 (0.02) (0.02) 
 
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
  
-0.37 -0.47  
  
-0.60** -0.36    
   
(0.38) (0.34)  
  
(0.24) (0.24)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
  
-0.62** -0.52**  
  
-0.70*** -0.21    
   
(0.29) (0.26)  
  
(0.22) (0.21)    
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 342 342 342 342  324 324 324 324    
r2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09  0.08 0.14 0.11 0.15    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 11. 
 
Finally, by comparison to those in the same gender group with moderate AG, we find a statistically significant 
effect of the AG on time discounting only for females with narrow AG (Table 2.23, columns 2). When the AG is 
measured as a continuous variable, we find evidence of a statistically significant effect of the AG on the time 
preferences (or impatience) of females (Table 2.23, column 1). In general, the lack of robustness of the results 
perhaps implies that there is very little effect of the aspirations-gap on time discounting.    
 
 
Table 2.23. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting across gender 
 
 Female  Male 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)    
 
DisFactF1 DisFactF2  DisFactM1 DisFactM2    
Asp.Gap index 0.48* 
 
 0.19              
 
(0.27) 
 
 (0.24)              
Squ.of Asp.Gap index -0.01 
 
 -0.06***              
 
(0.03) 
 
 (0.02)              
Wide Asp.Gap 
 
0.61  
 
0.18    
  
(0.50)  
 
(0.36)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
 
0.63*  
 
-0.16    
  
(0.32)  
 
(0.29)    
Risk (composite index) 0.10** 0.05  -0.04 0.01    
 
(0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04)    
Risk ×Asp.Gap -0.06* 0.01  0.03 -0.02    
 
(0.04) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01)    
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 342 342  324 324    
r2 0.12 0.12  0.10 0.07    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For full results, see the appendix, Table A2. 12. 
 
 
 
2.5.5. Robustness check 
The OLS results reported in the preceding section (Table 2.19 to Table 2.23) may suffer from an endogeneity 
bias of some sort. Since it is difficult to find instrumental variables that might affect aspirations but not risk or 
time preferences for all are “internal” factors, we test the robustness of these results using a combination of 
matching estimators which are widely used in impact studies. Matching methods calculate treatment effects by 
comparing the outcomes of the treatment and control observations conditional on observed covariates. Since the 
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data for this study is purely observational, we employ a modified definition of “treatment” and “control” status 
as explained next. According to Ray (2006), only a moderate aspirations-gap is conducive for forward-looking 
behavior by contrast to narrow or very-large aspirations-gap. In this context, moderate AG could be understood 
as some sort of “treatment” that affects future oriented behavior. Thus, we generate a dummy that sorts 
individuals into two groups based on their aspirations-gap. That is, people with moderate AG are considered 
“treated” while the remaining are considered “control”. This procedure, however, is likely to non-randomly 
assign individuals between these two groups. This is because individuals’ aspirations (and hence their AG) 
depend on their own circumstances including psychological factors which are unobserved and this may lead to 
selection bias.  
 
To address the selection bias, several matching estimators are used in the literature (e.g. Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983; Smith & Todd, 2005). Covariate matching, for example, is one that matches the treated and control units 
directly using observable characteristics. This method can yield unbiased estimates but it requires many variables, 
hence the curse of dimensionality (Davis et al, 2012). To minimize the bias that may stem from matching on 
multidimensional covariates, Abadie and Imbens (2011) developed a bias-corrected matching estimators. 
Alternatively, matching based on propensity scores24 (i.e. propensity score matching, PSM) is the most common 
method that is used to minimize the selection bias and the dimensionality problem (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
The technique matches the treatment and control groups using propensity scores, based on their observable 
covariates which affect both the “treatment” status (i.e. having moderate AG) and the outcomes being measured 
(e.g. indicators of risk or time preferences).  
 
Once the “treated” and comparable “control” observations are matched either through covariates directly or 
through propensity scores, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is estimated using the following 
equation: 
 
ATT = E[yi(1) − yi(0)|ti = 1] = E[yi(1)|ti = 1] − E[yi(0)|ti = 1]        (10)     
 
Where yi(1) and yi(0) respectively denote the outcome of individual 𝑖 in the state of “treatment” and without 
“treatment” (i.e. the counterfactual), and ti denotes the “treatment” status.  
 
The analysis in this section is based on the bias-corrected matching estimators and two PSM estimators - kernel 
matching (KM) and nearest neighbor matching (NN)25. In Kernel matching, treatment effects are measured by 
subtracting from each outcome observation in the treatment group a weighted average of outcomes in the 
comparison group. On the other hand, NN matches treated with control groups with the nearest propensity 
                                                          
24
The principal scores, P(Xi), are calculated according to: P(Xi)=E(DiXi), 0< P(Xi)<1 where Xi are a vector of covariates that determine 
the aspirations level as well as outcomes (e.g. risk or discount factor). 
25
 The theoretical detail of these estimators are referred to Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) and Heckman et al (1997, 1998). 
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scores and it accounts for differences in the mean values of the treated and control (Abadie and Imbens 2006). 
Further, efficiency of NN matching improves as the number of matches increase. As a standard procedure, we 
conduct a balancing test to check if there is a significance difference in the means of observed covariates across 
“treatment” and “control” groups (see Table A2. 13 and Figure A 1). Balancing test results suggest that the two 
groups are not balanced only in terms of gender and the value of assets owned. This implies that the bias will 
persist unless comparison is made based on exact matches. Yet, better inference could also be made by 
comparing the results obtained from PSM estimators with those obtained from the bias corrected matching (or 
covariate matching) estimator which is robust to the bias observed in the data.  
 
2.5.5.1. Aspirations-gap on risk and time preferences 
All results presented in this section are the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT)26. Considering the full 
sample, results suggest that having a moderate aspirations-gap had a positive and statistically significant effect 
(ATT) on minimized risk aversion (or increased risk loving) (Table 2.24). This result is robust across the three 
measures of risk aversion (i.e. based on lottery, market price of maize, and the composite risk aversion index), 
and nearly in all the three matching methods. Referring to column 3, for example, the impact of having a 
moderate AG, as opposed to having a narrow or large AG, is the increase in risk aversion index by about 
(0.53/3.64) = 14.6 percent. This means that individuals with moderate AG have risk aversion that is (0.53/1.553) 
= 0.34 standard deviations less than those with narrow or large AG. The coefficients in this table are not directly 
comparable with those in the preceding section for they were defined differently (i.e. in the preceding section, 
the effect of having low AG and having large AG were looked at by comparison to having moderate AG). Yet, 
the overall results confirm the robustness of the findings that a moderate aspirations-gap indeed enhances risk 
taking (or minimized risk aversion) behavior.  
 
In contrast, we do not find a statistically significant effects of having a moderate AG on the discount factor (or 
time preferences) using any of the three matching estimators (Table 2.25). This again is in line with the findings 
of the previous section that a moderate AG does not have a statistically significant influence on time discounting 
(or impatience).   
 
Table 2.24. The effect of aspirations-gap on risk aversion (using matching estimators)   
  Lottery   Market price  Composite index 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)    
 
Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected 
ATT 0.60** 0.62*** 0.53***  0.13 0.32* 0.34*  0.34 0.70* 0.85*** 
 
(0.27) (0.22) (0.18)  (0.26) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.50) (0.36) (0.32)    
Risk index 
 
3.64 
 
 
 
3.02 
 
 
 
6.66 
 %change 16.5 17 14.6  4.3 10.6 11.3  5.1 10.5 12.7 
N 664 664 664  664 664 664  664 664 664    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
                                                          
26
 Following (Abadie & Imbens, 2002), robust standard errors are generated using bootstrapping for the matching procedure matches 
control households to treatment households “with replacement.” Further, the option of “common support” is imposed to restrict the 
matches in the common support region (i.e. the option imposes a common support by dropping treatment observations whose pscore is 
higher than the maximum or less than the minimum pscore of the controls).  
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Table 2.25. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting, (using matching estimators)    
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Kernel NN Bias-Corrected 
    ATT -0.17 -0.13 -0.26 
 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.21) 
N 664 664 664 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
     
2.5.5.2. Average treatment effects (ATT) across gender 
Results for each gender group closely follow the overall results, that moderate AG has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on risk loving (or reduced risk aversion) behavior (Table 2.26 and Table 2.27). According to 
Table 2.26, column 3, for example, among females, having a moderate AG increases risk aversion index by 22 
percent, according to the lottery based risk measure. This means that females with moderate AG have risk 
aversion that is (0.71/1.264) = 0.56 standard deviations less than females with narrow or large AG. Similarly, 
using the lottery based measure of risk aversion, the average treatment effect (or increased risk aversion index) 
among males with moderate AG is about 15 percent (Table 2.27, column 3). This means that males with 
moderate AG have risk aversion that is (0.57/1.784) = 0.32 standard deviations less than those with narrow or 
large AG. While the magnitude of the average treatment effect seems to differ across gender, results strongly 
confirm the robustness of the findings of the preceding section. 
 
Lastly, results suggest that there is no statistically significant effect of having a moderate AG on time discounting 
for either sex groups (Table 2.28). Although the coefficient (Table 2.28, column 3) for the ATT seems to imply 
a presence of some statistically significant effect for females, the result is not robust, as in the preceding section.   
 
Table 2.26. The effect of aspirations-gap on females risk aversion, (using matching estimators)  
 Lottery  Market price  Composite index 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 
Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected 
ATT 0.56 0.64** 0.71**  0.97** 0.51 0.50*  0.89 1.17* 0.98* 
 
(0.56) (0.31) (0.30)  (0.45) (0.35) (0.27)  (0.79) (0.63) (0.53) 
Risk index 
 
3.3 
 
 
 
3.03 
 
 
 
6.32 
 %change 17 19.4 21.5  32 16.8 16.5  14.1 18.5 15.5 
N 329 329 341  329 329 341  329 329 341 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2.27. The effect of aspirations-gap on males risk aversion, (using matching estimators) 
 Lottery  Market price  Composite index 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 
Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected 
ATT 0.48 0.59*** 0.57**  0.33 0.30 0.17  1.25** 1.11*** 0.78* 
 
(0.37) (0.22) (0.23)  (0.28) (0.25) (0.23)  (0.60) (0.43) (0.41) 
Risk index 
 
3.84 
 
 
 
3.02 
 
 
 
6.86 
 %change 12.5 15.4 14.8  10.9 9.9 5.6  18.2 16.2 11.4 
N 323 323 323  323 323 323  323 323 323 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 40 
 
 
Table 2.28. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting across gender, (using matching estimators)  
 Female  Male 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Kernel NN Bias-Corrected  Kernel NN Bias-Corrected 
ATT -0.91 -0.53 -0.56*  -0.16 0.11 -0.28 
 
(0.57) (0.43) (0.33)  (0.49) (0.31) (0.27) 
N 329 329 341  323 323 323 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
Amartya Sen’s (1981) essay on entitlements and deprivation is referred to as a breakthrough in the analysis of 
poverty and well-being outcomes, and it has inspired numerous related concepts. One of the recent additions in 
development economics that draw inspiration from Sen (1981) and related literatures in social psychology and 
other social sciences includes the analysis of individual behavior using the aspirations-failure framework as 
articulated by Ray (2006) building upon Appadurai (2004). In Ray’s view, poverty stifles dreams and hence effort 
choices which may result in a self-sustaining trap of poverty and the failure of aspirations. Dalton et al. (2014) on 
the other hand theoretically show that while poverty stifles dreams, low aspirations are rather a consequence of 
poverty. In these theoretical literatures, social environment and social interactions are described central in the 
formation of aspirations.  
 
This Chapter empirically examines two research questions. First, we test the social interactions effect on 
aspirations based on two definitions of reference groups. Since individuals identify, interact and compare 
themselves with others in their immediate cognitive window, we use social networks as a reference group, in the 
first step. However, the availability of information regarding the outcomes of other people, who may not be 
“very close”, may allow individuals to include them in their reference group (or as a separate reference group). 
Thus, in the second step, we define village as a reference group for village may capture wider or multiple 
reference groups. In both definitions of reference groups, we examine the social interactions effect based on the 
average outcome of all people in the reference group, as well as based on the average outcome of only those who 
are doing relatively better. Further, we test the hypothesis using individual components of the four dimensions of 
aspirations as well as the aggregate aspirations index. If true, the evidence from the individual dimensions of 
aspirations would imply that aspirations are indeed formed by observing peers’ outcomes. Similarly, the evidence 
from the aggregate aspirations index would imply additional source of aspirations for individuals tend to 
“conform” with others, as the social interactions literature suggests.  
 
In general, results in this Chapter suggest that there is indeed a statistically strong social interactions effect on 
aspirations, confirming the theory that aspirations are socially determined. Yet, the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates are larger and they are statistically stronger when the reference group we consider are only those who 
are relatively doing better. This, in Genicot and Ray (2014) terminology, is referred to as upward looking aspirations. 
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This is particularly true when the wider reference group (i.e. village) is considered. We find that, for example, a 
standard deviation increase in the average aspirations index in the village is associated with a 0.046 to 0.076 point 
increase in individual’s aspirations index. This is a 0.075 to 0.124 standard deviations increase in aspirations. 
Further, we find that social network size is statistically significantly associated with aspirations, providing 
additional evidence that aspirations increase with the widening of the aspirations window (such as a reference 
group). In addition, results by gender suggest that the effect of social interactions is statistically significant only 
for females. In the light of the descriptive statistics, males may have aspirations windows wider than the village 
average and thus neither peers’ observed outcomes nor interactions with peers at the village level may 
substantially affect their aspirations. Females, in contrast, have limited exposure to media and living and 
travelling experience outside their village. Thus, observations and having some form of social interactions at the 
village level may just compensate and broaden their aspirations windows and thus their aspirations. 
 
Second, we examine the effect of aspirations on time and risk preferences. Based on several empirical strategies, 
we fail to find a robust and statistically significant effect of aspirations-gap (AG) on time discounting. In 
contrast, we find a robust evidence on the hypothesised non-linear effect of AG on risk behavior. For example, 
based on the specifications that define AG as a continuous variable, results suggest that a standard deviation 
increase in the AG index is associated with a 0.21 standard deviations reduction in risk aversion. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of the square term of the AG confirms the hypothesized non-linear effect 
of the AG on risk behavior. Alternatively, results suggest that individuals with narrow AG are associated with 
risk aversion that is 0.22 to 0.41 standard deviations higher than those with moderate AG. The corresponding 
risk aversion of those with large AG is 0.26 to 0.31 standard deviations higher than those with moderate AG. We 
tested the robustness of these findings using matching estimators; and, the overall results confirm that a 
moderate aspirations-gap indeed helps enhance risk taking (or helps relax risk aversion) behavior. 
 
Based on these findings, we conclude that policies aimed at raising the aspirations of the poor or their “capacity 
to aspire” may benefit from social interactions, and hence any such efforts may use and invest on social networks 
and reap the corresponding multiplier effects. Further, strategies that empower women and particularly that help 
widen their aspirations windows may earn the highest impact for wider aspirations window may increase their 
aspirations-gap which may in turn relax their risk aversion. Policies in this regard would be justified not only for 
the commonly expected direct motivation effects of aspirations on future regarding behavior, but also for the 
indirect effect through their effect on risk aversion.  
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3. SOCIAL NETWORKS, AGRICULTURAL INNOVATIONS, AND FARM 
PRODUCTIVITY IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter examines the existence of social learning in agriculture in Ethiopia. We use a ‘random matching 
within sample’ technique to collect data on social networks and elicit details of the relationships and information 
exchange between network members, complementing the analysis with information on self-reported networks. 
We find that, while kinship or membership in certain groups, informal forms of insurance, or having frequent 
meetings with network members are all associated with a higher probability of forming an information link, none 
of these are correlated with observed innovative behavior such as the adoption of row-planting. This may 
suggest that behavior is more likely to be affected by the nature of information that passes through the network, 
rather than the number of information links. In support of this, we find that information links that exclusively 
involve discussions on farming or business matters are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of adopting 
row-planting. We use econometric strategies to isolate social learning from that of correlated and contextual 
effects. After controlling for factors that might otherwise generate spurious correlation, we find a strong 
evidence of network externalities in the adoption of row-planting techniques and also in farm productivity. Our 
results imply that extension services and other programs that promote agricultural innovations and seek yield 
improvement may benefit from social networks but they may be more effective if they identify the ‘right’ 
networks, that is, the ones that exclusively involve information exchange regarding agriculture. This further 
implies that investment in group formation, rather than simply using existing networks, may be a beneficial 
strategy. 
 
Keywords: Social networks, innovations, row planting, agriculture, Ethiopia 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Eighty-two percent of the population in Ethiopia live in rural areas (World Bank, 2012), with the majority 
depending on agriculture or related activities for their livelihood, either directly or indirectly. Despite some 
improvements in agricultural production in recent years, the overall agricultural growth falls short of the rapid 
population growth and importing food (in the form of aid and to some extent commercial imports) has become 
an important component of food supply in the country with an equivalent of 6.4 percent of the national food 
production between 1996 and 2010 on average (Graham et al, 2012). Ethiopian agriculture is characterized by 
low productivity which is associated with low input usage (such as improved seed varieties and fertilizer), 
significant post-harvest loss, population pressure, poor farming practices, and land degradation, among others 
(Negatu, 2004; Rashid, et al., 2010; Yao, 1996). 
Besides measures that would take population pressure off agriculture, potential remedies lie in the promotion of 
agricultural innovations to sustainably improve agricultural productivity whilst increasing the efficiency of 
smallholder agriculture. Risk aversion (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009; Yu and Nin-pratt, 2014), perceptions about 
new technologies (Negatu and Parikh, 1999), access to extension and advisory services (Ragasa et al., 2013; Yu 
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and Nin-Pratt, 2014), and access to credit (Bekele and Drake, 2003) have been identified as the major 
determinants of technology adoption in Ethiopia. Other socio-economic factors also identified in these articles 
include human capital, livestock holdings, land size and tenure security.  
Although there is an extensive literature on the diffusion of innovations and its determinants, one of which is 
social interactions (Rogers, 1983; Feder et al., 1985; Feder and Umali, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010), 
studies on Ethiopian agriculture largely ignore the role social networks play in technology adoption. Only a few 
studies (Wossen et al., 2013; Kassie et al., 2012; Dessie et al., 2012) investigate the effects of social networks for 
improved farming and natural resource management practices. Evidence from other countries, however, suggests 
that social networks play a central role in people’s lives in so many ways including in shaping beliefs, preferences, 
and decisions (Jakson, 2011). There is, for example, evidence on the role of social networks on the diffusion of 
information, new products, and technologies (Jackson and Yariv, 2011), informal insurance and risk sharing 
(Fafchamps, 2011), and labor and credit networks for economic activities (Munshi, 2011).  
This Chapter adds empirical evidence to the existing literature on the role of social networks for the adoption of 
agricultural innovations and farm productivity in rural Ethiopia. Specifically, we examine the determinants of 
information and learning links among farmers, and whether those information links and their structure affect the 
adoption of innovations, mainly row planting in this context. We also identify social externalities in the adoption 
of row-planting methods, and in yield improvement as explained next. 
We choose row-planting as an indicator of innovative behavior for it is a recent practice in Ethiopian agriculture, 
which makes it convenient to test the existence and role of social learning in technology adoption. Recent studies 
conducted in Ethiopia show that yields are very responsive to this improved practice. By comparison to the 
conventional broadcasting technique, for example, Alemu et al. (2014) find an average of 14.6 percent higher 
wheat yields with row-planting, while Vandercasteelen et al. (2014) find an increase in teff yields between 12 and 
13 percent in farmers’ experimental plots and 22 percent in demonstration plots managed by extension agents. 
Other on-the-field experimental trials in the country, however, report a more significant yield increase (for 
example, about 70 percent increase in teff yields (ATA, 2013)) that encouraged the country’s extension system to 
up-scale the promotion of this agronomic practice in 2013. As is the case for other agricultural innovations, 
diffusion of this innovation requires farmers to experiment by themselves and also to learn from others before 
fully adopting the technique. Because of the potential importance of adopting row-planting, we examine whether 
social learning with respect to the adoption of row-planting takes place and whether evidence for an effect on 
yields exists. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents the background to this study, 
reviews the literature our study relates to, and sets the conceptual framework of the paper. Section 3.3. presents 
the data we use, including descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy and results are discussed in Section 3.4. 
Section 3.5 concludes the Chapter. 
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3.2. Background and conceptual framework  
There is little doubt about how central a role innovations can play for development. Yet, existing literature 
suggests that innovations, particularly in poor countries, are constrained by lack of information and market 
inefficiencies such as the absence of well-functioning credit and insurance markets. Networks may provide 
practical solutions in such circumstances and can guide policy decisions such as targeting. To be specific, social 
networks facilitate interaction, which is a central part of the innovation systems framework that understands the 
capacity for continuous innovation as a function of linkages, working practices, and policies that promote 
knowledge flows and learning among all actors (Hall et al., 2006). The underlying idea is that wider knowledge 
and information are embodied in different actors and interaction among them enhances their innovation 
behavior and performance. Social networks are the channels for such interactions and for social learning to 
occur.  
Conceptually, we mainly draw on the theory of innovation diffusion outlined in the early 1960s by Everett M. 
Rogers in this paper. According to Rogers (1983), innovation adoption is preceded by a process of knowing 
about the existence of an innovation, developing an interest and making a decision about adoption. Rogers 
reflects on the relevance of social networks within the two main elements of diffusion: communication channels 
and social structure. For example, while mass-media such as ICTs and related channels are considered as the 
most rapid and efficient means in creating knowledge of innovations, interpersonal channels are more effective 
in persuading an individual to adopt innovations (Rogers, 1983). This, according to Rogers, occurs because 
people depend mainly upon a subjective evaluation of an innovation that is conveyed to them from other 
individuals like themselves who have previously adopted the innovation. This may be the case because 
individuals believe that the other person has superior information and hence they may try to learn; or, simply 
because individuals want to imitate others for reasons related to conformism, jealousy, and paternalism (Manski, 
2000); or because neighbors are subject to related unobserved shocks (Conley and Udry, 2010). Despite 
enormous challenges of identification, this essentially underscores a central role that social networks can play in 
the adoption of innovations. 
A set of connections (edges) among a collection of individuals (nodes) represent a network through which 
information, money, goods or services flow (Maertens and Barrett, 2013). Social networks may facilitate 
knowledge externalities as interactions among network members influence individual behavior. This is partly 
because individuals update their beliefs for their behavior - aspirations and expectations - are shaped not only by 
their own past experience but also by experiences of others in their network (Ray, 2006). Hence, interaction 
among network members is necessary for observations and learning to occur. 
However, the degree of knowledge spillovers depends on the structure of the network (Rogers, 1983). It 
determines who interacts with whom, but as the determinants of the structure can be strategic or not (e.g. like-
mindedness), any observed behavioral change may or may not be a result of interconnectedness. As an example, 
some nodes in the network may act as “opinion leaders” and informally influence the attitudes of other 
individuals (Rogers, 1983) which may be a case of network effects, while in other instances factors that 
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determine the formation of links in the first place may also affect individuals’ behavior or decisions (referred to 
as ‘homophily’ (Jackson, 2011)).  
On the other hand, network effects also very much depend on the extent to which relationships are transitive, 
that is, “the extent to which if node i is linked to node j, and j is linked to k, then i is linked to k”, (Jackson, 2011: 
p.527). According to Jackson (2011), the frequency with which such transitivity is present is referred to as 
clustering, and clustering impacts the extent to which connections reach out to new nodes and can thereby affect 
information transmission. This issue of transitivity could be particularly interesting to research in the context of 
male versus female networks among members of the same households, the spouses’ network being assumed to 
display different frequencies than the husbands’. 
The other important factor for social learning is network size measured by the number of individuals linked 
through the network. While the literature on labor or credit networks, for example, predicts that individuals with 
access to stronger networks should have superior outcomes, Munshi (2011) argues that selective entry into the 
network and endogenous network size (strength) might give rise to a spurious network effect.     
The central idea of social learning in the empirical literature has evolved from that of having insignificant 
variation within a given village (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) to the concept of innovation systems which 
assumes heterogeneity among network members, for example with respect to their knowledge about 
technologies, and puts interactions at the center of innovation processes (Hall et al., 2006). Further, networks can 
be defined in different ways. Some empirical studies including Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), 
and Isham (2002) define networks based on membership to certain groups, such as village, which essentially 
imply that experience from all farmers in the group is relevant. This approach might also disregard the possibility 
of links or information flows outside the group that may be critical to the information circulated within the 
group, which is also referred to as “the strength of weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973).  
Despite significant differences on definition and measurement of social networks, there is a growing evidence for 
learning externalities or network effects on the adoption of agricultural innovations, highlighting learning 
spillovers in terms of the rate of adoption of the innovation (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995), the role of 
technology specificities in learning from neighbors (Munshi, 2004), or the impact of ethnicity and social 
affiliations on adoption rates (Isham, 2002).  
More recent studies measure networks in more detailed and structured manner that could account for various 
channels of information flow (e.g. self-reported networks, family, religious groups, kinship in Bandiera and 
Rasul, 2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; or van den Broeck and Dercon, 2011). With the exception of a few 
studies such as Conley and Udry (2010) and Maertens and Barrett (2013), much of the existing empirical 
literature relies on data which defines networks based on such group membership or on self-reported links. Yet, 
these network measures are criticized for the possibility of ignoring important links outside the group or sample 
and of suffering from unobserved heterogeneity which might influence both the formation of links and that of 
the variable of interest (Maertens and Barrett, 2013; Munshi, 2011; Santos and Barrett, 2008). According to 
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Maertens and Barrett (2013), ‘random matching within sample’ may help address some of these shortcomings 
and allow identification of endogenous (peer) effects separately from correlated and contextual effects.27 The 
limitation with this technique, however, is that the number of information contacts in the sample is smaller than 
the farmer’s actual number of information contacts (Conley and Udry, 2010) and may be missing a key contact 
from the defined network (Maertens and Barrett, 2013). Using random matching within sample, Conley and 
Udry (2010) find evidence of social learning among farmers in Ghana as the latter align their use of an innovative 
technique with successful farmers in the previous period.  
Networks, however, do not necessarily encourage innovations. Network externalities may introduce free riding in 
experimentation and hence strategic delays of technology adoption since neighbors’ and own experience could 
be substitutes (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006, Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995, Kremer and Miguel, 2007). To sum up, 
the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, highlights the importance of social networks for 
innovations. Yet, interaction effects vary with network characteristics including the type of network, network 
structure, network size, the frequency of interactions among members, the transitivity of relationships, 
technology specificity, and individual heterogeneity. However, the identification of network effects is challenging 
as it requires finding the ‘right’ networks, and, even in this case may suffer from problems of identification due 
to omitted variables, due to homophily (Jackson, 2011), or because mean behavior in the group is itself 
determined by the behavior of group members. Manski (1993) defines the latter simultaneity bias as the 
‘reflection problem’. 
Based on the existing literature, we investigate whether individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave 
similarly in terms of adopting row planting, a recent innovation in Ethiopian agriculture due to: 1) endogenous 
or peer effects, 2) exogenous or contextual effects, and 3) correlated effects, and test for effects on farm 
productivity. To overcome some of the problems related to identification discussed above, this study uses a 
random assignment of matches within the sample, and controls for the lagged outcomes of peers. To 
complement our results, we, furthermore, use self-reported ties as a second measure of social networks, also to 
see whether they can be an independent source of information, similarly to van den Broeck and Dercon (2011).   
 
3.3. Data  
3.3.1. Sampling and measurement issues  
We conduct a household survey between January and March 2014 in Ethiopia, which builds upon an existing 
sample of agricultural households surveyed in 2006 and again in 2010 in Oromia region under an NGO project 
                                                          
27
 According to Manski (1993), endogenous, contextual and correlated effects, respectively, arise wherein the propensity of 
an individual to behave in some way varies with: the behavior of the group; the exogenous characteristics of the group; and, 
wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face 
similar institutional environments. 
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that promoted agricultural innovations and ended in 2010.28 The baseline survey used a mix of purposive and 
random sampling procedures to select 390 households from three study sites (Aredo, et al. 2008). The primary 
sampling unit consisted of a pair of neighboring districts or woredas which were chosen based on the density of 
cultivation of the major crop and on the presence of active farmers' cooperatives. In the second stage, kebeles 
(sub-districts) with active farmers’ cooperatives were purposively selected. Finally, using the number of 
participating households within a cooperative as the sampling frame, households were then randomly selected. 
The major crop and total sample size in each research site are summarized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Geographical distribution of the sample 
 Bakko-Siree  
(major crop: maize) 
Lume-Adaa 
 (major crop:  
teff) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo (major 
crop: wheat) 
Total 
District Bakko Sibu Siree Lume Adaa Hettosa Tiyyo  
Sample size at baseline (2006/07) 65 65 65 65 65 65 390 
Number of households 64 63 63 64 62 63 379 
 
Our survey covered 379 households but some households rented out their land and others did not cultivate any 
one of the main crops (maize, wheat or teff) either in the present or previous production seasons. We exclude 
these from the subsequent analysis because of the need for complete data, also on lagged values of yields, which 
reduces the final sample size to 350 households. Nevertheless, since part of the data is at the individual level 
(separately for the household heads and their spouses if married), the sample size for the individual level analysis 
is 681. 
3.3.2. Social networks 
As noted before, early studies on networks define the latter based on membership to certain groups such as the 
village, clan or as otherwise determined by social and cultural characteristics. These definitions may ensure that 
networks are exogenously determined but they allow limited room for variation among households. More recent 
studies, on the other hand, rely on individual level links reported by the respondent either inside or out of a 
sample. While these more recent approaches may allow variations among individuals and households, they suffer 
from a truncation bias, especially if respondents are allowed to name only a certain number of links. To be 
specific, their true networks may be much wider or key nodes and important links may have been forgotten 
(Maertens and Barrett, 2013).  
 
Our approach follows Maertens and Barrett (2013) and Conley and Udry (2010) to collect network data using a 
random matching within sample where each respondent is matched with six randomly drawn individuals (three 
male and three female ones) from the sample and the same village (or kebele). Conditional on knowing the match, 
we construct network measures by eliciting details of the relationship between the individual and the match, and 
                                                          
28
 The analysis in this paper mainly relies on the 2014 data as the variables of interest in this analysis (networks and row-
planting) are missing in the preceding surveys. Yet, we make use of lagged values of some explanatory variables for 
identification. 
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combine this information with household level background characteristics. Since information flows occur not 
only between, but also within households (thereby highlighting the importance of transitivity in terms of 
information flow and clustering within networks) we match the household head and their spouse separately to 
six individuals each, with each of the six matches being randomly drawn from different households of the sample 
within the village.  
Further, to complement the analysis and to minimize the chance of omitting a key network node due to the 
random matching within sample, we also ask each respondent for the four other individuals they know best and 
elicit details of their relationships. These four contacts per respondent, that is, a maximum of eight per 
household, may include both the ones whom the respondent mostly interacts with for information or business 
matters and those whom the respondent relies upon as an informal source of insurance. These self-reported links 
are left out from our estimation of network effects for technology adoption as we do not have the matches’ 
background characteristics that are crucial for identification because self-reported links may come from outside 
the surveyed sample. Therefore, we solely use these self-reported links to estimate the determinants of 
information or learning links.  
Before we move on to the econometric analysis, we briefly examine the characteristics of networks. Table 3.2 
and Table 3.3 present gender disaggregated network characteristics from both self-reported networks and from 
networks elicited through random matching within sample, respectively. Out of the four network partners the 
respondents mention, the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 suggest that a little over half of the links do not have 
family ties with the respondent. By comparison, male respondents quote a higher percentage of close relatives 
among their links. Yet, the descriptives also suggest that both male and female respondents identify network 
partners who are around their own age, who mainly reside in the same village, and have the same native 
language, religion, and gender as the respondent. Furthermore, almost all respondents claim that their network 
partners and themselves help each other in times of need (or provide each other with an informal type of 
insurance). In terms of occupation, male respondents are, on average, more likely to identify links who are 
mainly farmers; and they report having discussions on farming or business matters with their network partners 
more often than female respondents do.  
The data presented in this paragraph seem to support the criticism against heavily relying on definitions of 
networks based on membership in a specific group and support our choice of using random matching within 
sample for the key analysis. For example, if we were to rely only on networks defined along kinship, we would 
likely end up using a radically smaller network and miss important links as more than half of the links the 
respondents mention do not also belong to the respondent’s family. Similarly, relying on definitions of networks 
based on, for example, religion, area of residence, ethnicity, and others would result in the omission of important 
links as shown in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2. Characteristics of self-reported network connections by gender of the respondent 
 Female Male 
Network connections  N=1392  N=1313 
 
Percent Percent 
Self-assessed relationship:    
  Close relative (binary) 23 38 
 Distant relative (binary) 20 11 
 No family link (binary) 57 51 
Male (binary) 23 93 
Similar age (binary, difference<=5 years) 35 32 
Same village (binary)  89 84 
Discussion of business/farming matters (binary) 63 87 
Same mother tongue (binary)  92 93 
Same religion (binary) 87 86 
Same iddir (binary) 70 77 
Farmer (binary) 51 84 
Help each other when in need (binary) 98 99 
Note: 350 female and 331 male respondents. 
In Table 3.3, we find that female respondents know a smaller proportion of their randomly drawn matches than 
their male counterparts. To be specific, female respondents know 3.7, male respondents 4.4 individuals on 
average out of their six random matches. Of those matches known to the respondent, less than 13 percent are 
related to the respondent (by blood or by marriage) for both sexes, while significantly more male respondents 
report belonging to the same iddir as their match.29 Female respondents are less likely to discuss farming and 
business matters with their matches than male respondents, but quote an equal share of their matches to help 
them in case of needs.  
Table 3.3. Characteristics of network connections derived through random matching within sample by gender of 
the respondent 
 Female Male 
Network connections N=1288  N=1450 
 Percent Percent 
Respondent knows the match (binary) 66 79 
 Conditional on knowing the match:   
Related by blood or marriage (binary) 10 12 
Male (binary) 51 52 
Discussion of business/farming matters (binary) 12 24 
Same iddir (binary) 33 51 
Help each other when in need (binary) 36 40 
 Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Distance between households (in minutes walking) 21 (19) 21(20) 
Average number of matches known by the respondent 3.68 (1.75) 4.38 (1.38) 
Average number of matches known by the household 7.22 (2.78) 
Note: 350 female and 331 male respondents. 
Another way of looking at network characteristics and in particular the characteristics of matches is to group 
respondents and their matches based on their relative poverty standing as proxied by the value of their asset and 
                                                          
29
 An iddir is a community-based funeral organisation that is common in Ethiopia. 
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land holdings.30 Since we expect that knowledge spillovers relating to agricultural innovations would come from 
networks that involve discussions regarding farming matters, we only consider network connections with whom 
respondents report having discussed farming and business matters. As shown in Figure 3.1, male respondents 
who are relatively poor along both asset- and land-based poverty measures are linked mainly to individuals who 
are also relatively poor. Similarly, those who are not poor are also connected mainly to individuals of a similar 
standing along both relative poverty measures. This pattern of interactions within social class is also evident for 
poor female respondents for both poverty measures, but all other classes (middle groups for males and females, 
non-poor class for females) show less clear interaction trends. 
Figure 3.1. Network characteristics based on relative poverty measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, it is worth noting from both self-reported and randomly allocated matches that, while both sexes are 
likely to similarly identify own links along gender, cultural or geographic lines, the nature of their relationships 
slightly diverge when asked whether they had discussed farming or business matters with the link. To be specific, 
the share of matches male respondents claim to have discussed farming or business matters with is twice the size 
female respondents report (Table 3.3). Yet, this should not be surprising: as men are generally perceived as 
decision-makers and involved in these activities in rural Ethiopia, which may have biased women to 
underestimate and underreport the significance of their own interactions. Another point that is apparent from 
                                                          
30
 Following Bandiera and Rasul (2006), we calculate relative poverty measures using two indicators: the size of own land 
holdings and the value of household assets including livestock. Hence, a household is considered: ‘poor’ (if the 
corresponding value is smaller than 75 percent of the sample average), ‘middle’ (if the value is between 75 percent and 125 
percent of sample average), and ’not poor’ (if the value is bigger than 125 percent of the sample average). 
69 
38 37 
43 
15 26 
35 
32 
49 
0
50
100
150
200
poor middle not poor
a. Male information networks by relative asset 
poverty (n=344) 
poor middle not poor
27 
15 25 
3 
7 
15 
21 
8 
22 
0
20
40
60
80
poor middle not poor
b. Female information networks by relative asset 
poverty (n=143) 
poor middle not poor
47 29 34 
41 
32 37 
39 
36 
47 
0
50
100
150
poor middle not poor
c. Male information networks by relative land 
poverty (n=342) 
poor middle not poor
14 16 20 
13 14 13 
11 16 
26 
0
50
100
poor middle not poor
d. Female information networks by relative land 
poverty (n=143) 
poor middle not poor
 51 
 
the descriptive statistics of the two types of networks is that there seems to be a lack of significant variation in 
the data when networks are measured based on self-reported links, which suggests endogenous network 
formation. As this is likely to complicate the identification of network effects, we rely on random matching 
within sample as described above. 
3.3.3. Other descriptive statistics and variable definition 
Table 3.4 presents a general overview of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the sample 
households. The data suggest that 10 percent of the households in the sample are female-headed, and the 
average age of the household heads is 50 years. Furthermore, about one third of household heads have not 
attended any schooling, while the average level of schooling attended by household heads is 4.6 years. 
Households in this sample appear to hold larger land holdings on average compared to the smallholder country 
average of about one hectare.31 We report indicators of wealth such as the values of consumer durables and 
production assets in Ethiopian Birr (ETB) based on the respondents’ own estimations.32 We define household 
productivity as the value of all crops the household produced in a given production year divided by the hectare 
of farm land the household had access to. Using the official consumer price indices from 2006 to 2014, we 
deflate current market prices to 2006 constant prices as we will be making use of lagged values in subsequent 
analysis. The average livestock holding is 8.3 tropical livestock units and households are located around 20 
minutes walking time to the nearest asphalt road or to the office of the agricultural extension agent. Other 
service centers such as markets, coop offices, input dealer shops, district towns and the nearest micro finance 
institution are all located in the range of 35 to 90 minutes walking time one way on average.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Note, however, that, in terms of land holdings, households in the three study sites in general hold more land than the 
country average, also outside of our sample. 
32
 The official exchange rate during the time of the survey was 1 USD=19 ETB according to the National Bank of Ethiopia 
(see http://www.nbe.gov.et/market/searchdollarcurrencies.html, accessed last February 9th, 2016). 
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Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics related to socio-economic characteristics (N=350) 
Variable Meann Std. Dev. Med Min Max 
Sex of household head (1 if Female) 0.10 0.30  0 1 
Age of household head (years)  50.4 13.3 50 25 88 
Number of years of schooling completed by household head 4.62 4.10 4 0 16 
Household size (number of household members) 6.76 2.36 7 1 16 
Number of adult household members 3.66 1.57 4 0 8 
Total land size owned by household (hectares) 2.21 1.40 2 0 8.25 
Total current value of production assets (ETB) 5670 14723 1635 0 203765 
Total current value of consumer durable assets (ETB) 7981 31803 2800 0 561950 
Total livestock holdings (TLU) 8.23 5.23 7.6 0 35.05 
Household treated in past NGO project (binary) 0.71 0.46 1 0 1 
Household adopted row planting (binary) 0.63 0.48 1 0 1 
Farm productivity 2014 (output/ha), value at 2006 prices 5071 6290 4234 2.11 85024 
Farm productivity 2010 (output/ha), value at 2006 prices 3783 1983 3417 41 14551 
Farm productivity 2006 (output/ha), value 3928 2457 3448 317 21917 
Number of days listening  to radio over the past year 220 143 206 0 365 
Number of days watching television over the past year 133 151 48 0 365 
Access to services/institutions (walking time in minutes)  
  
   
Distance to asphalt road 19.4 11.78 17 2 60 
Distance to market 64.5 31.60 60 11 158 
Distance to district town 93.3 37.66 93 20 185 
Distance to coop office 35.2 17.08 34 4 98 
Distance to input dealer 72.0 31.40 68 21 160 
Distance to farmer training center (FTC) 23.2 11.41 20 7 78 
Distance to micro-finance institution (MFI) 89.9 36.00 90 21 180 
 
 
3.4. Empirical strategy and results  
3.4.1. Empirical strategy 
We analyze the role of networks in four parts. Firstly, we examine the determinants of learning links among 
farmers based on both the self-reported network connections and those that were allocated based on the random 
matching within sample. Next, we test whether network size and structure are correlated with the probability of 
adopting row planting. In the two remaining parts we then examine the effects of social learning on the 
likelihood of adopting an innovation (row planting in our case) and on average farm productivity.  
We begin by defining that a ‘learning link’ or ‘information link’ exists if the respondent discussed farming or 
business matters with the network partner in the past 12 months. Following van den Broeck and Dercon (2011), 
De Weerdt (2002), and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), we explore the determinants of information links in a 
dyadic regression framework where attributes 𝑧𝑖 and 𝑧𝑗, for example, of network partners or nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 enter 
regressions in differences, (𝑧𝑖 - 𝑧𝑗), and in sums, (𝑧𝑖 + 𝑧𝑗). For example, if 𝑧 denotes age, then age enters the 
regression twice: fist as the difference between the ages of node 𝑖 and node 𝑗, and simultaneously as the sum of 
the ages of the two nodes. According to Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), this approach allows capturing the 
effects of differences in attributes and also of the combined level effect of the attributes on the variable of 
interest, respectively.   
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Let the binary variable 𝐿𝑖𝑗 represent the existence of an information link between network nodes and take a 
value of one if node 𝑖 discussed farming or business matters with node 𝑗 and zero otherwise. A regression 
equation for the determination of a learning link can then be specified as: 
𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑧𝑗) + 𝛼3(𝑧𝑖 + 𝑧𝑗) + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 ,  (1) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 captures attributes which do not vary between paired households such as geographic distance, 𝑧 
denotes other individual and household-level attributes that may determine the probability of a link between 𝑖 
and 𝑗, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is the error term. Since individuals that form networks and the networks of each node may have 
similar characteristics, the residuals are likely to be correlated. We allow for the error variances to be correlated 
through two-way clustering of the standard errors at the individual and at the match’s level (Cameron et al., 2011 
and Petersen, 2009).  
To see whether an existing link and other characteristics that determine link formation are also correlated with 
observed behavior such as row planting, the following regression equation is estimated: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑧𝑗) + 𝛼4(𝑧𝑖 + 𝑧𝑗) + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if farmer 𝑖 adopts row planting and zero otherwise. 𝐿,  
𝑤, and 𝑧 are defined as before. Estimating equations 1 and 2 already helps us understand the nature of link 
formation and how links may be correlated with actual behavior but neither is able to identify a causal 
relationship between observed behavior such as the adoption of an innovation and network effects as link 
formation and own innovative behavior may both be driven by confounding factors.  
Further, networks are mechanisms in which group behavior may influence individual behavior, and measuring 
network effects is tantamount to estimating neighborhood or peer effects, which is prone to simultaneity bias. As 
we recall from Section two, Manski (1993) refers to this as the “reflection problem” and hypothesizes that 
individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly due to endogenous peer effects, exogenous or 
contextual effects, and correlated effects.33 Since policy will have a social multiplier effect in the presence of 
endogenous effects (Manski, 1993), we identify endogenous effects separately from correlated and contextual 
effects. Hence, following Manski (1993), we employ the standard linear-in-means empirical model to estimate 
network effects, which can be specified as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦−𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥−𝑖𝑘𝑡𝛾 + 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝜆 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 ,   (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes an outcome (the adoption of row planting or average farm productivity in our case) for 
individual 𝑖 who belongs to network 𝑘 at time 𝑡; 𝑦−𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes the average outcome of the peers excluding 𝑖 at 
                                                          
33
 According to Manski (1993) endogenous, contextual and correlated effects arise when the propensity of an individual to 
behave in a specific way varies with the behavior of the group, the exogenous characteristics of the group, and when 
individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face similar 
institutional environments, respectively. 
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time 𝑡; 𝑥−𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes the average value of the observable characteristics of peers excluding 𝑖; 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes a 
vector of 𝑖’s observable characteristics; 𝛿𝑘 denotes location fixed effects and controls for unobservable 
characteristics common to all network points in the village or district that may influence adoption or 
productivity; and 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 is a time-variant unobserved component. 𝛽 ≠0, 𝛾 ≠0, and 𝛿 ≠0 suggest the existence of 
endogenous-, contextual- and correlated effects, respectively, and 𝜆 denotes direct effects.  
However, as it stands, equation (3) is unable to solve the reflection problem since the behavior of the individual 
also affects the mean behavior of their group or network. Hence, to improve identification we introduce 
dynamism to the model as suggested by Manski (2000) by replacing 𝑦−𝑖𝑘𝑡  with its lagged value 𝑦−𝑖𝑘𝑡−1of 
individual 𝑖’s reference group (more on this in Section 3.4.2.3). We allow for differentiated effects by estimating 
equation (4) with a focus on the network connections of the household head, and on the connections of both 
the household head and the spouse combined. 
𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦−𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝑥−𝑖𝑘𝑡𝛾 + 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝜆 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡          (4) 
3.4.2. Results and discussion 
As pointed out in the preceding section, we present the analysis of econometric results in four parts. We first 
examine the determinants of a learning link in part 1 and we follow that up by analyzing whether network size 
and structure are actually correlated with the probability of adopting row-planting technique (part 2).34 We 
identify social learning effects on the adoption of row-planting technique and average farm productivity in parts 
3 and 4, respectively. All continuous variables excluding those which enter regressions in differences (or changes) 
are log-transformed. 
 
3.4.2.1. Determinants of information links 
As mentioned above, we define a link as an ‘information’ or a ‘learning’ link if the respondent had discussed 
farming or business matters with the match in the past twelve months prior to the survey. Table 3.5 and Table 
3.6 present the marginal effects of Probit estimations of equation 1, that is, the determinants of whether a 
randomly allocated or self-reported link is an information link, respectively. We use a dyadic framework and 
estimate the relationship for household heads, male respondents, female respondents, or the latter two 
combined. To be specific, column 1 of Table 3.5 relates to all respondents combined regardless of gender and 
relationship of the respondent to the household head, while the results in columns 2 and 3 refer to male and 
female respondents, respectively. Column 4 and 5 are based on heads of households without and with the sums 
of certain control variables. Table 3.5 suggests that belonging to the same iddir, having blood ties, and having 
high frequency of meetings with the match all significantly increase the likelihood of a learning link regardless of 
the gender and whether the respondent is the household head or spouse. Other forms of network partnership 
such as being one that could be used in times of need also improves the likelihood of a learning link. These 
                                                          
34
 We find very little, if any, change of results when bootstrapping the standard errors in all estimations of Sections 3.4.2.1 
and 3.4.2.2. Results not reported but available upon request. 
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results also hold for self-reported networks (Table 3.6) except that belonging to same iddir appears to improve 
the likelihood of a learning link only for female respondents while having an insurance partner seems to be 
important only for male respondents.  
 
Table 3.5. Determinants of learning links (using random matching within network data), marginal effects of a 
Probit estimation‡ 
(Dependent variable: 1 if i discusses farming or business matters with j, 0 otherwise) 
 ALL MALE FEMALE HH HEAD HH HEAD 
 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Same ethnicity+                0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 
Same religion+                0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Same iddir+                   0.08 *** 0.02 0.06 * 0.03 0.06 ** 0.03 0.08 ** 0.03 0.07 ** 0.03 
Help when in need+             0.15 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.04 0.17 *** 0.04 
Related(blood/marriage)+      0.14 *** 0.04 0.15*** 0.06 0.13 *** 0.04 0.15 *** 0.06 0.14 *** 0.06 
Meeting frequency             0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 
Geo.dist.(i,j)(ln)          -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.04 ** 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Having plots nearby+          0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.09* 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Radio list.(freq)             0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 
Tv watch.(freq)              0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 
Travel to town.(freq)        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Diff. gender dummies        -0.03 0.02 -0.24 *** 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.2 *** 0.03 -0.1 *** 0.04 
Diff. of age (i,j)            0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Diff. educ (i,j)              0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Diff. HH size (i,j)          0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Diff. no. of men            0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Diff. land size             -0.01* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Diff. treatment status        0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Sum gender dummies            0.10 *** 0.02 0.00 -  -  
 
0.12 *** 0.04 
Sum of age (i,j)             0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
Sum of educ (i,j)           0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
Sum of HH size (i,j)          0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.01 
Sum no. of men               0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
0.00 0.01 
Sum of land size              0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
0.01 0.01 
Sum treatment status         0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  
0.04* 0.02 
Hitossa-Tiyo+                  0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Adaa-Lume+                     0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 
Observations 2339  1285  1054  1402  1402  
Log lik. -878.6  -530.6  -302.7  -601.3  -584.7  
Pseudo R2 0.24  0.27  0.22  0.24  0.26  
+Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Other covariates fixed at their means. 
‡Probit coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table A3. 1. 
The age difference variable is positive and statistically significant in Table 3.5 ((columns (2) and (3)) for both 
male and female respondents implying that younger people are more likely to mention older ones as their 
learning link. This is in contrast with the results from self-reported links (Table 3.6), which suggest that the 
likelihood of a learning link is higher within age groups. Gender of the network partner does not seem to be an 
important factor for the establishment of a learning link for female respondents, while the existence of a learning 
link with opposite sex seems less likely for male respondents and male household heads (Table 3.5). Yet, there 
seems to be a level effect on learning links across same gender and it is especially the case among male household 
heads. This again is also in line with results from self-reported networks (Table 3.6) which suggest that having a 
network partner of the same gender improves the likelihood of a learning link for both female and male 
respondents. 
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Table 3.6. Determinants of learning links (using self-reported networks), marginal effects of a Probit estimation‡ 
(Dependent variable: 1 if i discusses farming or business matters with j, 0 otherwise) 
 ALL MALE FEMALE HH HEAD 
 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Same ethnicity 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.05 
Same religion -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.10* 0.06 0.00 0.03 
Same iddir  0.11*** 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.14*** 0.05 0.02 0.03 
Close family 0.13*** 0.03 0.06** 0.02 0.16*** 0.05 0.07*** 0.03 
Distant family 0.10*** 0.03 0.05** 0.03 0.16*** 0.05 0.07*** 0.02 
Same village 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.09 0.07 
Same kebele -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.05 0.04 
Same gender 0.22*** 0.04 0.11** 0.05 0.15** 0.06 0.11*** 0.04 
Same age 0.07*** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09** 0.04 0.04** 0.02 
Farmer 0.20*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.06 0.09* 0.05 0.23*** 0.05 
Meet less than 1/week 0.20*** 0.06 0.15* 0.07 0.17** 0.08 0.15** 0.07 
Help when in need 0.11 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.36** 0.17 
Max of age from i & j‡ 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
Education 0-4(dummy) 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.07** 0.03 
Education 5-8(dummy) 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.00 0.04 
Education 8+(dummy) 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.05 
Radio list.(freq)‡ 4.8E-05 9.2E-05 8.5E-05 8.3E-05 -2.0E-04 1.5E-04 2.4E-05 8.4E-05 
Tv watch.(freq)‡ 2.0E-04 1.3E-04 1.1E-04 9.8E-05 3.3E-04* 1.9E-04 4.1E-05 1.0E-04 
Travel to town.(freq)‡ 4.7E-04** 2.3E-04 1.3E-04 1.3E-04 1.0E-03 6.3E-04 2.0E-04 1.5E-04 
Land size (ha) (ln)‡ 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.01 
Hitossa-Tiyo (dummy) -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.08 0.02 0.04 
Adaa-Lume (dummy) -0.11** 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.23*** 0.07 0.03 0.03 
Observations 2565 
 
1270 
 
1295 
 
1400 
 Log lik. -1233.5 
 
-362.57 
 
-772.19 
 
-436.3 
 Pseudo R2 0.1465 
 
0.258 
 
0.0956 
 
0.2401 
 ‡These covariates are fixed at their means. dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base 
level. ‡Probit coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table A3. 2. 
 
Contrary to expectations, other socio-economic indicators such as education, household size, and the size of land 
holdings seem to be less important for the likelihood of learning links. In addition, while evidence suggests that 
living near the match tends to only weakly improve the likelihood of learning links among male respondents, the 
location of residence in relation to the network partner does not appear to be important in general and for self-
reported networks in particular. Rather, having a network partner who is also a farmer increases the likelihood of 
a learning link in self-reported networks. These results therefore suggest that our findings are not only driven by 
correlated and contextual effects, and hence endogenous formation of networks seems to be of less a concern in 
this specific case.  
Further, since it is essential to control for all potential sources of information in estimations of ‘learning links’ 
(Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Maertens and Barrett, 2013), we do so by accounting for the frequency of travel the 
respondent makes to the nearest town and the frequency that the respondent listens to the radio and watches 
television. We proxy for other information sources such as extension services, markets, and also other fixed 
effects by controlling for district dummies. Our results suggest that frequently following mass-media such as 
radio and television facilitates the chance of a learning link but only from estimations using networks from the 
‘random matching’-exercise. The frequency of travel to nearest town does not appear to be important in the 
probability of a learning link at individual level analysis in both methods of sampling networks. Yet, the 
frequency of travel matters at the household level for self-reported networks. Finally, the results do not 
 57 
 
qualitatively change when we include indicators for smaller geographic units (such as kebele) instead of district 
dummies. 
3.4.2.2. The effect of social network size and structure on the probability of adopting row 
planting  
In this section we directly examine whether learning links are correlated with innovation behavior. We start by 
noting that our data do not suggest that spouses individually hold farms and hence we assume that the adoption 
of an innovation is a household-level decision, represented by the behavior of the household head. Thus, unlike 
the investigation of determinants of learning links at the individual level, we conduct household-level analyses in 
this and the subsequent sections. Marginal effects of Probit estimation from a dyadic regression framework as 
outlined in equation 2 relating the adoption of row planting to the characteristics of the household head, the 
match and the nature of their relationship, and other controls are presented in Table 3.7, conditional on knowing 
the randomly allocated match. We specify the nature of the link between nodes, which may involve advice; 
informal insurance; kinship; belongingness to same iddir, ethnicity or religion; frequency of meetings between the 
two; the distance between the households; and whether they hold adjacent plots.  
Table 3.7.  The effect of social network structure on the probability of adopting row planting, marginal effects of a 
Probit estimation‡ 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 Household head 1 Household head 1 
 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Discussion on farming/business+ 0.066** 0.028 0.059** 0.028 
Help when in need+             -0.053 0.028 -0.044 0.028 
Related(blood/marriage)+      -0.018* 0.042 -0.018 0.041 
Meeting frequency             0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Geo.dist.(i,j)(ln)          -0.041** 0.017 -0.036** 0.017 
Having plots nearby+          0.011 0.047 0.018 0.046 
Radio list.(freq)             0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tv watch.(freq)              0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Travel to town.(freq)        -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Diff. gender dummies        0.014 0.026 0.012 0.026 
Diff. of age (i,j)            -0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Diff. educ (i,j)              0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Diff. no. of men            0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Diff. land size             0.051*** 0.008 0.053*** 0.008 
Diff. treatment status        0.041** 0.018 0.034* 0.018 
Sum gender dummies            -0.051* 0.027 -0.048* 0.026 
Sum of age (i,j)             0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Sum of educ (i,j)           0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Sum no. of men               0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006 
Sum of land size              0.039*** 0.008 0.041*** 0.008 
Sum treatment status         0.063*** 0.019 0.064*** 0.019 
Same ethnicity+ 0.027 0.030 0.013 0.029 
Same religion+                0.039 0.033 0.024 0.032 
Same iddir+                   0.016 0.028 0.027 0.028 
Dist. asphalt road (minutes)(ln) 
  
0.001 0.001 
Dist. market (minutes)(ln)                        0.000 0.000 
Dist. district (minutes)(ln)                         0.000 0.001 
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln)                         0.000 0.000 
Dist. input dealer (minutes)(ln)            
 
0.000 0.000 
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln)                         0.000 0.001 
Dist. MFI (minutes)(ln)                         -0.001* 0.001 
Hitossa-Tiyo+                  -0.699*** 0.037 -0.669*** 0.042 
Adaa-Lume+                     -0.849*** 0.026 -0.804*** 0.036 
Observations 1402 
 
1404 
 
Log lik. -567.8 
 
-557.9 
 
Pseudo R2 0.37  0.38  
+Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Other covariates fixed at their means. 
‡Probit coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table A3. 3. 
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Table 3.7, column 1, shows that the ‘advice link’- having discussed farming or business matters with the network partner- is 
statistically significantly associated with the likelihood of adopting row planting. Perhaps this might be indicative 
of suggestive evidence of learning externalities, which we formally test in the next part. While the statistical 
significance of the variable for the distance between households may cast doubt on the existence of correlated 
behaviors, other potential network indicators such as kinship, belonging to same iddir, ethnicity or religion, 
having plots next to each other, are not statistically significantly associated with the probability of adopting this 
innovation. Further, in addition to indicators for mass media such as radio and television, the results remain 
robust in column 2 after controlling for more potential sources of information and extension services proxied by 
average distance between farmer’s residence and offices of the extension agent, cooperative offices, input dealer 
shops, nearest markets, nearest micro-finance institutions, district towns, and nearest asphalt road. Surprisingly, 
none of these additional sources of information and other services appear to be strongly associated with the 
probability of adopting row planting.  
Watching television more frequently appears to affect the probability of adopting row planting positively and 
statistically significantly. This may show the power of visual aids in convincing farmers more strongly than other 
sources of information specified in this study and may be in line with Bernard et al. (2015) who establish the 
effectiveness of video-based interventions in inducing behavioral changes in rural Ethiopia. Surprisingly, 
however, making more frequent travels to the nearest town seems to negatively affect the likelihood of adopting 
this innovation. This may be because the cost of receiving new information and knowledge from such travels 
outweighs the potential benefits because row planting is currently still perceived as a labor-intensive practice in 
Ethiopia and making frequent travels to towns may just induce a trade-off between the required labor supply and 
the chance of receiving new information. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, this could potentially be 
investigated by testing the separability of household labor supply and demand.    
Moving on to other results, the sum and difference in land holdings between the farmer and the match are both 
positive and statistically significant, thereby implying that innovation adoption is more likely among networks 
with both large and small farmers. This is in line with expectations as the size of land holdings is a very good 
predictor of wealth in rural Ethiopia, and as farmers with more wealth are likely to experiment with new 
innovations, which may create the possibility of knowledge spillovers to smaller farmers in their network. Our 
results also suggest that farmers having more links with farmers of similar age are more likely to adopt the new 
technology. The result, however, is only weakly statistically significant and not robust to different specification. 
In contrast, the variable that represents the sum of male dummy is negative and significant implying that links 
with more male household heads are less likely to adopt row planting. This is less intuitive, however, because 
having many male network connections may mean more learning links as we find in the previous section. Yet, 
we cannot rule out the fact that the results may present evidence of strategic delays in the adoption of this 
innovation when there are many male links in one’s networks.  
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On the other hand, variables that represent the sum and difference of farmers who were treated by an NGO 
project in the past are both positive and statistically significant.35 This implies that non-treated farmers who are 
linked with past project beneficiaries are more likely to adopt row planting, which is in line with expectations as 
the NGO project promoted related agricultural innovations and farmers may learn from others. In summary, 
having controlled for many factors that could proxy for correlated behavior within networks, the results in this 
section suggest that learning from network connections exists among the study households, which we formally 
test in the next section. 
3.4.2.3. The effect of networks on technology adoption 
We noted in Section 2 that the identification of social network effects is complicated due to the presence of 
omitted variables and simultaneity. Our rich dataset allows us to effectively control for factors that may 
otherwise generate spurious correlation. To correct for the reflection problem, Manski (2000) suggests to 
introduce dynamism to the model and to relate individual behavior to lagged rather than contemporaneous 
values of group mean behavior. An alternative approach Manski suggests is to use instrumental variables that 
directly affect the outcomes of some, but not all group members. The latter is equivalent to Angrist and 
Pischke’s (2009, p.196) suggestion to use “some measure of peer quality which predates the outcome variable 
and is therefore unaffected by common shocks.” We fit equation 4 using a slightly modified combination of the 
two options as explained next.  
Row planting is a recent innovation in Ethiopia and our data were collected in 2006 and again in 2010 long 
before this innovation was promoted in 2012/13. Therefore, we expect that lagged indicators such as farm 
productivity measured as output per hectare from the baseline period to be unaffected by present common 
shocks or the new innovation (or row planting). In addition, only some of the study households were treated by 
an NGO project during the baseline period (2006-2010) and, again, we do not expect that the new innovation 
would affect their past treatment status. On the contrary, we expect that both past productivity levels and past 
treatment status would affect a farmer’s present innovation behavior. Our data refer to the production years 
2006/07, 2009/10 and 2013/14 and since this innovation was promoted half-way between the second and third 
data points (and that innovation adoption being a rather slow process) we believe that we have a reasonable lag 
length, not to mention availability of the data as such. Our two identifying variables are therefore the change in 
productivity between 2006/07 and 2009/10 and past treatment status of the farmer and their peers. We choose 
the change in productivity rather than levels because doing so helps to control for time-invariant characteristics 
as well as it would reflect past trend in the innovation behavior of farmers, which is likely to be correlated to 
present ones. Further, we use various specifications and the change in productivity between 2013/14 and 
2009/10 as identifying variables for a robustness check. 
                                                          
35
The NGO project promoted various agricultural technologies and practices (such as improved varieties and improved 
natural resource management practices excluding row planting). The project was terminated before the data in 2010 were 
collected.  
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Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present results that identify endogenous (network) effects separately from correlated and 
contextual effects. In both tables, columns 1 and 2 report results using networks from only the household head, 
while columns 3 and 4 are based on networks from both the spouse and the household head combined. Results 
clearly indicate that there is strong evidence of network externalities in the adoption of row planting in the study 
areas. For example, the results in column 1 of Table 3.8 suggest that the average change in peers’ productivity 
between 2009/10 and 2006/07 is strongly associated with the probability of a farmer adopting row planting. This 
result is even stronger when we use the wider network, i.e. combined networks from both spouses (columns 3 
and 4), which may be interpreted as evidence of transitivity of relationship or clustering among networks as 
described above. Furthermore, the number of treated individuals in one’s network statistically significantly 
increases the probability of adopting row planting (columns 1 and 3). This evidence of endogenous effect is 
present even after controlling for own past treatment status.  
Table 3.8. The effect of social learning on the adoption of row planting, marginal effects of a Probit estimation‡ 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 Networks of the household head  Networks of both spouses 
 dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err  dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err 
Average value of peers’ characteristics        
Change in ave. yield (2006-2010)          4E-05* 2E-05 2.1E-05 2E-05  8E-05*** 3E-05 5.3E-05** 2.6E-05 
Share of treated     0.19* 0.12 0.13 0.11  -0.12* 0.20 -0.26 0.18 
Ave. age(years)(ln)           0.12 0.17 0.10 0.16  0.21 0.24 -0.02 0.23 
Ave. HH size(ln)              0.05 0.20 0.04 0.19  0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Ave. value of prod. assets(ln)          0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Ave. value of cons. durables(ln)          0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03  0.08 0.14 0.15 0.12 
Ave. livestock holdings(TLU)(ln)        0.03 0.12 0.01 0.10  -0.14 0.11 -0.03 0.10 
Ave. landholdings(ha)( ln)         -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10  0.24 0.13 0.09 0.12 
Household characteristics 
    
 
    
Female HH head+          0.02 0.08 0.01 0.08  0.03 0.08 0.03 0.07 
Age of HH head (years)         -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Square. of age of HH head           8.7E-05 0.0001 6.9E-05 1E-04  5E-05 1E-04 3.5E-05 1.1E-04 
Education 0-4(dummy)+         -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.08  0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 
Education 5-8(dummy)+          0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06  0.11* 0.06 0.09 0.05 
Education 8+(dummy)+           0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07  0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Radio list.(freq)             1.5E-04 2E-04 1.5E-04 2E-04  5E-05 2E-04 4.1E-05 1.6E-04 
Tv watch.(freq)               0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00  0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
Nonfarm/business activities+         -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.06  -0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
HH size (ln)                  0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08  0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 
Size of own land (ha)(ln)         0.18*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.05  0.18*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.04 
Treated+          0.18*** 0.07 0.15** 0.06  0.17*** 0.06 0.14*** 0.06 
Dist. asphalt road (minutes)(ln) 
  
0.07 0.06  
  
0.08 0.07 
Dist. market (minutes)(ln)                        
  
-0.09 0.07  
  
-0.16 0.08 
Dist. district (minutes)(ln)                         
  
-0.04 0.28  
  
0.90 0.39 
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln)                         
  
-0.02 0.05  
  
-0.08 0.06 
Dist. input dealer (minutes)(ln)            
  
0.00 0.08  
  
0.01 0.10 
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln)                         
  
-0.03 0.06  
  
0.09 0.07 
Dist. MFI (minutes)(ln)                         
  
-0.23 0.28  
  
-1.24 0.40 
Hitossa-Tiyo+                 -0.7*** 0.10 -0.7*** 0.10  -0.6*** 0.11 -0.5*** 0.14 
Adaa-Lume+                    -0.96*** 0.10 -0.7*** 0.10  -0.9*** 0.11 -0.6*** 0.16 
Observations 346 
 
346 
 
 348 
 
348 
 
Log lik. -140.1 
 
-135.3 
 
 -137.3 
 
-129.5 
 
Pseudo R2 0.39 
 
0.41 
 
  0.40 
 
  0.45 
 
+Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Other covariates fixed at their 
means. ‡Probit coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table A3. 4. 
 
None of peers’ exogenous characteristics including age, household size, the value of production assets, the value 
of consumer durables, livestock holdings, and land size holdings are statistically significantly associated with a 
farmer’s probability of adopting row planting, which suggests the absence of contextual effects, i.e. farmer’s 
innovation behavior is not correlated with the exogenous characteristics of their reference group.  
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We control for correlated effects using district dummies. By comparison to the Bakko-Sire study site, it appears 
that farmers in Lume-Adda and Hitossa-Tiyo are less likely to adopt row planting. This does not come as a 
surprise as, among many other factors, the main crop in the reference study site is maize, whose agronomic 
management is less labor demanding, when using the existing practice, by comparison to teff and wheat, which 
are the main crops in the other two study sites.        
Most of the individual and household-level characteristics such as gender, age and religion of the household 
head, and household size do not appear to be strongly associated with the probability of adopting row planting. 
Farmers with primary education seem to be more likely to adopt row planting compared to those with no 
education. Having a larger land size is also strongly associated with the likelihood of adopting row planting. We 
also control for potential sources of information and extension services including radio, television and other 
proxy variables such as the average distance between the farmer’s residence and offices of the extension agent, 
cooperative offices, input dealer shops, the nearest market, the nearest micro-finance institution, district town, 
and the nearest asphalt road. We find that farmers who frequently watch television are more likely to adopt row 
planting, which is in line with expectations and our findings in the preceding section on the correlates of 
adopting row planting.  
Similarly, our results suggest that farmers who are located further away from services such as markets and micro-
finance institution are less likely to adopt row planting. Another result which seems less intuitive is that those 
who reside closer to district towns are less likely to adopt row planting. This could be because these farmers may 
tend to frequently travel to towns and doing so may leave them little time to adopt this labor-intensive technique. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on the dummy that represents whether any of the household members engages in 
other income-generating activities is negative but not statistically significant. This indicator variable may be a 
poor proxy for picking up the effect of making frequent travels and engagement in non-farm activities and 
testing for separability of household labor supply and demand might help, but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper.     
 
Robustness check 
As mentioned above, we also use the average change in peers’ average productivity between 2009/10 and 
2013/14 as identifying variables for a robustness check of our findings on the existence of social learning. All 
other controls are the same as before. We find that the coefficient for the change in peers’ average productivity 
between 2009/10 and 2013/14 is negative and statistically significant (Table 3.9). This again is evidence of 
network externalities but of the opposite sign. We propose two possible reasons for the negative sign. First, the 
peers’ contemporaneous data (2013/14 data) is being used to calculate the change in productivity and doing so 
may not properly satisfy the requirements of using a lagged value as an identifying variable. Secondly, we note in 
the descriptive statistics that the average change in peers’ average productivity between 2009/10 and 2013/14 is 
positive while the change between 2006/07 and 2009/10 of the same indicator is negative. Our interpretation is 
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that, when farmers observe a decline in average productivity of the reference group, individual farmers may tend 
to improve their own productivity by doing something different or by employing a new technology while they 
otherwise could stick to their old practice if everybody else is doing well. In any case, our results suggest that 
there is indeed evidence of network externalities, which is also reflected by the second identifying variable i.e.  
The average number of treated farmers in the reference group is statistically significantly associated with the 
probability of adopting row planting (columns 1 and 3). Further, the results regarding the other controls are 
similar to the main results. 
Table 3.9. The effect of social learning on the adoption of row planting, marginal effects of a Probit estimation‡ 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 Networks of the household head  Networks of both spouses 
 dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err  dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err 
Average value of peers’ characteristics        
Change in ave. yield (2010-14)          -2E-05*** 6E-06 -2.5E-05*** 7E-06  -1.7E-05 1E-05 -2.6E-05* 1.4E-05 
Share of treated     0.26** 0.12 0.18 0.11  0.26* 0.14 0.10 0.13 
Network size 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.10  0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Network-size sq. -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01  5E-04 0.003 0.00 0.00 
Ave. age(years)(ln)           0.09 0.18 0.07 0.17  -0.03 0.21 -0.22 0.19 
Ave. HH size(ln)              0.13 0.20 0.09 0.19  0.39 0.25 0.09 0.25 
Ave. value of prod. assets(ln)          0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Ave. value of cons.durables(ln)          0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Ave. livestockholdings(TLU)(ln)        0.04 0.12 0.02 0.11  0.06 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Ave. landholdings(ha)( ln)         -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10  -0.13 0.11 -0.02 0.11 
Household characteristics   
  
 
    
Female HH head+          0.03 0.08 0.02 0.08  0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 
Age of HH head (years)         -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Square. of age of HH head           0.00 0.00 8E-05 1E-04  6E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Education 0-4(dummy)+         -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.09  0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 
Education 5-8(dummy)+          0.11 0.07 0.10 0.06  0.13* 0.07 0.11* 0.06 
Education 8+(dummy)+           0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07  0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Radio list.(freq)             0.00 0.00 0.00 2E-04  9E-05 0.0002 0.00 0.00 
Tv watch.(freq)               0.00** 0.00 0.00** 2E-04  5E-04** 0.0002 0.00** 0.00 
Nonfarm/business activities+         -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.07  -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.06 
HH size (ln)                  -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.08  -0.02 0.08 0.00 0.07 
Size of own land (ha)(ln)               0.18*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.05  0.18*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.04 
Treated+          0.18*** 0.06 0.16** 0.06  0.17*** 0.06 0.14*** 0.06 
Dist. asphalt road(minutes)(ln)   0.06 0.06  
  
0.10 0.07 
Dist. market (minutes)(ln)                          -0.09 0.07  
  
-0.16*** 0.09 
Dist. district (minutes)(ln)                          -0.05 0.28  
  
0.86 0.40 
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln)                          -0.02 0.05  
  
-0.10 0.06 
Dist. input dealer(minutes)(ln)             -0.01 0.08  
  
0.01 0.10 
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln)                          -0.02 0.06  
  
0.09 0.07 
Dist. MFI (minutes)(ln)                           -0.20 0.29  
  
-1.24*** 0.41 
Hitossa-Tiyo+                  -0.8*** 0.10 -0.73*** 0.10  -0.74*** 0.09 -0.57*** 0.13 
Adaa-Lume+                    -1.0*** 0.10 -0.81*** 0.09  -0.89*** 0.05 -0.67*** 0.15 
Observations 346  346   348  348  
Log lik. -138.1  -133.4   -139.3  -130.6  
Pseudo R2 0.39  0.41   0.39  0.43  
†Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Other covariates fixed at their 
means. ‡Probit coefficients are reported in the appendix in Table A3. 5. 
 
Finally, we include network size36 measured by the number of links identified from all matches and its square for 
an additional test of robustness (Table 3.9). We observe that the main findings do not qualitatively change, 
thereby confirming that our main results are not driven by endogenous network size. This is further supported 
by the fact that neither network size nor its square are statistically significant.   
                                                          
36 We also control for the fraction of randomly allocated matches the household knows in order to measure their 
connectedness in general. But results remain unchanged. 
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3.4.2.4. The effect of social learning on farm productivity 
Social learning may occur not only in adopting a single innovation such as row planting but also in many other 
innovations and aspects, the collective effect of which may improve yields. In this context, we regress farm 
productivity (output/ha) on average values of group or network characteristics and other controls including 
individual and household-level characteristics as well as community-level fixed effects. We report regression 
results in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11. Results in columns 1 through 4 relate to networks of only the head of the 
household, while the remaining columns are based on the networks of both spouses taken together. To capture 
network externalities, we use average productivity of the reference group measured by present yields, past yields, 
and by the change in average productivity in a similar approach to the preceding section. 
 
Referring to Table 3.10 column 1, our results suggest that own farm productivity is strongly associated with the 
average productivity of the reference group for the same production year. This result remains statistically 
significant when we extend the reference group to that of both spouses (column 5), thereby again presenting 
evidence of transitivity of relationships and clustering among networks. Even though these may suggest evidence 
of learning externalities, we cannot rule out the presence of a reflection problem since we are using peers’ 
outcome from the same production year. Therefore, we re-estimate the model using lagged (i.e. the 2010) values 
of average productivity of the reference group. As the results in columns 2 and 6 show, the coefficient is positive 
and highly statistically significant, thus suggesting strong evidence of social learning or endogenous effects. 
Further, the coefficient on average livestock holdings of the reference group (columns 1-4) is positive and 
statistically significant, thereby suggesting that farm productivity increases with the increase in livestock holdings 
of one’s networks. This evidence of contextual effects is not surprising as it is customary among rural 
households in Ethiopia to exchange or lend out livestock as draft power or for other farming activities. Finally, 
we also attempt to identify network effects using the change in average productivity of the reference group but 
the results are not statistically significant (see columns 3, 4, 7 and 8). 
Moving on to the other results, we find that having primary education (1-4 years) and household size to be 
strongly associated with farm productivity in all specifications (columns 1-8). This may suggest that larger 
households have more labor which is an important input in small-scale agriculture in Ethiopia. Yet, we do not 
find other characteristics of the household to affect farm productivity.    
 
Robustness check 
Inclusion of network size and its square term in all the specifications as additional test of robustness do not 
change the results confirming that results are not driven by size of the network (Compare Table 3.10 against 
Table 3.11 where indicators of network size and its square term are included). Again, both indicators of network 
size and its square term are not statistically significant only supporting our claim that there is evidence of 
knowledge spill overs.  
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Table 3.10. The effect of social externalities on farm productivity  
(Dependent variable: log (value of output per hectare of land)) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
HH_HEAD1 HH_HEAD2 HH_HEAD3 HH_HEAD4 ALLP1 ALLP2 ALLP3 ALLP4    
         Average value of peers’ characteristics 
Ave. yield_2014 0.28** 
   
0.28** 
  
             
 
(0.11) 
   
(0.11) 
  
             
Ave. yield_2010 
 
0.28* 
   
0.33* 
 
             
  
(0.14) 
   
(0.19) 
 
             
Change in yield 2010-2014 
 
0.00** 
   
0.00              
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.00)              
Change in yield 2006-2010 
  
0.00 
   
0.00    
    
(0.00) 
   
(0.00)    
Ave. livestock holdings(TLU)(ln) 0.29*** 0.28** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.18    
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21)    
Ave. landholdings(ha)( ln) -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 -0.12 -0.22* -0.22*   
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)    
Household characteristics         
Education of household head 1-4(dummy) 0.12** 0.13** 0.13** 0.15*** 0.15** 0.17** 0.16** 0.19*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)    
HH size (ln)  0.52** 0.52** 0.53** 0.53** 0.50* 0.50** 0.50** 0.50**  
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)    
Hitossa-Tiyyo 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.48*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.73*** 
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07)    
Adaa-Lume 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.16    
 
(0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15)    
Constant  5.00*** 5.23*** 6.93*** 7.18*** 4.37** 4.51** 6.13*** 6.49*** 
 
(1.42) (1.51) (1.33) (1.35) (2.02) (1.91) (1.94) (2.02)    
         Other controls≠ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 346 346 348 348 348 348    
r2 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
≠Note: the following controls were included but the coefficients were not statistically significant: networks’ characteristics (average: age, household size, value of productive assets, value of 
consumer durables); own household characteristics (dummy for female household head, age and square of age of the household head, dummies for education of the household head (5th-
8th) grade and 8+ grade, dummy whether the household head engaged in business or wage labor, size of land holdings, dummy whether the household participated in NGO project 
intervention in the past). 
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Table 3.11. The effect of social externalities on farm productivity  
(Dependent variable: log (value of output per hectare of land)) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
HH_HEAD11 HH_HEAD21 HH_HEAD31 HH_HEAD41 ALLP11 ALLP21 ALLP31 ALLP41    
         Average value of peers’ characteristics 
Ave. yield_2014 0.26** 
   
0.28** 
  
             
 
(0.11) 
   
(0.12) 
  
             
Ave. yield_2010 
 
0.26* 
   
0.34* 
 
             
  
(0.15) 
   
(0.19) 
 
             
Change in yield 2010-2014 
  
0.00** 
   
0.00              
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.00)              
Change in yield 2006-2010 
   
0.00 
   
0.00    
    
(0.00) 
   
(0.00)    
Network size -0.07 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09    
 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)    
Network-size sq. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01    
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)    
Ave. livestock holdings(TLU)(ln) 0.28** 0.28** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.18    
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)    
Ave. landholdings(ha)( ln) -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.13 -0.22* -0.23*   
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)    
Household characteristics         
Education 0-4(dummy) 0.11** 0.12** 0.13** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
HH size (ln)  0.51* 0.51** 0.51** 0.51** 0.48* 0.50* 0.48* 0.49*   
 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)    
Hitossa-Tiyyo 0.48*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.73*** 
 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08)    
Adaa-Lume 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.21 0.18    
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15)    
Constant  5.22*** 5.50*** 7.01*** 7.31*** 4.06** 4.14** 5.79*** 6.15*** 
 
(1.44) (1.54) (1.25) (1.29) (2.03) (1.92) (1.92) (1.95)    
         Other controls≠ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 346 346 348 348 348 348    
r2 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
≠Note: the following controls were included but the coefficients were not statistically significant: networks’ characteristics (average: age, household size, value of productive assets, value of 
consumer durables); own household characteristics (dummy for female household head, age and square of age of the household head, dummies for education of the household head (5th-
8th) grade and 8+ grade, dummy whether the household head engaged in business or wage labor, size of land holdings, dummy whether the household participated in NGO project 
intervention in the past). 
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3.5. Conclusions  
Existing studies on Ethiopian agriculture largely ignore the role of social networks for the adoption of 
agricultural innovations and improved farm productivity. This Chapter aims to contribute to filling this gap. We 
use purposefully collected data that combine conventionally-used network indicators such as membership in 
groups and self-reported networks of family and friends in addition to exogenously and randomly assigned 
matches. By eliciting details of the relationships between network members, their individual farming practices 
and yield performances, we examine the role each network type plays in terms of information or knowledge 
transfers for innovation and productivity. We use econometric strategies to isolate social learning from correlated 
and contextual effects and first examine which factors determine the formation of information links and whether 
those learning links are actually correlated with innovative behavior. We then examine the existence of social 
learning with respect to the adoption of row planting, a recent innovation in Ethiopian agriculture. Finally, we 
investigate social externalities in farm productivity. 
Our results suggest that, as expected, belonging to certain groups such as iddirs, having some form of relationship 
with network members in terms of kinship or informal forms of insurance, or having a high frequency of 
meetings with a network member all seem to increase the probability of forming an information link. It appears, 
however, that the quality of information is more important when it comes to innovation behavior than the 
frequency of interaction. To be specific, we fail to find evidence for a relationship between these indicators and 
the probability of adopting row planting. Instead, we find that information links that exclusively involve 
discussions on farming or business matters are significantly correlated with the likelihood of adopting row 
planting. 
Further, after controlling for factors that may otherwise generate spurious correlation, we find strong evidence of 
network externalities in the adoption of row-planting and in farm productivity. Our findings are in line with 
similar studies such as van den Broeck and Dercon (2011). Therefore, based on our findings, we conclude that 
extension services and other programs that promote agricultural innovations may benefit from social networks 
but they may achieve maximum impact if they identify networks that exclusively involve information exchange 
regarding agriculture. This suggests that farmer groups or cooperatives could be important tools for better 
delivery of agricultural extension and advisory services. This also implies that investment in the formation of 
groups, rather than simply using existing networks, could also be a strategy with high returns. 
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4. THE EFFECT OF ASPIRATIONS ON AGRICULTURAL 
INNOVATIONS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA 
 
Abstract 
This Chapter studies the effect of aspirations on the adoption of agricultural innovations in the context of rural 
Ethiopia. While most studies on agricultural innovations have focused on identifying observable and resource-
related deprivations or ‘external’ constraints, a related stream of literature suggests that ‘internal’ constraints, such 
as the lack of aspirations, could reinforce external constraints and lead to self-sustaining poverty traps. Since 
both aspirations and the adoption of innovations are forward-looking, they are likely to be intimately linked. 
Aspirations are motivators that can enhance innovations or their adoption not only in their own right but also 
through their determinants, including self-efficacy, locus of control and other internal traits that may be 
unobserved. This implies that aspirations may affect innovations through multiple channels and hence may be 
endogenous. On the other hand, aspirations are also affected by a person’s level of achievement, implying that 
aspirations and innovations may be simultaneously determined. To identify the effect of aspirations on the 
adoption of agricultural innovations, we conducted both plot-level and household-level analysis using purposely 
collected data from households in rural Ethiopia. Using econometric strategies that account for the endogenous 
nature of aspirations, we found that a narrow or a very wide gap between aspirations and achievement in a 
farming household is strongly associated with low levels of innovativeness and low adoption rate of innovation 
products such as chemical fertilizers. Policies promoting agricultural innovations may benefit if they incorporate 
aspirations-raising strategies. 
 
  
 
Key words: Aspirations, innovations, agriculture, Ethiopia 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This Chapter studies the relationship between aspirations and innovation behavior in Ethiopian farmers. 
Previous studies on innovation have mainly focused on the adoption pattern of technologies, which have 
increased our understanding of why some technologies diffuse faster than others. Technology attributes, a 
farmer’s perception of a technology (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993; Negatu and Parikh, 1999),  land size, risk 
preferences, education, access to credit and extension services, wealth and labor endowment, roads, markets, 
tenure arrangement, and the availability of complementary inputs and networks are the main determinants 
identified in the literature studying innovations (for extensive reviews see Rogers, 1983; Feder et al., 1985; Feder 
and Umali, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010).  
However, these widely studied determinants of innovations have been mainly observable and resource-related, 
or, in other words, they are ‘external’ constraints. Any policies targeting purely at addressing them may not 
necessarily be able to bring about the desired change. This is because ‘internal’ constraints, such as the lack of 
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self-efficacy, could reinforce external constraints, and this may lead to a self-sustaining poverty trap and low 
levels of proactivity (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006; Dalton et al., 2014). For example, Guyon and Huillery (2014) 
found that in France students from a low social background – such as having parents with a low education level 
or living in a disadvantaged neighborhood – exhibited low aspirations for education despite having the same 
academic abilities as students from a higher social background. However, policies could be used to induce 
motivation or protect people from falling into the trap of low aspirations and poverty. For example, following 
Bandura’s  (1977) theoretical exposition of how perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes might be related, 
Bandura et al. (1977) empirically tested and showed that behavioral changes can be effected by altering the level 
and strength of self-efficacy. 
Further, notwithstanding the importance of policy interventions aimed at relaxing external constraints, for 
example, the provision of credit and extension services, Bertrand et al. (2004) argued that highly consequential 
behaviors are often triggered by situational factors, also known as “channel factors”, which may include 
psychological factors as addressed in the context of this paper. Thus, it is essential to consider and factor in 
internal constraints when designing social policy initiatives (Bandura, 2009) because at the very minimum they 
can enhance the effectiveness of policies that address material deprivation (Dalton et al., 2014).  
The main objective of this Chapter is to investigate whether low aspirations or very wide (and narrow) aspiration 
gaps lead to a low adoption of agricultural innovations or a low degree of innovativeness in selected rural areas 
of Ethiopia. Aspirations are future-oriented, and they entail effort conditional on a person’s belief in their own 
ability to change outcomes. This is also known as self-efficacy; having self-efficacy in turn implies a person has an 
internal locus of control – the belief that life outcomes are within their control (Bernard et al., 2011). Genicot and 
Ray (2014) argued that aspirations encourage a person to invest if they are moderately above their standard of 
living. In other words, the aspirations-gap – the difference between aspirations and achievement – affects future-
oriented behavior. According to Ray (2006), when the aspirations-gap is either too narrow or too wide, we 
observe aspirations failure and people giving up (i.e., a lack of personal effort to raise their future living 
standards). This is because when the aspirations-gap is too narrow, the reward is considered too small for the 
effort, and when it is too wide, the gap will remain large regardless of the amount of effort put in. Yet, Ray 
(2006) noted that policies could be used to moderately open up the aspirations window (and hence the 
aspirations gap) or create a sense of possibilities (when the gap is wide) as long as people are not fatalistic or 
believe that their destiny is preordained. 
Innovation is also future-oriented because it is about change. Thus, we hypothesize that innovation is closely 
linked to aspirations and that low aspirations or very narrow/wide aspirations-gap would lead to low innovations 
or low adoption rate of innovation products. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next 
section contains the background and literature review. Section 4.3. introduces our theoretical model. Section 4.4. 
presents the data and empirical strategy. Results are discussed in section 4.5. And section 4.6. concludes the 
Chapter.       
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4.2. Background and literature review  
The existing literature provides different theories and analytical tools that facilitate a better understanding of the 
circumstances of the poor and possible ways to help them out of the situation they are in.37 Recent additions to 
the economics literature include a study of individual behavior using the aspirations-failure framework (see 
Bernard et al. (2011) for an extensive review, particularly in the Ethiopian context). On the other hand, 
innovation is regarded as an important avenue of bringing about change and sustaining development.38 In the 
systems approach, innovation is broadly defined as “the process by which individuals or organizations master 
and implement the design and production of goods and services that are new to them, irrespective of whether 
they are new to their competitors, their country, or the world” (Ernst et al, 1998: pp.12-13). Agricultural 
innovations may involve use of agricultural technologies, improved practices, and institutional innovations and 
opportunities that can help facilitate interactions among different actors and improve efficiency and growth in 
the sector (World Bank, 2007).  
The innovation systems concept (ISC) is particularly attractive because it gives attention to tacit knowledge, 
which is crucial in the case of developing countries (as opposed to codified knowledge) and yet “difficult to 
articulate or write down” and is “often embedded in skills, beliefs, or ways of doing things” (Mytelka, 1987; cited 
in World Bank, 2007). An aspect that is closely related and highly relevant to this study is the attention the ISC 
gives to attitudes and practices, which are important to innovation processes. According to Hall et al. (2006), 
attitudes and practices such as mistrust, being closed to others’ ideas, secretiveness, lack of confidence, and 
limited scope and intensity of interaction are restrictive, while others such as trust, openness, transparency, 
confidence and proactive networking actually support innovation processes. This perspective could also offer a 
partial explanation to some “non-fully rational” behaviors that Duflo et al. (2011, 2008) observe in Kenya. 
Unlike the widely held belief that low fertilizer adoption rates are due to low returns or credit constraints, Duflo 
et al. (2011, 2008) found that simple interventions (such as offering free delivery of fertilizer while selling them at 
full market price) just after harvest substantially increased the fertilizer adoption rate (the researchers found the 
effect comparable to that of a 50 percent reduction in the price of fertilizer later in the season). Surprisingly, 
Duflo et al. found that offering free delivery when fertilizer is actually needed had no significant impact on the 
fertilizer adoption rate. Findings like these motivate economists to explore alternative explanations by looking at 
other disciplines, substantiating the view that beliefs and/or internal factors, such as aspirations, could help in 
understanding individual decision-making.  
Studying within the framework of the aspirations failure theory, Bernard et al. (2014) conducted a video-based 
experiment that featured success stories to test whether aspirations and future-oriented behavior can be altered. 
Using data collected six months after the video screening, Bernard et al. identified multiple treatment effects, 
                                                          
37 For example, Amartya Sen’s (1981) essay on entitlements and deprivation is considered the breakthrough in the analysis of poverty and 
famine that led to the development of related concepts that include the Human Development Index and many other multidimensional 
poverty measures.  
38 For example, G20 2011 communiqué of Ministerial Meeting on Development put emphasis on innovation in the context of 
agricultural development 
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including significant improvements in: aspirations, use of financial tools related to both savings and credit, the 
number of children enrolled in school, and the total spending on children’s education. They also found a positive 
treatment effect on a hypothetical demand for loan – a result consistent with previous studies by Bernard et al. 
(2011), and Bernard and Taffesse (2012), which found evidence that low aspirations or external locus of control 
could be correlated with low demand for long-term loans and low use of such loans for long-term investments. 
Other studies have also found strong correlation between the lack of aspirations and many factors, including the 
following: expenditures on agricultural inputs, yields, and savings (Kosec et al., 2012); savings choices and health-
seeking behavior (Ghosal et al, 2013); career aspirations and educational attainment of adolescent girls (Beaman 
et al., 2012); private school enrollment (Galab et al., 2013); educational outcomes (Serneels and Dercon, 2014); 
and dropout behavior (Goux et al., 2014). In addition, Gorard et al. (2012) conducted a review on education, 
psychology and related social science literature that examine the importance of attitude and aspirations of young 
people and their parents on educational attainment and participation. 
While existing studies have examined, mainly theoretically, the formation of aspirations and their role in various 
outcomes, the effect of aspirations on agricultural innovations remain largely unexplored. Related behavioral 
studies such as that by Kebede and Zizzo (2015) have shown the negative impact of social preferences, such as 
envy (which Kebede and Zizzo measured using a money burning experiment), on agricultural innovations. Other 
studies on innovation have focused on innovation adoption patterns mainly based on observable socio-economic 
characteristics (as described in the introduction of this paper). This study contributes to the literature by 
examining internal constraints, such as aspirations, as determinants of agricultural innovations.    
 
4.3. Theoretical model 
To understand the link between aspirations and the adoption of agricultural innovations, this paper adopts the 
theoretical model developed by Dalton et al. (2014).39 The two key premises of the model are as follows:  
i. aspirations are reference points that affect utility from achieving a particular status, but - 
ii. aspirations are endogenous reference points in that they are affected by effort choices.  
In this framework, an individual is assumed to have aspirations level (𝐴) for their final wealth status (𝑤𝑓), which 
is determined by their initial wealth (𝑤0) and the level of effort (𝑒) they put in. This implies for the given initial 
status 𝑤0, the individual’s utility derived from achieving a particular status 𝑤𝑓 by choosing effort level 𝑒 also 
depends on their aspirations level (𝐴). The individual’s utility function can be described as:  
𝑢(𝑒, 𝐴, 𝑤𝑓) = 𝑏(𝑤𝑓) + 𝑣 (
𝑤𝑓−𝐴
𝑤𝑓
) − 𝑐(𝑒)                                                                 (1) 
Where:  
                                                          
39 A detailed presentation and the corresponding proofs can be found in that paper. 
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 𝑤𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑒,𝑤0) is assumed to be an increasing function of effort 𝑒, {𝑒 𝜖[0, 1]}, which comes with some 
cost 𝑐(𝑒), whereby the cost function is assumed to be smooth, increasing and convex with 𝑐(0) = 0; 
 𝑏(𝑤𝑓) is assumed to be a smooth, increasing, concave function over final status with 𝑏(0) = 0;  
 𝑣(. ) is a continuously differentiable reference-dependent value function that captures the premise that 
individual aspiration level 𝐴 is a reference point that affects the satisfaction experienced by achieving a 
final outcome 𝑤𝑓.  
 
According to Dalton et al. (2014), poverty imposes external constraints (e.g., lack of access to information or 
credit to acquire skills), which effectively reduce the productivity of the poor. Consequently, for a given effort 
level, final wealth is proportional to initial wealth{𝑤𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑒,𝑤0)}, which clearly puts the poor at a disadvantage 
since the marginal product of effort increases with initial wealth. This would subsequently cause the poor to limit 
their effort choice and thereby their aspirations level since agents would aspire only to achieve an outcome that is 
perceived as attainable. This gives rise to the model’s second premise that aspirations are endogenous to an 
effort choice. Therefore, at a given effort level, aspirations level 𝐴 can be defined as the final outcome attained40: 
𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑒, 𝑤0)                                                                     (2) 
The two premises of the model together imply a two-way feedback between aspirations and effort. Thus, to find 
an optimal level of status and utility, the rational solution would be to jointly choose an effort level and an 
aspirations level (ê, Â) such that: 
ê 𝜖 arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑠(𝑒, 𝑤0) = 𝑢(𝑒, 𝑓(𝑒, 𝑤0), 𝑓(𝑒, 𝑤0))    (3) 
where 𝑒 𝜖 [0, 1]  and,  
Â = 𝑓(ê,𝑤0)        (4) 
However, as the evidence presented in the literature review suggests, most individuals may lack the foresight to 
recognize the feedback effect and therefore may not make decisions in this manner. Such people are referred to 
as behavioral decision-makers. Hence, according to Dalton et al. (2014), a behavioral decision-maker regards 
their aspired status 𝐴 as fixed (instead of endogenously evolving with effort and achieved status), thus imposing 
an externality on themselves that is not fully internalized. Hence, for a fixed initial wealth level, the behavioral 
solution is (ë, Ä), which is different from (or less than) the rational solution (ê, Â), and the decision-maker is 
internally constrained. This implies that poverty and initial disadvantage interact to generate a behavioral poverty 
trap characterized by minimal effort-aspirations pair.   
                                                          
40 The basic assumption is that everyone can reach their aspirations; and that reaching aspirations does not necessarily imply aspiring 
optimally (Dalton et al., 2014)   
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The implication is that interventions could be used to break behavioral poverty traps simply by raising the 
aspirations of the poor. Interventions can also be used with mechanisms that increase individual wealth or 
reduce the cost of effort (e.g., cost of innovations) faced by the poor. Hence, using agricultural innovations as a 
proxy for effort and as an avenue of improving rural livelihoods, this Chapter aims to find out whether 
aspirations actually determine agricultural innovations. 
 
4.4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.4.1. Empirical model 
Following the literature review and theoretical framework outlined in the previous sections, we now present our 
estimation strategy. Innovations are efforts to achieve a certain outcome, and they may require patience and risk-
taking, which are central to the decision-making process. Aspirations, on the other hand, are motivators which 
can enhance innovation and effort allocation to facilitate innovation not only by themselves but also indirectly 
through other determinants such as risk preferences which may be unobserved. This again implies that 
aspirations may affect innovations through multiple channels and hence may be endogenous or simultaneously 
determined.  
Since individuals with different level of aspirations (i.e., those with lower aspirations and those with higher 
aspirations, or between people with moderate aspirations-gap and narrow/large aspirations-gap) may generate 
data differently, a simple regression model may not capture variations both within a group and between groups 
of individuals. An alternative approach is to sort individuals into two groups, or ‘positions’, based on their 
aspirations status. However, as noted above, outcomes (or innovations) and aspirations are simultaneously 
determined, which can lead to selection bias as categorizing people into the two positions would not be random. 
Hence, among the estimation strategies that allow joint determination of endogenous discrete variables and the 
outcomes they affect, endogenous switching models are preferred (Mare and Winship, 1987; Adamchik and Bedi, 
2000; Di Falco et al., 2011). According to Mare and Winship (1987), the main advantages of an endogenous 
switching model are that they allow us to model both the allocation of persons to various ‘treatments’ and the 
effects of treatment on other outcomes; estimate the degree to which common, unmeasured variables affect both 
the outcome and explanatory variables; take account of the potential selection bias; and estimate the impact of 
the classification regime by simulating how individuals would fare had they entered different ‘treatment’ groups.  
Formally, the determination of household innovations can be expressed as the following function: 
𝑦𝑗  =  𝑓(𝐴, 𝐼𝑁,𝐻𝐻, 𝐶, 𝑉 )                                         (5) 
Where 𝑦𝑗 represents innovations implemented by the household, A represents the aspirations status, IN denotes 
other individual characteristics, HH and C respectively denote household and community level characteristics 
that may influence innovations, and V represents location- or village-fixed effects. But for the ease of 
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presentation, let 𝑡𝑗 denote the ‘treatment’ variable A, and 𝑋𝑗 denote IN, HH, C and V.  Following Wooldridge 
(2010), the above function can be expressed as an endogenous treatment-effects model with the regression form: 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗β + δ𝑡𝑗 + εj                                                                                    (6) 
where 𝑡𝑗 is a binary-treatment variable that is assumed to stem from an unobservable latent variable: 
𝑡𝑗
∗ = 𝑤𝑗γ + υ𝑗  with 𝑡𝑗 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑗
∗ > 0 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                         (7) 
where 𝑤𝑗 are the covariates used to model aspirations status (or treatment), and the error terms εj  and υ𝑗 are 
bivariate normals with mean zero and covariance matrix [
𝜎2 𝜌𝜎
𝜌𝜎 1
]. The covariates 𝑋𝑗 and 𝑤𝑗 are unrelated to 
the error terms, or they are exogenous. 
 
The log-likelihood of observation j is given by: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑙𝑛Φ {
𝑤𝑗𝛾+
(𝑦𝑗−𝑋𝑗β−δ)𝜌
𝜎
√1−𝜌2
} −
1
2
(
(𝑦𝑗−𝑋𝑗β−δ)
𝜎
)
2
− 𝑙𝑛√2𝜋𝜎  , 𝑡𝑗 = 1
 
𝑙𝑛Φ {
−𝑤𝑗𝛾−(𝑦𝑗−𝑋𝑗β)𝜌/𝜎
√1−𝜌2
} −
1
2
(
(𝑦𝑗−𝑋𝑗β)
𝜎
)
2
− 𝑙𝑛√2𝜋𝜎, 𝑡𝑗 = 0
             (8) 
Where Φ(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution.  
The Stata program etregress (StataCorp, 2013) was used for the estimation of the endogenous treatment-effect 
model with maximum likelihood when the dependent variable is continuous. Binary dependent variables were 
estimated using the endogenous switching model with full-information maximum likelihood. To fit the model, a 
“wrapper” program, ssm, which calls for the gllamm Stata program (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006) was used. 
Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh argued that the identification of the model does not require identifying restrictions, 
even though it would be a good practice to specify at least one exclusion restriction. A description of the model 
can be found in the paper by Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006) and will not be presented here because it is 
similar to the treatment-effects model described above.  
When the dependent variable is a count number, we followed Cameron and Trivedi (2010) and used a structural 
model, also known as the control function approach. Similar to the switching model, this approach also defines 
explicit models for both the dependent variable (𝑦𝑗) and the endogenous regressor (𝑡𝑗). The basic assumption is 
that the structural equation for the count variable 𝑦𝑗 is a Poisson model with a mean that depends on an 
endogenous regressor: 
𝑦𝑗~Poisson (μ𝑗) and 
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μ𝑗 = Ε(𝑦𝑗|𝑡𝑗, 𝑋𝑗 , 𝜐𝑗) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(β1𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗
′β2 + 𝜐𝑗)                                                       (9) 
where the error term 𝜐𝑗 can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
𝑋𝑗 but correlated with 𝑡𝑗, allowing for endogeneity. The addition of 𝜐𝑗 also controls for overdispersion in the 
Poisson model. The interdependence between 𝑡𝑗and 𝜐𝑗 is specified as: 
𝑡𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗
′γ1 + 𝑤𝑗
′γ2 + εj                                                                                     (10) 
Where 𝑤𝑗 is a vector of exogenous variables that affect 𝑡𝑗 nontrivially but does not directly affect 𝑦𝑗 , which is 
commonly known as an instrument or an exclusion restriction. Further, the errors 𝜐𝑗 and εj are assumed to be 
related via: 
𝜐𝑗 = 𝜌εj + 𝜂j                                                                                                            (11) 
where  𝜂j ~[0,𝜎𝜂
2] is independent of  εj ~[0,𝜎ε
2]. Consequently, this means that ε is a common latent factor that 
affects both yj and tj and is the only source of dependence between them after controlling for the influence of 
the observable variables Xj and wj. If ρ = 0, then tj can be treated as exogenous. Otherwise, tj is endogenous 
since it is correlated with υj in (10) because both tj and υj depend on ε. 
Now, substituting (11) for 𝜐𝑗 into (9) yields  μ𝑗 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(β1𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗
′β2 + 𝜌εj )e
𝜂. Then, taking the expectation of  
μ𝑗 with respect to 𝜂 yields: 
Ε𝜂(μ) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(β1𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗
′β2 + 𝜌ε )Ε(e
𝜂) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(β1𝑡𝑗 + 𝑙𝑛Ε(e
𝜂) + 𝑋𝑗
′β2 + 𝜌ε )          (12) 
The constant term 𝑙𝑛Ε(e𝜂) can be absorbed in the coefficient of the intercept, a component of 𝑋𝑗. It follows 
that: 
μ𝑗|𝑋𝑗 , 𝑡𝑗, εj = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(β1𝑡𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗
′β2 + 𝜌εj )                                                                           (13) 
Where εj is a new additional variable, and the intercept has absorbed Ε(e
𝜂). If ε were observable, including it as 
a regressor would control for the endogeneity of 𝑡𝑗. Given that it is unobservable, the estimation strategy is to 
replace it by a consistent estimate from a two-step estimation procedure as follows. First, equation (10) is 
estimated using OLS and the residuals έj are generated. Second, parameters of the Poisson model given in (13) 
are estimated after replacing εj  by έj . Finally, if 𝜌 = 0 in the second stage, robust estimates can be drawn by 
adding the command vce(robust) option. But if 𝜌 ≠ 0, then the VCE needs to be estimated with the bootstrap 
method that controls for the estimation of εj  by έj  (Cameroon and Trivedi, 2010). 
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4.4.2. Sampling and measurement issues 
The data was collected through a household survey carried out between January and March 2014 in Ethiopia. 
The survey revisited an existing sample of agricultural households surveyed in 2006 and again 2010 in Oromia 
region under an NGO project, which ended in 2010, aimed at promoting agricultural innovations. The original 
survey used a mix of purposive and random sampling procedures to select 390 households from three study sites 
(Aredo et al., 2008). The primary sampling unit consisted of a pair of neighboring districts, or woredas, which were 
chosen based on the planting density of their major crop and whether they had active farmers' cooperatives. At 
the second stage, kebeles (subdistricts) with active farmers’ cooperatives were selected. Using the number of 
participating households within a cooperative as the sampling frame, households were randomly selected. The 
major crop and total sample size at each research site are summarized in Table 4.1. As shown in Table 4.1, one to 
three households in each district dropped out of the survey for various reasons, including death, relocation to 
another area and unavailability for the survey interview. Nevertheless, when compared against the full sample, 
the households that dropped out of the survey did not show any statistically significant baseline difference with 
regards to key indicators such as income, wealth, and landholdings (results not reported but available upon 
request).  
Table 4.1. Geographic distribution of the sample households  
 Bakko- Siree site 
(Maize crop) 
Lume-Adaa site 
 (Tef crop) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo site 
(Wheat crop) 
Sample size 
District Bakko Sibu Siree Lume Adaa Hettosa Tiyyo Total 
Sample size at 
baseline (2006) 
65 65 65 65 65 65 390 
Sample size (2014) 64 63 63 64 62 63 379 
 
4.4.2.1. Psycho-social indicators 
The new survey included a module that asked about aspirations and other internal features. The module was 
identical to the one used by Bernard and Taffesse (2014), and the instrument passed their test for validity and 
reliability based on a test-retest approach (for details, see Bernard and Taffesse, 2014). 
To capture aspirations and expectations, the instrument asked the respondents about:  
 First, their current level, aspired level, and expected level with regards to four dimensions (income, 
wealth, social status, and children’s education).41 Wealth (or current value of assets) and income (annual 
income from agriculture and non-agricultural activities) were reported in terms of Ethiopian Birr; 
children’s education in terms of education level; and social status in terms of the percentage of the 
village population that had asked the individual for advice on important decisions. 42 
                                                          
41 Since individuals aspire to achieve different things, depending on their experiences and the information set they have, relying on any 
single indicator may not suffice for measuring a person’s aspirations. Nonetheless, these four indicators are believed to be strongly 
correlated with many dimensions a person might want to achieve in their life. Hence, the aggregate index is comprehensive enough to use 
as a strong proxy for a person’s aspirations. 
42
 Since attitudinal measures such as aspirations are likely to be measured with errors, normalization would help to smooth out errors at 
individual level. Further, normalization also makes individual indicators unit free, a prerequisite for aggregation as explained next. 
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 Second, the weight or relative importance they place on each of the four aforementioned dimensions. 
The respondents were each given 20 beans and a piece of paper with four squares, each labeled with one 
of the four dimensions. Then the respondents were asked to distribute the beans in the four squares 
according to the importance of each dimension to them.  
Following Beaman et al. (2012), Bernard and Taffesse (2014), and Kosec et al. (2012), a respondent’s aspirations 
level was calculated using an aggregate index based on their answers to the questions about their aspirations for 
each of the four dimensions. The index is constructed by first normalizing each dimension (i.e., by removing the 
average level for individuals in the same district and then dividing this difference by the standard deviation for 
individuals in the same district) and then multiplying the result by the weight the respondent gave to the 
dimension. The aspiration index was derived by summing the weighted average of the four normalized 
outcomes.43  
Mathematically, the aspirations index (𝐴𝑖) 44 can be represented as: 
𝐴𝑖 = ∑ (
𝑎𝑛
𝑖 −𝜇𝑛
𝑑
𝜎𝑛
𝑑 )𝑤𝑛
𝑖4
𝑛=1                                                                                 (14) 
Where: 
𝑎𝑛
𝑖  is the aspired outcome of individual 𝑖 on dimension 𝑛 (income, assets, education, or social status).   
𝜇𝑛
𝑑 is the average aspired outcome in district 𝑑 for outcome 𝑛.   
𝜎𝑛
𝑑 is the standard deviation of aspired outcomes in district 𝑑 for outcome 𝑛.  
𝑤𝑛
𝑖  is the weight individual 𝑖 places on dimension 𝑛. 
In addition, the survey instrument also asked several questions to capture factors that help shape aspirations. 
These include factors associated with cognitive processes, such as locus of control, perception on the causes of 
poverty, attitude towards change, self-esteem, envy, and trust. The psychosocial indicators are measured using 
Likert-type scales (see Table 4.2). 
 
 
                                                          
43 The expectation index is constructed using the same method. 
44
 Relatedly, aspirations-gap is the difference between the aspired outcome and current level in terms of each of the four dimensions. The 
individual aspirations-gap index is calculated by dividing the aspirations-gap with the aspired outcome of each dimension. The weighted 
sum of the individual aspirations-gap indices of the four dimensions gave the aggregate aspirations-gap index. A dummy for narrow/large 
aspirations-gap was then constructed as follows. First, we classified individuals into three groups (i.e., narrow, moderate and very wide) 
according to their level of aspirations-gap index (or AG_i). To do this, we employed the formula used by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) to 
categorize individuals into three relative poverty statuses: poor, moderate and rich. Accordingly, the aspirations-gap of an individual was 
considered NARROW if AG_i  was < 75% of sample average, MODERATE if AG_i was between 75% and 125% of sample average, 
and VERY WIDE if AG_i was > 125% of sample average. (Alternatively, the aggregate aspirations-gap index can be used to classify 
individuals into 5 quintiles. In this case, the bottom 1 and top 1 quintiles could represent narrow and very large aspirations-gap 
respectively). Since theory suggests both narrow and very large aspirations-gap are unconducive for proactive behavior (or innovations), 
they were put together to form one category (taking the value of 1). The middle represents moderate aspirations-gap and form the second 
category (taking value of 0).          
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Table 4.2. Brief description of internal factors and measurement 
Internal factor Each of these factors was constructed from an individual’s response to different statements read 
to them about their lives. Most of the responses were coded on a 4-point scale: strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree or strongly agree. Those marked with an asterisk had only 2 choices, and the rest are 
defined below. 
Self-esteem Standardized index constructed from 6 items.  Responses were recoded to reflect higher self-esteem 
Internal locus of control A standardized index constructed from 14 items that reflect a respondent’s perception of whether life 
outcomes are controlled by: (1) oneself (internality), (2) powerful people (powerful others), or (3) chance.  
Responses were recoded to reflect internal locus of control 
Perception of cause of poverty as 
external 
A standardized index constructed from 12 items which reflect the respondent’s perception of whether the 
causes of poverty are (1) individual, (2) fate, or (3) structural.  Responses were recoded to reflect that causes 
of poverty are external factors 
Openness to change* A standardized index constructed from 7 items which reflect the respondent’s attitude to change and 
adherence to community norms.  Responses were coded to reflect more openness to change. 
Competition/envy* A standardized index constructed from 3 items which reflect the respondent’s sense of 
rivalry/envy/competition.  Responses were coded to reflect more envy. 
Trust in others A standardized index constructed from 2 items which reflect the respondent’s sense of trust in others.  
Responses were coded to reflect higher trust. 
Subjective well-being A standardized index constructed from 2 items which reflect the respondent’s perception of own life 
condition. Respondents were asked to define (a) “best/worst life” and (b) “happy/miserable life” on a scale 
of 10.  Responses were coded to reflect higher subjective well-being. 
Time preference (impatience) An index constructed from 4 choices. Respondents were asked to choose whether they prefer to receive a 
certain amount of money today or a higher amount at a later date. Responses were recoded to reflect 
impatience. 
Risk aversion  An index constructed from results of two hypothetical decisions: (1) lottery choices with payouts determined 
by a coin toss, and (2) choices among selling price of a bag of maize with same structure as the lottery 
payouts x 100. Responses were recoded to reflect less risk aversion.  
 
4.4.2.2. Innovation and adoption indicators 
Innovation and adoption behavior of farmers were measured using different indicators. First, to elicit 
innovativeness, farmers were asked the following question with regards to 12 value chain innovations:   
Question: In the past 5 years, have you changed the way, or do you have a new or better way of [….]45? 
Using the twelve responses (1 yes, 0 otherwise), the innovation index (𝑌𝑗) was calculated as: 
𝑌𝑗 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑗
12
𝑛=1                                                                                                           (15) 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑗 refers to the type of innovation 𝑖 individual 𝑗 implemented, and 𝑌𝑗 = [0, 12]. 
Innovation adoption was measured in two steps. First, respondents were asked if they had access to or used a 
certain innovation (i.e., the type of innovation). Second, conditional on adoption, respondents were asked to 
report the intensity of use (unit/ha) of the specific agricultural technologies (such as fertilizer, improved seeds, 
herbicides and pesticides) and other agronomic practices (such as improved planting methods) (see Table 4.5). 
 
                                                          
45 This question asked about changes in the context of farming practices. For example, the farmers were asked questions about the 
changes in: the crops they grow in each season, the kind of seeds they used and the places they buy the seeds, the type and quantity of 
other inputs they use (e.g., fertilizer and chemicals), their use of improved agronomic practices (e.g., planting techniques and land 
preparation), in the adoption of soil and water conservation (e.g. mulching, zero or reduced tillage, use of crop residue, water harvesting 
and drip irrigation), marketing information, and credit and loans? 
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4.5. Results and discussion 
4.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
We begin by presenting a general overview of the study sites in terms of their household characteristics, such as 
demography, resources, and membership in groups. Table 4.3 indicates that, on average, the sample households 
in the three sites have similar characteristics. Only a few exceptions were found in the Bakko-Sire site, where 
some indicators showed slight differences. According to the results, the household heads in Bakko-Sire were on 
average slightly younger and more educated. The area also had slightly larger households and a marginally lower 
percentage of female-headed households.46 Considering the full sample, the data suggest that about 9 percent of 
the households were headed by females. The average age and schooling attainment of household heads was 
about 50 years and 4.6 years, respectively. The average family size was about 6.8 people with a 0.39 dependency 
ratio. The average size of livestock and land holdings in the sample was about 8.2 tropical livestock units and 3 
hectares, respectively. The average number of days households were in contact with agricultural extension agents 
was about 8 days. The number of social groups households belonged to was about 6.9, on average. About 70 
percent of the households were project beneficiaries between 2006/07 and 2010.   
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics on demographics, endowment, membership in groups, and other factors 
   
Bakko-Sire  
(N=115) 
Hitossa-Tiyo  
(N=124) 
Adda-Lume  
(N=124) 
Variable  
  
Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Mean  
Std. 
Dev. 
Sex of household head (1 if Female) 0.04 0.20 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 
Age of household head (in years) 45.2 13.1 54.2 13.2 51.7 12.2 
Number of years of schooling completed by household head 5.31 3.94 4.55 4.39 3.98 3.89 
Household size (number of household members) 7.46 2.39 6.50 2.23 6.47 2.32 
Dependency ratio (number of dependents divided by number of working adults 0.45 0.20 0.38 0.20 0.33 0.21 
Household head participates in business or wage labor (1 yes) 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Livestock holdings (in Tropical livestock unit, TLU) 8.29 6.05 7.74 4.49 8.67 5.09 
Total land size accessed by household (hectare) 2.92 2.20 3.18 1.96 2.98 1.66 
Total land size used for main crop (hectare) 2.09 1.83 2.66 1.91 2.70 1.62 
Number of days of contact with extension agent 7.62 8.11 8.19 9.22 10.54 12.46 
Number of groups household belongs to 6.27 2.71 7.89 3.28 6.36 2.84 
Household was project beneficiary in the past (1 yes) 0.69 0.47 0.71 0.46 0.70 0.46 
 
Employing the formula described in equation (14) for the computation of aggregate aspirations and expectations 
indices results in only a marginally skewed (to the right) distribution of the aspirations and expectations scores 
(Figure 4.1a  and Figure 4.1b); this indicates that the sample is a fair representation of the population. The 
aggregate indices were also used to classify individuals into the low and high groups according to the level of 
their aspirations and expectations by comparing their scores to the district average. Table 4.4 indicates that about 
33% and 41% of household heads had low aspirations and low expectations, respectively. Female household 
heads were also more likely than their male counterparts to have low aspirations and expectations. Further, 
wealthier and more highly educated individuals were less likely to have low aspirations and low expectations. 
Surprisingly, a higher percentage of household heads in the younger age groups showed low aspirations and low 
                                                          
46 These slight differences may have occurred because households that did not cultivate any of the three main crops were omitted from 
the analysis. The households were omitted because the focus of this study is limited to the three main crops. 
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expectations. Perhaps, this could be because of their limited experience and information set and hence narrow 
aspirations window.  
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of aspirations and expectations indices 
a. Distribution of aspirations index score 
 
b. Distribution of expectations index score 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Share of household heads with low aspirations and low expectations  
 
Low 
Aspirations 
Low 
Expectations 
  
Low 
Aspirations 
Low 
Expectations 
All 0.33 0.41 
    By sex 
 
By wealth quintile 
Male 0.30 0.39 
 
Q1 poorer 0.64 0.65 
Female 0.56 0.65 
 
Q2 0.34 0.53 
By age group 
 
Q3 0.31 0.37 
age 15-30 0.55 0.50 
 
Q4 0.23 0.33 
age 31-50 0.27 0.35 
 
Q5 richer 0.15 0.20 
age 51+ 0.36 0.47 
 
By per-capita expenditure quintile 
By education group 
 
Q1, poorer 0.56 0.59 
education 
none 0.47 0.61 
 
Q2 0.33 0.52 
0-4 grade 0.41 0.55 
 
Q3 0.23 0.36 
5-8 grade 0.19 0.29 
 
Q4 0.29 0.38 
9+ grade 0.21 0.16 
 
Q5, richer 0.23 0.23 
 
Other cognitive processes might determine an individual’s level of aspirations. Figure 4.2 presents the mean 
standardized outcomes of some cognitive indicators by aspirations level. The mean comparison tests (Figure 
4.2b) showed that people with higher aspirations exhibited higher internal locus of control, higher self-esteem, 
more trust in others, higher subjective well-being, and lower risk aversion. Further, the results suggested that, on 
average, people with high aspirations were less likely to perceive external factors as the cause of poverty. All 
these results were statistically significant. There was not much difference between the two groups in other 
cognitive indicators such as openness to change, envy (competitiveness) and patience. 
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Figure 4.2. Descriptive statistics on cognitive indicators 
a. Mean of cognitive indicators by aspirations status 
 
b. Mean comparison test 
 
High 
Asp. 
(N=245) 
Low 
Asp. 
(N=118) 
t test 
Index mean mean p-value 
Internal locus 
of control 
0.16 -0.03 0.000 
Perception on 
causes of 
poverty -
External 
-0.09 0.01 0.033 
Openness to 
change 
0.07 -0.02 0.105 
Self-esteem  0.09 -0.11 0.000 
Envy -0.10 -0.11 0.945 
Trust 0.26 -0.14 0.000 
Subjective 
well-being 
0.03 -0.36 0.000 
Impatient 2.28 2.25 0.877 
Less risk averse  6.19 5.56 0.036 
 
 
Several innovation and adoption indicators were examined in this study in terms of innovativeness (the use of 
innovations) and the intensity of use of the adopted innovations. The results (Table 4.5) suggested that on 
average male-headed households exhibited higher innovativeness and adopted row-planting techniques more 
frequently than female-headed households. They also displayed higher intensity of fertilizers use (kg/ha). 
However, there did not seem to be much difference between the sexes in terms of the following aspects: (1) 
access to fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, and improved seeds; (2) the adoption of sustainable natural 
resource management practices (SNRMPs); (3) the intensity of use of herbicides and pesticides, and improved 
seeds; and (4) the intensity of general innovativeness (innovativeness index). This result, without accounting for 
other determinants of innovations, implies that gender may not play a statistically significant role in terms of 
access to and use of some of these innovations. This will be econometrically checked in the next section after 
controlling for other determinants. 
Table 4.5. Comparison of innovation/adoption by sex of household head (M=329, F=34) 
   
Male (N=329) Female (N=34) t-test: mean difference 
   
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value 
 Innovation/adoption (1 Yes, 0 otherwise)    
Innovativeness   0.92 0.27 0.82 0.39 0.069 
 Fertilizer use  0.98 0.13 0.94 0.24 0.126 
 Herbicides/Pesticides use  0.94 0.24 0.91 0.29 0.533 
 Improved seed use  0.57 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.246 
 Conditional intensity of innovation/adoption (unit/ha)     
Innovation index [1,12] 5.58 2.89 5.18 2.58 0.479  
Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 176 87 145 70 0.051  
Herbicides/Pesticides use (Lt/ha) 1.40 1.70 1.67 2.36 0.417  
Share of land with improved seeds  0.66 0.29 0.61 0.33 0.555  
Plot level indicators (N=1595)       
SNRMP* (Index [0,9]) 1.70 0.99 1.60 0.80 0.305  
Planting method (1 row-planting, 0 otherwise) 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.033  
*SNRMP= composite index of sustainable natural resource management practices employed at each plot. These practices comprise of mulching, terraces, 
reduced tillage, use of crop residue, water harvesting, use of drip irrigation, compost, manure and crop rotation. 
 
-0,400 -0,300 -0,200 -0,100 0,000 0,100 0,200 0,300
Internal locus of control
Perception of poverty External
Openess to change
Self esteem
Envy
Trust
Subjective welbeing
mean (Low Asp) mean (Hig Asp)
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A comparison of innovations by aspirations and expectations status also revealed statistically significant 
differences. For example, individuals with high aspirations tended to have higher innovativeness and be more 
likely to adopt innovation products, including fertilizers and improved seed; the results were statistically 
significant (Table 4.6). However, people with high expectations seem to perform better only in terms of the 
innovativeness index. Further, when considering only the households that had actually innovated or adopted any 
of the given technologies, those with high aspirations used more fertilizers per hectare of land and had higher 
share of land planted with improved seeds. Similarly, people with high expectations seemed to be more 
innovative, have higher share of land planted with improved seeds, and adopted more SNRMPs, on average. 
Table 4.6. Comparison of innovation/adoption by aspirations and expectations status  
   
High Asp. Low Asp. t-test High Exp.  Low Exp. t-test 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. (p-value) Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. (p-value) 
Innovation/adoption (1 Yes, 0 otherwise) 
          Innovativeness   363 0.93 0.25 0.86 0.35 0.014 0.95 0.21 0.85 0.36 0.001 
Fertilizer use  363 1.00 0.06 0.94 0.24 0.001 0.98 0.14 0.97 0.16 0.615 
Herbicides/Pesticides use  363 0.95 0.22 0.91 0.29 0.106 0.95 0.22 0.92 0.27 0.276 
Improved seed use  363 0.62 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.002 0.60 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.150 
Conditional intensity of innovation/adoption (unit/ha) 
        Innovation index [1,12] 330 5.69 2.93 5.23 2.70 0.181 5.99 2.82 4.84 2.80 0.000 
Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 355 180 87 160 82 0.040 179 89 166 82 0.164 
Herbicides/Pesticides use (Lt/ha) 340 1.43 1.78 1.40 1.76 0.866 1.50 1.89 1.30 1.58 0.301 
Share of land with improved seeds (%) 205 0.62 0.30 0.75 0.25 0.006 0.62 0.31 0.72 0.26 0.021 
Plot level indicators (N=1595)            
SNRMP (Index [0,9])  1.68 0.98 1.73 0.96 0.389 1.73 0.97 1.61 0.97 0.014 
Planting method (1 row-planting, 0 
otherwise)  0.31 0.45 0.28 0.46 0.318 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.397 
 
The bivariate analysis presented in this section clearly indicated that aspirations and expectations might be 
important determinants of agricultural innovation. The analysis further suggested that the sex of the household 
head could also matter for certain innovations. In the next section, econometric techniques are used to examine 
if the findings in this section hold after controlling for other determinants.  
 
4.5.2. Econometric results 
This section presents regression results from various specifications. Estimation techniques described in section 4, 
such as endogenous treatment effects, simultaneous equation with endogenous switching, and the control 
function approach were used. To improve identification, indicators of parental involvement in different local 
institutions – such as kebele committee, iddir (funeral organization), religious groups, cooperatives –  and the ratio 
of own income growth to the average income growth in the same district between 2006 and 2010 were used as 
the main exclusion restrictions. In addition to satisfying the statistical requirements of relevance and excludability 
from the first-step regressions, instruments also need to be theoretically valid. Next we explain why this is the 
case in this study.    
Past active involvement or leadership experience in local institutions is likely to have exposed parents to new 
information that can be passed on to their own household members, including children. This in turn is likely to 
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have broadened their children’s aspirations window. Holding leadership positions would also give an individual a 
higher social status in their community, which would consequently influence their children’s aspirations during 
the same period. Since present aspirations are linked to past aspirations, the instruments are relevant. On the 
other hand, since parent’s past involvement in local institutions is not directly linked to innovation, it would 
most likely affect their children’s present innovation behavior only through its effect on their aspirations. Hence, 
the instruments are excludable, satisfying the second requirement of a theoretically valid instrument.  
The other instrumental variable is the ratio of a household’s income growth to the average income growth in the 
community in the past. The actual income growth in the past may affect present innovation. However, since the 
relative position (i.e. the ratio) of the household’s income growth is exogenously determined and not by the 
individual, it cannot directly affect innovation and hence is excludable. Further, since this outcome is measured 
in the past, present innovation could not have affected past income. On the other hand, since aspirations are 
formed by comparing own outcomes to other people’s outcomes, the instrument is linked to aspirations and 
hence necessary, fulfilling the requirements of a theoretically valid instrument.  
It should be noted that, however, not all these indicators were able to pass formal statistical tests for a valid 
instrument in all specifications. Rather, each of the indicators were used only in specific regressions in which they 
satisfy the requirements.47 Due to the highly endogenous nature of aspirations, more instruments were hard to 
come by with the existing data. Results are compared against those estimated under the exogeneity assumption 
of aspirations. Various innovation indicators were considered in the analysis, and the results are summarized 
below. 
Result 1: Effect of low aspirations (and narrow/large aspirations-gap) on innovativeness of farmers  
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 present the estimated effect of aspirations on a farmer’s innovativeness. After controlling 
for other factors, the results in Table 4.7 suggested that aspirations are important determinants of household 
innovativeness. For example, based on the exogeneity assumption, the results of the negative binomial regression 
(column 1) suggested that there was a statistically significant difference in innovation behavior between 
households with low aspirations and those with high aspirations. This result, however, is not robust because the 
estimated coefficient loses statistical significance when controlling for other determinants (column 2), possibly 
because aspirations are endogenous to innovativeness. Hence, we employed a control function estimation 
technique to account for the potential endogeneity bias. While the results (column 3) seemed to show that low 
aspirations are negatively associated with the innovation index, the estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant. According to Ray (2006), it is not aspirations per se but rather the aspirations-gap that non-linearly 
affects behavior.  
                                                          
47
 The Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments was used for various specifications. The null hypothesis of weak instrument was 
rejected using either a minimum value of 10 (a rule of thumb for F statistic), or the minimum eigenvalue statistic to tolerate distortion for 
a 5% Wald test based on the LIML estimators. Hansen’s test of over identifying restriction was not rejected, therefore implying that the 
instruments were valid. Further, falsification tests were also conducted. Results are not reported here because of space constraints, but 
they are available upon request. Other parental characteristics such as education, their involvement in savings group, membership in a 
school’s parent committee were also considered, but they did not pass the statistical tests for weak instrument. 
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Hence, we employed a negative binomial estimations technique and controlled for other factors, and two 
dummies representing aspirations-gaps reflecting the hypothesized non-linear relationship between the 
aspirations-gap and innovation. Following Ray (2006), we hypothesized that narrow and large aspirations-gap are 
not conducive for innovation. The results shown in column 4 of Table 4.7 suggested that when compared to 
people with moderate aspirations-gap, those with narrow aspirations-gap were more likely to adopt more 
innovations. This did not seem to be in line with the theory that narrow aspirations-gap offers very little 
motivation to innovate. While the coefficient for the dummy representing large aspirations-gap had the expected 
negative sign, it is not statistically significant. We then re-ran the model after controlling for other determinants 
and only one of the two dummies representing aspirations-gap (i.e., either the narrow or large aspirations-gap), 
leaving out the remaining as the base category (columns 5 and 6). The results (column 5) again suggested that 
people with narrow aspirations-gap were more likely to have a higher level of innovativeness by comparison with 
others. While it is possible that narrow aspirations-gap may induce very little motivation to innovate, it may not 
induce frustrations, unlike what we would expect from very large aspirations-gap. It may also be the case that the 
method employed for the construction of the three aspirations-gap categories (i.e., narrow, moderate and large) 
may have put people in ‘wrong’ categories. The next specification (column 6), however, returned the expected 
results; by comparison with others, people with very large aspirations-gap were more likely to demonstrate a low 
level of innovativeness. Based on Ray (2006) and Genicot and Ray (2014),  this could be the result of frustration 
because the gap may appear too large to close.  
 
 
Table 4.7. Determinants of farmer innovativeness† 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
NEGBIN1 NEGBIN2 CONTFUN1 NEGBIN3 NEGBIN4 NEGBIN5 
Low aspirations -0.22*** -0.10 -0.24 
   
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.41) 
   Narrow asp. gap 
   
0.35*** 0.36*** 
 
    
(0.10) (0.08) 
 Large Asp-gap 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.31*** 
Other controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 377 375 375 `375 375 375 
Wald chi2 91.81 107.94 123.55 131.69 131.25 122.05 
Log likelihood -949.76  -930.32 -959.26 -920.23 -920.23 -926.38 
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 1 in the appendix.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The results in Table 4.7, columns 4 to 6, may suffer from endogeneity bias, which we could not directly test 
because of a lack of strong instrumental variables for the two dummies representing aspirations-gap. As an 
alternative, we employed matching estimators and tested if people with a large aspirations-gap were less likely to 
innovate by comparison with others. We used propensity score matching and covariate matching estimators 
described in chapter 2, including kernel matching, nearest neighbor matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Smith 
& Todd, 2005), and bias-corrected covariate matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). The results (Table 4.8) 
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indicated that individuals with a very large aspirations-gap adopted (1.15/5.01) = 23 to (1.42/5.01) = 28 percent 
fewer innovations by comparison with the base category (i.e., people with a moderate or narrow aspirations-gap). 
This result is consistent with the findings presented in Table 4.7, confirming that people with a large aspirations-
gap were less innovative.   
 
Table 4.8. The effect of large aspirations-gap on farmer innovativeness† 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Kernel NN Bias-corrected NN 
ATT -1.42* -1.35*** -1.15** 
 (0.75) (0.45) (0.46) 
Average innovation index  5.01  
%change (-)28 (-)27 (-)23 
 
Observations 375 375 375 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Moving on to other results in Table 4.7, we found that impatience (the preference for receiving rewards sooner), 
the use of credit48, and wealth status were all positively and statistically significantly correlated with the 
innovation index. This implies that eagerness and access to material resources are important to innovation. 
Household size is negatively associated with the innovation index, a result which we found surprising since most 
of the innovations that made up the index may actually require more labor to implement. The remoteness of a 
farmers’ cooperative office was negatively correlated with innovativeness, which is in line with expectations 
because proximity to an office is likely to improve access to information and agricultural inputs.  
 
Result 2: Effect of aspirations-gap on access to or use of fertilizers, improved seed, and herbicides and 
pesticides and adoption of row-planting techniques  
Table 4.9 presents the determinants of access to or use of different technologies at plot level. Out of the four 
innovation indicators (i.e., the use of improved seed, herbicides/pesticides, fertilizers and the adoption of row 
planting techniques) that we examined in this part, we found that having narrow/large aspirations-gap was 
negatively and strongly associated only with the adoption of chemical fertilizers. According to these results 
(Table 4.9, columns 7 and 8), having narrow/large aspirations-gap decreased the probability of a person using 
inorganic fertilizers, and the results are robust across specifications. However, since the returns generated 
through adoption of technologies are quite dependent on the intensity of input use, it might be more meaningful 
to look at the effect of aspirations-gap on the intensity of innovation use. This is examined in the next section by 
studying the intensity of inorganic fertilizer use49 at household level and by crop type. 
 
                                                          
48
 Only one household in the entire reported credit constraints in the self-assessment. So we controlled for a dummy that represented 
credit use. 
49
 We chose fertilizer use for further investigation only because of space constraints. 
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Table 4.9. The effect of narrow/large aspirations-gap on the use of improved seed, herbicides/pesticides, 
fertilizer, and row-planting techniques†  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 i.seeds i.seeds Row-plant Row-plant Herbicides Herbicides Fertilizers Fertilizers 
Narrow/large asp.gap 0.45 0.47 0.30 0.22 -0.21 -0.18 -0.88*** -0.75**  
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)    
Plot characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crop type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dist. to services No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
rho -0.39** -0.37** -0.26 -0.24 -0.01** 0.02 0.49** 0.42** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) 
Wald chi2 559*** 596*** 708*** 734*** 618*** 656*** 343*** 375*** 
Observations 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595    
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 2 in the appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10,** p<0.05,***p<0.01 
 
We found that plot size and asset holdings were positively and strongly associated with the use of all technology 
indicators, and the results are robust across various specifications (Table 4.9). This could be because when 
farmers are faced with new innovations, having larger land holdings may allow them to conduct experiments on 
at least a portion of their land. This is also true when they are wealthy because wealth serves as a cushion to 
protect them against innovation risks. Other plot-level characteristics, such as perceived soil quality and distance 
from residence, did not seem to be important determinants of the use of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds, 
herbicides and pesticides; and the adoption of row planting techniques. If any, those plots very close to 
residence, which are likely to be homesteads, are negatively associated with the use of chemical fertilizers. 
Perhaps, this is because farmers might opt to rather use inputs such as household refuse which are less costly to 
get but costly to transport to remotely located plots. Further, there was a statistically significant, albeit weak, 
evidence suggesting that plots which were perceived as having low soil fertility were positively associated with 
the use of chemical fertilizers, which is in line with expectations as fertilizers are added to improve soil fertility. 
As Table 4.9 also shows, female-headed households and the age of the household head were positively and 
negatively associated with use of herbicides/pesticides, respectively. The results also suggested that the 
household head’s education level and household size were positively associated with the use of improved seeds 
and the adoption of row planting techniques. This is because education is likely to increase a farmer’s openness 
to using new technologies and larger household is advantageous for labor-intensive farming methods, which are 
still prevalent in the country. The results also suggested that past involvement in technology promotion project 
seemed to increase a farmer’s likelihood of adopting the use of herbicides, pesticides and inorganic fertilizers.    
The type of crop also determined the use of inputs and improved practices. Both maize and wheat plots are 
more likely to be planted with improved seeds; row planting techniques are also more likely to be used in both 
maize and wheat plots than teff plots (Table 4.9). This may be because both wheat and maize in general give 
higher yields and also are agronomically easier to manage than teff. Further, in the country, the supply of 
improved seeds for wheat and maize have always been better than that of teff (see Thijssen et al. (2008) for the 
volume of production of improved seeds over time and by type of crop in the country). Consequently, farmers 
may have gained better knowledge of improved varieties of wheat and maize, which might have encouraged their 
adoption decision. However, by comparison to teff plots, maize plots were found to be negatively and strongly 
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associated with the use of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, while wheat plots in contrast were positively and 
statistically significantly associated with the use of fertilizers (Table 4.9). Indicators of distance (remoteness) 
between a household and the agricultural cooperative office, the nearest micro finance institution, and the farmer 
training center (FTC) were found to be negatively associated with either the use of improved seeds, herbicides 
and pesticides; or the adoption of row planting techniques. This is in line with expectations as access to inputs, 
and access to extension and advisory services are likely to be limited when farmers are located farther away from 
these service centers. However, the remoteness of the nearest input dealer is positively associated with the use of 
herbicides and pesticides, a result which seems less intuitive.  
The results from the switch parts50 (where a dummy representing either large or narrow aspirations-gap is the 
dependent variable) of the endogenous switching regression suggested that father’s past involvement in a 
cooperative, larger household size, having low risk aversion, and remoteness of the FTC and the nearest asphalt 
road were all negatively associated with large or narrow aspirations-gap. Having a female household head, having 
larger livestock and asset holdings, participation in past technology interventions, and remoteness of the nearest 
microfinance institution are all positively and significantly associated with large or narrow aspirations-gap (Table 
4.9).  
Result 3: Effect of aspirations-gap on the intensity of fertilizers use   
The choice of adopting an innovation or technology involves a multistage decision-making process (or “hurdle”). 
Given all other constraints, it is essential to examine the effect of the main variable of interest at each stage. The 
first-stage analysis have already shown that a narrow or large aspirations-gap is an important determinant of 
adoption of inorganic fertilizers at plot level (Table 4.9). In this section, we examine if the result holds for the 
intensity (kg/ha) of fertilizer use. We start by examining if the effect of aspirations-gap varies by type of crop 
planted.   
Result 3.1. Effect of aspirations-gap on the intensity of fertilizer use: by crop type  
As presented in Table 4.10, regressions were performed for each crop at household level separately. Except for 
teff (column 2), we did not find any evidence that suggests that the intensity of fertilizer use was strongly 
associated with a person’s aspirations-gap. Perhaps this is because even though teff in general has a higher 
market value than wheat and maize, its output per hectare (or yield) is very low by comparison. Further, teff 
production cost is also higher because it requires more labor time and other complementary inputs. As a result, 
people who lack motivation in general or who have a narrow or large aspirations-gap may avoid investing too 
much on this crop. Other factors such as having a female household head and distance to input dealer were 
found to be negatively associated with the intensity of fertilizer use when the crop is teff (Table 4.10). The results 
for wheat indicated that farmers who had experienced some negative shocks in the previous 12 months tended 
                                                          
50
 The switch part presents the key determinants of the aspirations status (and aspirations-gap) including those which also determine the 
adoption of technologies. But the results will not be discussed in detail because identifying determinants of aspirations is not the focus of 
this chapter. 
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to use less fertilizers per hectare of land. Further, having larger asset holdings also increased the intensity of 
fertilizer use on both teff and maize crops. 
Table 4.10. Determinants of the intensity of fertilizers use by crop type, household level (aspirations-gap as 
explanatory variable) †  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Teff1 Teff2 Maize1 Maize2 Wheat1 Wheat2 
OLS Endog.Te. OLS Endog.Te. OLS Endog.Te. 
Narrow/large asp.gap -3.03 -67.32** 8.42 14.52 8.22 -13.07 
 
(9.28) (30.25) (10.02) (36.65) (14.56) (20.22) 
Other controls Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          
Wald chi2  260.66***  1762.43***  102.46*** 
Log lik. -1165.9 -1140.42 -1308.63 -1275.79 -1203.38 -1167.53 
r2 0.53  0.8  0.3  
Observations 220 200 246 223 225 208 
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 3 in the appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
***p<0.01 
 
 
Result 3.2. Effect of aspirations-gap on the intensity of fertilizers use at household level 
To get a general picture of the effect of aspirations-gap on total fertilizer use per hectare of land at household 
level, the data is further examined without taking into account plot characteristics and the types of crop 
cultivated. The results (Table 4.11) clearly indicate that households with narrow or large aspirations-gap tended 
to have lower fertilizer use per hectare of land than households with moderate aspirations-gap. According to 
these results, the average difference in fertilizer use between a household with narrow or large aspirations-gap 
and that with moderate aspirations-gap was 104-106 kg/ha (columns 2-4). This could also be interpreted as the 
estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of having a narrow or very large aspirations-gap. In addition, since the 
‘treatment’ variable (i.e., having a narrow or very large aspirations-gap) did not interact with other regressors, the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is the same as the ATE (StataCorp, 2013). Further, adding or 
excluding the households that did not use fertilizers from the analysis did not change the results qualitatively, 
again confirming the robustness of the findings.51 
Table 4.11. Determinants of the intensity of fertilizer use, household level† 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
OLS Endog.Te. Endog.Te. Endog.Te. 
Narrow/large asp-gap 8.11 -104.79*** -105.35*** -106.43*** 
 
(10.81) (23.86) (22.09) (22.26) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 
 
185.03*** 187.64*** 186.93*** 
Log lik. -1983.62 -2102.51 -2100.63 -2100.91 
r2 0.38 
   Observations 352 352 352 352 
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 4 in the appendix. The source of difference among Columns 2-4 is only the type of 
IVs used in each specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
With regards to other determinants, livestock and total asset holdings were positively and strongly associated 
with the intensity of fertilizer use. This is in line with expectations because access to credit in rural settings is 
                                                          
51
 Results not reported but available upon request 
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generally limited, and hence these wealth indicators may not only reflect a person’s purchasing power but also 
serve as collateral when the person takes out a credit agreement. They also contribute to insurance against 
innovation risks. On the other hand, the amount of land holdings was negatively associated with the intensity of 
fertilizer use. This could be because the lower yield caused by a lack of intensification (since total output is also 
determined by the size of cultivated land) may not seem as important to farmers with larger land holdings than to 
those with smaller land holdings.  
Result 4: Correlation of aspirations and other psychosocial indicators 
Other internal factors or beliefs such as self-esteem, locus of control, attitude to change, competitiveness or 
envy, trust in others, subjective well-being, and the perception that poverty is caused by external factors are likely 
to affect innovation behavior. However, since they are very likely to be linked to each other, it is challenging to 
find credible identifying instruments to directly examine the potential effect of each of these factors on 
innovation. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that these factors are strongly correlated with aspirations and 
targeting them could be a useful policy strategy. This is because “correlation can sometimes provide…evidence 
of a causal relation” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: p.197). In this context, an indirect approach was adopted to 
establish the importance of other psychosocial factors to innovation through their correlation with aspirations. 
Consequently, the aspirations index was separately regressed on each of these internal factors and other 
determinants of aspirations (Table 4.12). The results suggested that indicators of self-esteem, trust in others, and 
subjective well-being are positively and significantly correlated with the level of aspirations. This is consistent 
with the theory and the results from the descriptive statistics of this study as well as other studies, such as Kosec 
et al (2012).  
Table 4.12. Correlation of aspirations and psychosocial indicators†  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
SE LC OC E T SW PP ALL 
Self-esteem 0.17** 
      
0.12 
 
(0.08) 
      
(0.09) 
Locus of control 
 
0.07 
     
-0.10 
  
(0.11) 
     
(0.12) 
Openness to change 
  
0.08 
    
0.06 
   
(0.06) 
    
(0.07) 
Envy 
   
-0.00 
   
-0.01 
    
(0.03) 
   
(0.03) 
Trust 
    
0.09*** 
  
0.09*** 
     
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
Subjective well-being 
     
0.08*** 
 
0.09*** 
      
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
Poverty caused by external 
factors  
    
-0.13 -0.12 
   
 
    
(0.10) (0.09) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.33 
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 5 in the appendix as. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
We also made a similar attempt to see the correlation of future expectations with each of the internal traits after 
controlling for other determinants. As shown in Table 4.13, future expectations were strongly and positively 
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correlated with self-esteem, internal locus of control, trust in others, and subjective well-being, whereas the 
perception that poverty is caused by external factors was found to be negatively correlated with future 
expectations.   
 
Table 4.13. Correlation of expectations and psychosocial indicators†  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
SE LC OC E T SW PP ALL 
Self-esteem 0.22*** 
      
0.11 
 
(0.07) 
      
(0.09) 
Locus of control 
 
0.26*** 
     
0.20** 
  
(0.08) 
     
(0.10) 
Openness to change 
  
-0.05 
    
-0.09 
   
(0.05) 
    
(0.06) 
Envy 
   
-0.03 
   
-0.01 
    
(0.03) 
   
(0.03) 
Trust 
    
0.12*** 
  
0.10** 
     
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
Subjective well-being 
     
0.08** 
 
0.10*** 
      
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
Perception on causes of 
poverty as external 
      
-0.17** 0.01 
       
(0.07) (0.09) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.42 
†Full results are presented in Table A4. 6 in the appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
Beliefs or the sense of control individuals have over their life shape their preferences. An internally constrained 
person may have low aspirations and hence may not put too much effort into improving their situation. In this 
study, we used an aggregated index constructed from four indicators that measure aspirations with regards to 
income, wealth, social status and children’s education, as indicator of aspirations. Descriptive statistics suggested 
that individuals in the poorest income and wealth group and those with less education exhibited low aspirations, 
strengthening the notion that the poor may lack the resources or the ‘capacity’ to aspire (Appadurai, 2004). These 
results were confirmed by regression analyses that controlled for indicators of wealth and other potential 
determinants of aspirations. We examined whether a narrow or large aspirations-gap determines innovation 
behavior. We used the adoption of agricultural technologies – such as improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, and 
herbicides/pesticides – and the adoption of improved planting method (i.e., row planting) as indicators of 
innovation. We conducted plot-level and household-level analyses and found that having a narrow or very large 
aspirations-gap was strongly associated with a low level of innovativeness or low adoption of inorganic fertilizers. 
For example, our estimates suggested that, on average, a household with a narrow or very large aspirations-gap 
used about 105kg/ha less fertilizers, on average, than an otherwise similar household with moderate level of 
aspirations-gap.  
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Results of this study, however, should be interpreted with caution for the following reasons. Fist, aspirations and 
other cognitive indicators are likely to be measured with error. Yet, attempts were made to minimize the 
potential influence of the error through standardization of the data. Secondly, the method employed for the 
construction of the three aspirations-gap categories (i.e., narrow, moderate and large) may have put people in 
‘wrong’ categories. Various specifications were tried to find robust results and thus accounting for this issue. 
Further, the data was collected from study sites which have high agricultural potential. This may limit the 
external validity of the study. However, most of the findings in this study are in line with the theory which 
suggests that moderate aspirations motivate future-oriented behavior. Our findings are also in line with a few 
other empirical studies such as Bernard et al. (2014) and Ghosal et al. (2013), which found that aspirations have 
strong impact on savings, increased demand for credit and other forward-looking behavior. Despite the highly 
endogenous nature of aspirations – our main variable of interest – and hence corresponding challenges of 
finding powerful instrumental variables in observational studies, this study, to our knowledge, is the first attempt 
at providing empirical evidence using multiple innovations in the context of agriculture. Our findings clearly 
demonstrated that beyond access to material resources, psychological factors such as aspirations may also play a 
role in the adoption of agricultural innovations in rural Ethiopia.  
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5. ASPIRATIONS AND INCOME, FOOD SECURITY AND SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING IN RURAL ETHIOPIA 
 
Abstract 
Despite some improvements in recent years, poverty and food insecurity remain widespread and main challenges 
in Ethiopia. Much of the empirical literature focus on identifying resource related constraints with little attention 
to ‘internal’ or psychological factors such as aspirations. Using individual and household level data collected in 
rural Ethiopia, we examine if aspirations are strongly associated with well-being outcomes, as posited in the 
aspirations failure framework articulated by Ray (2006) and others. We employ both bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. We find that aspirations (particularly that of the household head) are indeed strongly associated with the 
household per-capita income and expenditure and various triangulating measures of household food (in)security 
including per-capita calorie consumption, food consumption score (FCS), household dietary diversity score 
(HDDS), and household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS). Contrary to few other studies, we also find strong 
evidence that aspirations are positively associated with satisfaction in life and/or happiness in rural Ethiopia. 
Findings in this Chapter provide suggestive evidence that policies aimed at improving the well-being outcomes 
might benefit if they incorporate aspirations raising strategies.  
 
 
Key words: Aspirations, income, poverty, food security, subjective well-being, Ethiopia 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Despite some improvements in recent years, poverty and food insecurity remain widespread and the main 
challenges in Ethiopia. These challenges are further exacerbated by climatic shocks such as the failure of rainfall 
which adversely affect agriculture and allied activities, the main sources of livelihoods for the rural population52. 
In fact, following the failure of rainfall during the 2015 agricultural seasons, estimates suggest that about 10.1 
million people require emergency food assistance as of December 2015 (EHRD, 2016). Poverty persistence had 
long been recognised as a major contributing factor for the continuing vulnerability of the food insecure group 
and this has led the government, jointly with development partners, to implement a social safety net program 
(PSNP) since 2005. This program aims at smoothing consumption, reducing risks the poor face and protecting 
their assets (GFDRE, 2009). In 2012, the PSNP reached over 7.6 million people and the program is 
complemented by a household asset building program (HABP) which provides food insecure households with 
financial services and technical support to strengthen their production systems by diversifying income sources, 
and increasing productive assets so as to improve their productivity (World Bank, 2013).  
                                                          
52 According to the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), the rural population is estimated to constitute about 83 
percent of the total which is estimated at 87,952, 000 as of July 2014. http://www.csa.gov.et/ (accessed Nov 17, 2015). 
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Notwithstanding the potential benefits associated with policies such as the PSNP, the alleged benefits would be 
realized only under a set of conditions. For example, the recent weather related shocks highlight the level of 
vulnerability of the poor despite such programs. In addition, while earlier evaluations of the PSNP (e.g. Gilligan 
et al., 2009; Berhane et al., 2011, 2014; Coll-Black et al., 2011) find some positive impact of the program on food 
security, asset holdings and income growth, there is little evidence of graduation53. These studies attribute the 
lack of graduation, among others, to limited efficiency in program implementation, higher food prices and the 
nature of the program targeting households which are both poor and food insecure. Yet, what is missing in these 
studies as well as the broader empirical literature on the determinants of well-being outcomes is the importance 
of psychological factors or ‘internal’ constraints, such as lack of aspirations. As discussed in the preceding 
chapters, however, internal constraints are also important for they could reinforce external constraints (or 
material deprivations) and this may lead to a self-sustaining trap of low-aspirations, poverty and food insecurity. 
In this context, we study the effect of aspirations on income, food security and subjective well-being in rural 
Ethiopia.  
The next section presents the background and review of related literature followed by section 5.3 which presents 
the data and descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy and results are discussed in section 5.4 and section 5.5 
concludes the Chapter. 
 
5.2. Background and literature review  
5.2.1. Some concepts and measurements of poverty and food insecurity 
The literature on the determinants of poverty and food insecurity continues to grow for a significant proportion 
of the world population still suffers from such deprivations. Sen’s (1976, 1981) seminal studies respectively on 
poverty measurement and poverty and famines have inspired the development of more analytical tools such as 
the aspirations-failure framework and the improvement of the measurements of poverty, food insecurity, and 
other well-being outcomes. The Alkire and Foster (2011, 2009) multidimensional poverty index (MPI) is the 
latest entrant to the list of measurements of poverty. The MPI encompasses the many deprivations that people 
can experience across different areas of their lives including lack of education or employment, inadequate 
housing, poor health and nutrition, low personal security, or social isolation. According to Alkire and Foster 
(2009, 2011) the MPI is a powerful tool to show how and where people are poor, within and across countries 
and regions. Consequently, the MPI has been adopted as a target indicator for monitoring the UN sustainable 
development goals.54 Yet, composite measures such as the MPI are not without critics.55 For example, Ravallion 
                                                          
53 “Graduation” is a situation where a household can meet its food needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand modest 
shocks in the absence of the PSNP (GFDRE, 2007; p.2) 
54 http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index-adopted-as-a-sdg-target-indicator/ (accessed Nov 26, 2015) 
55 To read the debates regarding the MPI, refer to the world bank blog on this link: 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/the-multidimensional-poverty-index-debate-rounds-2-3-4 (accessed Nov 26, 2015) 
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(1996, 201056) argues that the “welfare rankings of social states (including policies) based on composite measures 
[such as the MPI] will often be more difficult.” For this or other reasons, much of the empirical studies on 
poverty to a large extent rely on unidimensional poverty measures, often following Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984). In such approach, only monetary dimensions are used and the poor are identified as those whose 
expenditure (or income) falls below a defined poverty line which is often determined by the income required to 
achieve the minimum caloric requirements (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). Three methods are used to calculate 
the poverty line, including direct caloric intake, subjective poverty lines, and the cost of basic needs. According to Haughton 
and Khandker (2009), the cost of basic needs estimates the cost of acquiring enough food for adequate nutrition and 
then adds the cost of other essentials such as clothing and shelter. The food energy intake method can be used as 
the next option in the absence of price information. To determine the expenditure (or income) level at which a 
household acquires enough food, the method plots expenditure (or income) per capita against food consumption 
(in calories per person per day). On the other hand, by asking people the minimum income level that is needed 
just to make ends meet, subjective poverty lines are calculated (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). 
 
The most commonly used method, among the three, is the cost of basic needs approach (Haughton and Khandker, 
2009). Further, it is argued that poverty measurements based on consumption expenditure are preferred to 
income for the measurement is more accurate in the case of consumption expenditure and also it is subject to 
less temporal variations which is often the case for income, particularly in developing countries (see review by 
Deaton and Grosh, 1998). In some cases, a slightly modified form of these indicators (e.g. share of food 
expenditure by the poor) (Jones et al., 2013) are used to measure food security even though poverty is commonly 
considered as one of the main determinants (Barrett, 2010). However, food security is a rather complex concept 
and its definition continues to evolve. The latest definition that refined the one adopted in the 1996 World Food 
Summit states that “food security (is) a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (FAO, 2002). According to Jones et al (2013), this definition addresses concerns related 
to: inequitable distribution of food not only within countries but also within households, the ability to acquire 
socially and culturally acceptable food and the ways in which to acquire it, and the food composition and micro 
nutrient requirements. Food insecurity on the other hand is a state “when people do not have adequate physical, 
social or economic access to food” as defined above (FAO, 2002).  
 
To operationalize the definition of food (in)security, empirical studies often use one or some combination of the 
four domains that reflect: food availability, access, utilization, and the stability of food over time. Yet, the 
complexity of the concept is simply evident from the availability of multiple approaches and tools for assessing 
food security. For example, in some cases, the concept of food insecurity is used interchangeably with nutrition 
insecurity even though nutrition security requires food security along with “care, health and hygiene practices” 
(Jones et al, 2013). A related concept often used to measure food and nutrition insecurity is undernutrition, 
                                                          
56 https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/guest-blog-world-bank-research-director-critiques-the-new-un-poverty-index/  (accessed 
November 26, 2015) 
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which is “caused by undernourishment –defined as a level of food intake insufficient to meet dietary energy 
requirements” (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015). In the same report, hunger is defined as synonymous with chronic 
undernourishment. This simply shows that the concepts are overlapping (Jones et al, 2013, see Figure 5.1), and 
hence a diverse pool of food and nutrition security measurements exist. Based on a systematic review of available 
measurements, Jones et al (2013) and Pangaribowo et al. (2013) argue that the choice of which measurement to 
use requires understanding the underlying constructs and identifying the intended use of a tool (or the intended 
use of the data to be collected).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Overlapping concepts within the context of food and nutrition security.  
(The figure is from Jones et al (2013) who adapted it from Benson (2004). Used with permission from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. The more elaborated version can be referred to Benson (2004)). 
 
5.2.2. Empirical evidence on the state of poverty and its determinants  
The share of world population living under $1.90 or less per-day, a new international poverty line using the 2011 
purchasing power parity (PPP), is estimated to be 700 million (or 9.6 percent of the world’s population) in 2015 
(World Bank Group, 2016). Based on data from 2011, the same report predicts that the poverty rate in Ethiopia 
would be 33 percent in 2015. On the other hand, based on the national poverty line measured at 2010/11 prices, 
official reports show that the incidence of poverty in the country was 29.6 percent in 2011, a decline from 38.7 
percent in 2004/05 (MOFED, 2013). While this shows a significant improvement over the years, poverty 
remains a priority policy concern in Ethiopia. Various studies examine the correlates of poverty and poverty 
dynamics in rural Ethiopia. Based on a panel household survey data (ERHS) from 15 rural villages in Ethiopia, 
some studies find a statistically significant poverty reducing effects of access to: roads and towns (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 1998; Dercon et al, 2009; and Dercon et al, 2012), agricultural extension services (Dercon et al, 2012 
and Dercon et al, 2009) and human and physical capital such as better education, male headship of the 
household and relatively being younger, land and oxen (Dercon and Krishnan., 1998). While results from these 
studies are based on data collected from same households repeatedly interviewed (six times) between 1989 and 
2004, the number of waves used in each study is not necessarily the same. Yet, similar findings were also 
reported by Bogale et al. (2005) who used a three-round survey data other than the ERHS. Bogale et al (2005) 
study the determinants of rural poverty in three rural villages in Ethiopia. They find that rural poverty is strongly 
linked to access to land, human capital and oxen. Similarly, Dercon, (2006) analyses the determinants of growth 
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and poverty changes between 1989 and 1995. He finds that location, land and labor endowment are important 
factors for the observed differences in terms of some changes and poverty persistence. Similar results are also 
reported by Bigsten et al.(2003) that also identify the importance of growing cash crop (Chat) for the 
improvement of household welfare. Bigsten and Shimeles (2008) also analyse the persistence of poverty in both 
rural and urban areas in Ethiopia during 1994-2004. They find that households move frequently in and out of 
poverty. Their findings suggest that the difficulty of exiting from poverty increases with the time spent in that 
state and varies considerably between male and female headed households.  
 
Rural households in Ethiopia are highly vulnerable to weather and idiosyncratic shocks for their livelihoods 
depend on subsistence agriculture and related sectors such as pastoralism. For example, an earlier study by von 
Braun (1991) reports that a 10% decline in rainfall below the long-term national average causes national cereal 
production to decline by 4.4%. A more recent study by Porter (2012) also finds that extreme low rainfall relative 
to local norms can cause significant reductions in farm income, and also on consumption whose reduction 
amounts to 20%for people in the bottom quintile of the local distribution. This is in line with Börner et al (2014) 
who, based on data from 25 developing countries, find that climate-related shocks predominantly result in 
reduced consumption.  
Ethiopia is arguably one of the most famine-prone countries with a long history of famines and food shortages 
(see for example Webb and von Braun, 1994) and such type of shortfalls are likely to occur more frequently with 
the change in climate and this may severely affect the rural poor. In fact, the failure of rainfall in the recent past 
is revealing the level of vulnerability of the rural people57 despite the massive social safety net programs that have 
been put in place since the mid-2000s. Further, shocks of this nature may have a long-lasting impact on the 
welfare of the people, as a previous study shows (Dercon et al, 2005). Using the two waves of the ERHS data 
(i.e.1999 and 2004), Dercon et al (2005) show that experiencing a drought at least once in the previous five years 
lowers per capita consumption by about 20%, and experiencing an illness reduces per capita consumption by 
approximately 9%. Dercon and Krishnan (2000a) also report finding evidence on the sensitivity of consumption 
for various shocks in rural Ethiopia. Although other studies such as Asfaw and Braun (2004), Porter (2012) and 
Yilma et al. (2014) report that consumption is unaffected by health shocks in rural Ethiopia, coping mechanisms 
in general may include sale of productive assets such as oxen, which might limit the future productivity of the 
household and that eventually might lead to poverty (or poverty persistence) as discussed above. In line with this, 
Börner et al (2014) report that households tend to deplete financial and durable assets in response to death or 
illness or asset-related idiosyncratic shocks. Their study finds that households in sites characterised by high asset 
wealth tend to cope with shocks in a more proactive way than those in sites with average or below average asset 
wealth. Yet, the authors note that the role of asset types in conditioning shock responses varies across regions. 
As another indirect mechanism, weather related shocks may perpetuate poverty through their effect on risk 
aversion behavior for farmers tend to smooth their consumption by avoiding the use of risky productive inputs 
such as fertilizers. In this context, using ERHS data, Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) show that some farmers 
                                                          
57 Recall that an estimated 10.1 million people are reported to be in need of emergency food assistance as of December 2015  
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are trapped in “low return, lower risk” agriculture, a recipe for the perpetuation of poverty. In the absence of 
“effective” social safety net programs, this in turn might lead to food insecurity. In fact, based on ERHS data, 
Dercon and Krishnan, (2000b) find that the body mass index, a widely used indicator of FNS, of adults in poor 
households in rural Ethiopia are affected by idiosyncratic agricultural shocks, while richer households are more 
successful in smoothing nutritional levels. 
 
5.2.3. Empirical evidence on the state of food (in)security and their determinants 
The latest report on the State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015) estimates the number of 
people undernourished in 2014-16 at 795 million or 10.9 percent of the total, a reduction from 18.6 percent in 
1990-92. The report notes that the vast majority of the hungry (780 million people) live in the developing world 
and the overall share of the hungry currently stands at 12.9 percent of the total population. The same report 
estimates that the share of people in Ethiopia who are undernourished in 2014-16 is 32 percent, a reduction 
from 74.8 percent in 1990-92. According to the report, this improvement in Ethiopia could be attributed to 
several interlinked factors including the high GDP growth rate the country has been experiencing in the recent 
years and the existing social protection program. This assertion echoes other studies such as the World Bank 
(2015b), Berhane et al (2011, 2014) and Dorosh and Rashid (2012). According to World Bank (2015b), for 
example, real GDP growth in the country averaged 10.9 percent between 2004 and 2014 and a significant part of 
this growth comes from agriculture. If this is indeed the case, the reduction in the number of undernourished 
may not be surprising for the majority of the people in Ethiopia depend on agriculture, a sector which had been 
found to have a high growth poverty elasticity (e.g. Christiaensen and Demery, 2007; Tafesse, 2005), and poverty 
is arguably one of the determinants of food and nutrition security. Tafesse (2005), for example, estimates that a 
one percentage increase in agricultural per capita value added in Ethiopia would result into a one percent decline 
in poverty level of rural households. Similarly, based on data from Ethiopia and other African countries, 
Christiaensen and Demery (2007) report that agricultural growth has a high poverty reducing effects.  
 
On the other hand, Berhane et al (2011) evaluate the impact of the PSNP implementation from 2006-2010 on 
the livelihoods of participating households. They find that, on average, program participation has improved food 
security by over one month and increased meals eaten by children by 0.15. They also find that five years 
participation in the program raised livestock holdings by 0.38 tropical livestock units by comparison to receipt of 
payments in only one year. However, Berhane et al (2011) find limited impact of the program in terms of 
graduation of beneficiaries from the program. Yet, it is argued that, the establishment of the productive safety 
net program along with other policy measures (such as substantial liberalization of markets, investment in 
agricultural research and extension, building of key transport infrastructure) is credited to the prevention of 
large-scale country wide famines such as those in 1972-1974 and 1984-1985 (Dorosh and Rashid, 2012). 
 
As the concept of FNS evolves, rigorous and national level studies on the determinants of food and nutrition 
security in Ethiopia are largely lacking. A brief review of available studies which are mainly limited to smaller 
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geographic areas and often associated with project evaluations, shed some light regarding one or the other 
domains of food security. In this context, Asenso-Okyere et al.(2013), for example, study the determinants of 
food security in selected agro-pastoral communities in south-eastern Ethiopia. Using availability of food in the 
household as proxy indicator to food security, they find that the most significant factors affecting household 
food security are educational level of the spouse and that of the household head, size of farm land, availability of 
household assets including livestock, peace and security. Beside household endowments such as land (Feleke et 
al, 2005) and proximity to food markets (Abay and Hirvonen, 2016), Negatu (2004) reports that livelihood 
diversification strategies such as livestock rearing, growing cash crops, and engagement in trading are important 
factors for achieving household food security.  
 
Just like poverty, food insecurity is also affected by seasonality or by irregular shocks such as weather events, 
deaths or conflicts (Barret, 2010) and hence food insecurity may be chronic or transitory depending on the 
frequency of such shocks (Jones et al, 2013). According to Jones et al (2013), in response to temporary shocks, 
households may resort to the sale of assets and other coping strategies which may in turn lead to more sever 
shocks, failed returns on investments, and an eventual fall into a state of chronic food insecurity. In the event of 
such shocks, food aid through different modalities is the often used policy response. In this context, a few 
studies  examine the importance of food aid programs following drought or harvest failures on food security in 
Ethiopia (e.g. Yamano et al., 2005; Quisumbing, 2003; and Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). These studies find 
positive impact of such transfers on consumption or child nutrition outcomes, but Gilligan and Hoddinott 
(2007) also uncover some evidence of food aid dependency. In addition, even the achieved positive effects are 
considered to be short term as the country continues to suffer from food insecurity even in good harvest years 
(Clay et al, 1999). It is this realization that led to the policy shift from such “ad hoc responses” to the more 
planned and systematic approach of the PSNP (GFDRE, 2009).  
 
To sum up, the presence of widespread food insecurity in Ethiopia is argued to be the result of several factors 
including recurrent drought and heavy reliance on nature, use of backward agricultural technologies (or low input 
–low output production systems), and inappropriate agricultural policies in the past (Devereux, 2000). Relatedly, 
von Braun and Olofinbiyi (2007) more broadly classify the major factors of food crisis in the country as: 
population pressure, production failures, marketing failures, and policy, institutional, and organizational failures. 
However, what might be an important determinant and yet largely ignored in the studies reviewed here or more 
generally from the broader empirical literature on poverty and food insecurity is the role of internal factors, 
specifically aspirations. This study contributes to filling the gap in the literature. 
5.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
5.3.1. Data 
The study is based on a household survey data collected from rural households in Ethiopia. The sampling 
method and measurement issues regarding aspirations are fully described in chapter two. But in general, the 
study is based on 379 farm households who reside in three study sites. The survey collected information on 
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individual aspirations and future expectations using four indicators: income, wealth, social status and children’s 
education. Using these four indicators, an aggregate aspirations index is calculated using the formula described in 
chapter 2. Further, the aggregate aspirations index is used to classify individuals into low-aspirations and high-
aspirations status by comparison to the district average. The survey also collected information on other 
individual as well as household level information including income, assets, consumption expenditure, food 
security and other indicators of well-being.    
 
5.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
5.3.2.1. Income and wealth  
We begin with the descriptive statistics on income and wealth indicators to show how the sample households 
have fared over time (2006-2014). Table 5.1 provides the (per-capita) mean and median annual income of the 
study households by source of income. The data suggest that the per-capita annual income has improved 
between 2006 and 2014 for each income source except for livestock income, and for income from all sources 
combined. The total per-capita income has grown by about 27 percent during the same period and the difference 
between the means of per-capita income in 2006 and 2014 is statistically significant. Table 2 also suggests that 
the number of households with off-farm income has increased between 2006 and 2014. Similarly, Table 5.2 
shows that, on average, the total value of assets owned by households have increased during the specified period. 
The value of livestock holdings take the lion’s share in the value of total asset holdings, and its significant decline 
in 2010 seems to fully explain the total decline in the total value of assets for that year.  
 
Table 5.1. Annual household income by source (Ethiopian Birr, at 2006 constant terms).  
 
2006 2010 2014 
Source N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Livestock income 295 3172 1609 328 2924 1326 329 2303 1288 
Crop income 387 12128 9886 383 13873 11425 376 14788 10489 
Agricultural income 390 14434 11562 384 16334 13787 377 16758 12134 
Business and wage labor 164 3190 942 227 2562 1236 185 4797 1795 
Transfers income 5 1840 300 28 1169 562 81 2047 1077 
Off-farm income 168 3169 942 236 2603 1273 230 4579 1843 
Total income 390 15799 12296 384 17935 14974 379 19449 13848 
Total income per-capita 390 2290 1794 384 2596 2182 379 2899 2122 
Note: t-test mean comparisons show that differences are significant at the 1% level for total income (2006/2010, 
2006/2014 and 2010/2014), agricultural income (2006/2010 and 2006/2014) and off-farm income (2010/2014). 
Other differences in these categories are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.2. Total value of assets58 owned by the HH (in ETH Birr) at 2006 constant terms 
  
2006 (n=386) 2010 (n=384) 2014 (n=379) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Value of production assets  403 100 963 129 1,743 455 
Value of consumer durables 934 234 959 392 2,359 788 
Value of livestock 10,273 7,865 5,752 4,413 14,969 10,630 
Total value of assets 11,611 9,127 7,674 5,977 19,071 14,089 
                                                          
58 Production assets, consumer durables, and livestock holdings were used to calculate household wealth or total value of 
household assets 
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Since the data on aspirations is available only for the 2014 survey, we could not show if there was any correlated 
trend between aspirations and income or wealth indicators over time. Yet, as we presented in chapter 2, 
descriptive statistics for the 2014 data suggest that aspirations increase with age, education, and wealth status. 
Further, we conduct mean comparisons across indicators including annual household income per adult 
equivalent, monthly per capita expenditure, and value of asset holdings between people with different levels of 
aspirations. According to Table 5.3, individuals with high aspirations have on average higher income or wealth by 
comparison to those with low aspirations and the difference is statistically significant at less than 1 percent (with 
the only exception of per-capita expenditure for spouses with low and high aspirations). These descriptive 
statistics in general reflect preliminary evidence suggesting that aspirations could be one of the strong correlates 
of poverty (or income) as the theory predicts.  
 
Table 5.3. Mean comparison of the 2014 household income and wealth (in ETB) by aspirations level of the spouse 
and head of the household 
 
Household head Spouse 
 
Mean 
outcome 
(High 
Asp.) 
Mean 
outcome 
(Low 
Asp.) 
Mean 
difference:  
p-value 
Mean 
outcome 
(High 
Asp.) 
Mean 
outcome 
(Low 
Asp.) 
Mean 
difference: p-
value 
Total annual income per-adult equivalent 12453 8170 0.0001 14167 9825 0.0003 
Monthly per-capita consumption expenditure  593 506 0.0051 572 542 0.3734 
Total value of assets 77662 39991 0.0000 89702 59822 0.0008 
 
 
5.3.2.2. Food Security  
Food security, as discussed in the literature review, is a broad and complex concept and we try to capture its 
multidimensionality (i.e. availability, access, utilization and stability) by employing widely used indicators. We 
construct triangulating measures of food (in)security including per-capita calorie consumption, food 
consumption score (FCS), household dietary diversity score (HDDS), household food insecurity access scale 
(HFIAS), and the incidence of inadequate food supply in the household in the previous 12 months. We capture 
intra-household food allocations based on the information we collected by asking whether all household 
members eat the same diet, and whether each of them eats more- or less- diversified diet and how many times a 
day, by age categories.  
 
The measurement of food consumption using kilocalories (such as per-capita calorie consumption) is referred to 
as the “gold standard” to measure food security but its implementation is challenging for it requires the 
collection of detailed food intake data which is time consuming (WFP, 2008). This study however benefits from 
the availability of such information in the data, which also helps triangulate the result from other indicators. One 
of the alternative tools to measuring food security is the WFP’s (2008) FCS that measures the frequency of 
consumption of different food groups consumed by a household during the 7 days before the survey. In this 
approach, different food items are first categorized into 9 main groups and a food consumption score is then 
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calculated using weights assigned to each food group.59 Using the recommended FCS cut-offs which had been 
validated based on data collected from households in different countries (e.g. Wiesmann et al, 2009), this 
technique categorises households into three food security groups: poor, borderline and acceptable.  
 
A related composite measure is the HDDS, which reflects the average household dietary diversity and proxies 
for household food access (Swindle and Bilinsky, 2006). HDDS differs from FCS for it does not attach any 
weight among different food items and also does not take into account the frequency of consumption of a 
certain food. Further, it often uses a 24-hour recall period which is shorter than the seven-days recall used in the 
FCS. The average HDDS is calculated based on whether anyone in the household consumed any of the 12 types 
of food groups.60 To examine household food access, the resulting HDDS is compared among income groups 
such as income-terciles.  
 
On the other hand, household food insecurity could also be measured using HFIAS, which captures the 
household’s food insecurity (in terms of access), including the frequency of occurrence of the event in the 4 
weeks prior to the survey (Coates et al, 2007). In this measure, three dimensions of occurrence of food insecurity 
are captured: “anxiety and uncertainty about the household food supply; insufficient quality (includes variety and 
preferences of the type of food); and, insufficient food intake and its physical consequences” (Coates et al, 2007: 
p.6). The HFIAS is then calculated by summing over the frequency-of-occurrence of food insecurity-related 
conditions with higher value indicating severe food insecurity. Following the recommended cut-offs (Coates et 
al, 2007), households are then categorised into 4 levels of household food insecurity: food secure, mild, moderately 
and severely food insecure. Next, we provide empirical evidence on the level of household food (in)security among 
the study households using the indicators discussed above. 
 
To begin with, based on the direct responses by the household head (and/or the spouse), the data suggest that 
only about 7 percent of households had a situation where the household did not have enough food in the 
previous 12 months. In terms of intra-household food allocations, under-five children had, on average, 4 meals 
per-day by comparison to 3 meals eaten by other household members. Further, about 83 percent of households 
reported that all household members eat roughly the same diet while the remaining report that children eat more 
diverse foods.  
  
Based on the recommended cut-offs for the food (in)security measurements such as the FCS and HFIAS, the 
data suggest that the share of households in the sample who are food insecure are between 7 and 10 percent (See 
                                                          
59 The 9 main food groups and the given corresponding weights (in parenthesis) include- Main staples: cereals, starchy 
tubers and roots (2); Pulses: legumes and nuts (3); Meat and fish: beef, goat, poultry, pork, eggs and fish (4); Vegetables 
(including green leaves) (1); Fruits (1); Oil: oils, fats and butter (0.5); Milk: milk, yogurt and other diary (4); and Sugar: sugar 
and sugar products, honey (0.5). For details including calculation steps, see WFP’s (2008). 
60 These food groups include: cereals; root and tubers; vegetables; fruits; meat, poultry offal; eggs; fish and sea food; 
pulses/legumes/nuts; milk and milk products; Oil/fats; Sugar/honey; miscellaneous. HDDS is then calculated following 
Swindale and Bilinsky (2006) 
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Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). However, when we investigate calorie consumption using the 2,100 kilocalories61 per 
person and day dietary energy requirement, the share of households that can be considered food insecure 
increases to 27 percent (Table 5.6). Further disaggregation of the data by calorie consumption thresholds reveal 
that households who are considered greatly food insecure (<1470 kcal) and those on the borderline (≥ 1,470 and 
< 2,100 kcal) are about 6 percent and 21 percent, respectively (Table 5.6).  
 
These figures may seem a great underestimation of the level of food insecurity by the country standard since 
FAO, IFAD and WFP’s (2014) estimate puts the share people undernourished in 2012-2014 at 35 percent. 
However, we offer two reasons for our results: (1) our sample households were drawn from relatively well-off 
districts in terms of average land holdings and agricultural potential, and (2) data were collected immediately after 
harvest. These two factors may tend to overemphasize the availability of food in the sample households. 
Nonetheless, availability of food does not necessarily guarantee access to- and utilisation of- food and by 
extension overall food security. To capture the household’s food access, we cross tabulate one measure of diet 
quality (HDDS) against per-capita food expenditure terciles. According to Figure 5.2, the average diet diversity 
increases with the increase in expenditure. Further, consumption of food groups such as fruits, meats, and eggs 
greatly vary by income group with progressive increase. For example, the share of households that consume 
fruits, meats, and eggs for the lowest expenditure group is 13%, 21%, and 33%, respectively while the 
corresponding figures for each food group by the middle expenditure group are roughly twice, and that by the 
top expenditure group are roughly thrice.  
 
Finally, we triangulate relations among our different indicators. Pairwise correlation of per-capita calorie 
consumption, FCS, HDDS, HFIAS and per-capita food expenditure suggests that all except HFIAS score are 
statistically significantly correlated to each other (i.e. p<0.01) (Table 5.7 ). Note however that since households 
draw their calories mainly from cereals, the correlation coefficients of FCS and HDDS with per-capita calorie 
consumption are relatively low (i.e. less than 0.3). Yet, as expected, there is a high correlation coefficient between 
FCS and HDDS since both indicators reflect the diversity of foods consumed. HFIAS score is also statistically 
significantly correlated with FCS and per-capita food expenditure (i.e. at p<0.1 and p<0.05 respectively), though 
the correlation is low. The latter can be explained by the different nature of the self-reported HFIAS, which may 
also reflect tastes, preferences and traditions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 The cut-off point, as the minimum caloric requirement, used by official reports in Ethiopia is 2200 kilocalories (See 
MOFED, 2013). If we were to use that cut off point, the number of food insecure groups would rise to 32 percent. 
However, we use 2100 kcal cut-off to keep consistency with the internationally used measures and in line with other 
indicators employed in this study. 
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Table 5.4. Households by food consumption score (FCS)62 profile 
 Freq. Percent 
% with low-aspirations within 
each food (in)security profile 
FCS profile   Head Spouse* 
Poor (FCS<=28) 3 0.79 33 100 
Borderline (28.5<= FCS<=42) 24 6.35 58 71 
Acceptable (FCS<=42) 351 92.86 31 64 
*Note: Corresponding statistics does not include female headed households. 
 
Table 5.5. Households by household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) profile63 
 Freq. Percent 
% with low-aspirations within 
each food (in)security profile 
HFIAS category   Head Spouse* 
Food secure 340 90.19 30 64 
Mildly food insecure 9 2.39 78 40 
Moderately food insecure 21 5.57 43 83 
Severely food insecure 7 1.86 71 67 
*Note: Corresponding statistics does not include female headed households. 
 
Table 5.6. Households by per-capita calorie consumption profile64 
 Freq. Percent 
% with low-aspirations within 
each food (in)security profile 
Calorie consumption thresholds   Head Spouse* 
Poor (<1470 kcal) 21 5.56 38 67 
Borderline (≥ 1,470 – < 2,100 kcal) 82 21.69 38 61 
Acceptable (>=2100 kcal) 275 72.75 31 67 
*Note: Corresponding statistics does not include female headed households. 
 
Figure 5.2. Dietary diversity score (HDDS) by per-capita consumption expenditure terciles 
 
 
                                                          
62 FCS thresholds constructed following Wiesmann et al (2009).  
63 Household Food Insecurity Access category was determined following Coates et al (2007). 
64 The calorie value of foods consumed in the household was calculated using FAO’s calorie conversion factors. 
calorie/gmhttp://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X6877E/X6877E20.htm. Calorie consumption thresholds are based on 
Wiesmann et al (2009). 
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Table 5.7. Pairwise correlation of various food (in)security indicators 
 
Per-capita calorie 
consumption per day FCS HDDS 
HFIAS 
score 
Per-capita monthly 
food expenditure 
Per-capita calorie consumption per day 1 
    FCS 0.2658*** 1 
   HDDS 0.2305*** 0.7294*** 1 
  HFIAS score -0.104 -0.1356* -0.1295 1 
 Per-capita monthly food expenditure 0.7618*** 0.4392*** 0.3903*** -0.1634** 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
One of the preliminary approaches to see the possible links between household food security and aspirations is 
to examine the share of people with low-aspirations that belongs in each food (in)security profile across 
indicators. Accordingly, Table 5.4 to Table 5.6 present such descriptive statistics, differentiated by the aspirations 
of the household heads and spouses.
65
 For example, Table 5.5 shows that, among households who are 
considered “severely food insecure”, the share of household heads with low aspirations is 71 percent while the 
corresponding figure for spouses is 67 percent. Further, spouses with low aspirations account for more than 50 
percent of all spouses in households which are considered “food insecure” and this is the case for almost all 
indicators (Table 5.4  to Table 5.6). While the large proportion of household heads that belong in households 
which are “food insecure” seem to have low aspirations, there is no clear trend across various indicators. In 
general, these preliminary evidences imply that it may be useful to control for the aspirations of both the 
household head and spouse while studying food security correlates using multivariate analysis.  
 
5.3.2.3. Subjective well-being  
Any effort that a household puts for the betterment of its economic outcomes such as income, wealth or food 
security may partly depend on the perception it holds regarding its well-being by comparison to others or by 
comparison to own past outcomes. In this context Stark et al (2015), for example, theoretically show that when 
other unemployed people constitute the main reference group for an individual, this may reduce motivation and 
hence give rise to a “culture of unemployment.” From a policy perspective satisfaction in life, happiness or 
subjective well-being in a society could also be an end in its own right,66 not to mention the availability of 
empirical evidence on the positive effects of, for example, happiness on - productivity (Oswald et al, 2014) and 
economic growth through life expectancy and investment (Li and Lu, 2008). In this section, we present 
descriptive statistics on the subjective well-being of the study households using various indicators. Availability of 
data for some of these indicators in the previous surveys (i.e. in 2006 and in 2010) allows us to see the average 
change in subjective well-being between 2006 and 2014. First, in all three surveys, the heads of households were 
asked about their household’s welfare by comparison to other households in the village. According to Figure 
                                                          
65 We focus on FCS, HFIAS and per capita calorie consumption because (a) Per-capita food expenditure is not used as a FS 
measure in this study but as an indirect measure of food access and (b) the HDDS does not have standard cut-offs and is 
best used in relation to other indicators. 
66 This is because, according to Helliwell et al (2012), happiness, for example, offers important information about the society: it can 
signal underlying crises or hidden strengths and it can suggest the need for change. Further, cognizant of the limitations of other well-
being indicators such as income, the study on happiness or life satisfaction has received increased attention in recent years. 
Recent developments on larger scale for example include OECD’s better life initiative (OECD, 2011, 2013) and World 
Happiness Report (Helliwell et al, 2012).  
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5.3a, about 72% of households in 2006 thought their household’s well-being was not different from other 
households’ in the same village. But their share has declined to 59% and then to 53% in 2010 and 2014, 
respectively. In contrast, the share of those who thought either they were “better than” or “worse than” others 
has increased over the years and the highest increase comes from those who thought they were “worse than 
others”.  
 
Secondly, without reference to other households, the latest survey (i.e. the 2014) asked household heads two 
questions about (a) their own assessment of their household’s current situation (i.e. well-being), and (b) the 
change in the well-being of their household in the previous five years. In response to the first question, about 
40% of the households thought that they were “rich” or “comfortable” and about 50% of households thought 
that they “can manage to get by” (Figure 5.3b). Only about 3% of households thought that they were “poor” or 
“never had quite enough”, and none reported to be “destitute.” In terms of change in well-being in the past five 
years (Figure 5.3c), about 80% of households thought they had experienced “some” or “very big” improvement 
and only 14% of households thought that there was “no change.” The remaining (less than 6%) household heads 
thought that the well-being of their household actually has experienced “some” or “big” deterioration. On 
average, these figures on perceived changes in well-being seem to go along with the general positive changes that 
are observed in terms of per-capita income and wealth between 2006 and 2014 (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 ). 
 
Thirdly, the 2014 survey also included two individual level subjective well-being questions. Both the spouse and 
head of the household were separately asked, by referring to a 10-step ladder, where they personally stand at 
present if: (1) the top of the ladder represents the ‘best possible life’ and the bottom step represents the ‘worst 
possible life,’ and (2) the top of the ladder represents the ‘happiest possible life’ and the bottom step represents 
the ‘most miserable life.’ On average, household heads thought that they were above the 5th step of the ladder 
while spouses thought they were above the 6th step of the ladder in terms of ‘best possible life.’ In terms of 
‘happiness’, household heads and spouses respectively thought that, on average, they were above the 7th and 8th 
steps of the ladder. In both indicators spouses seem to have higher subjective well-being than the household 
heads, on average. Cross-tabulation of these two indicators of subjective well-being with aspirations turn in 
mixed evidence supporting a positive relationship between aspirations and higher subjective well-being among 
household heads; and, in contrast the relationship seems to be negative among spouses of the household heads 
(Figure 4). For example, the share of household heads who had higher subjective well-being in terms of both 
indicators (i.e. “best life” Figure 5.4a, and “happiest life” Figure 5.4c) is larger for those with high aspirations 
than for those with low aspirations. On the contrary, the share of spouses of the household heads who had 
higher subjective well-being in terms of both indicators (i.e. “best life” Figure 5.4b, and “happiest life” Figure 
5.4d) is larger for those with low aspirations than for those with high aspirations. Perhaps this could be 
interpreted as follows. Spouses of the household heads in general also revealed lower aspirations by comparison 
to the household heads, on average. Hence, this could mean that having accepted their situation as it is and 
without much aspiration for improvement, they are more or less satisfied with what they have. This, as Ray 
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(2006) argues, could be because their dreams are stifled due to poverty and also due to their limited aspirations 
window for they have limited exposure to media and living and travelling experience outside their village as 
shown in chapter two; or, alternatively, this could be a reflection of reconciliation to poverty (Sen, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Subjective well-being and change over time (%) 
(a) How does your household’s welfare or 
well-being compare with that of other 
households in the village? (%) 
 
(b) Just thinking about your own 
household circumstances, how 
would you describe your 
household? (%) 
 
(c) How has the well-being of your 
household changed in the past 5 years 
(since 2000 EC)? (%)  
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Figure 5.4. Subjective well-being by aspirations status 
a. Head of household 
 
b. Spouse of household head 
 
c. Head of household 
 
d. Spouse of household head 
 
 
 
5.4. Estimation and results  
The well-being outcome (𝑦) of the jth household67 can be expressed in the following function: 
𝑦𝑗  =  𝑓(𝐴, 𝐼, 𝐻, 𝐶)                                 (1) 
Where, A represents the aspirations status (of the household head and of the spouse), I denotes other 
characteristics of the household head and that of the spouse, H and C respectively denote other household and 
community level characteristics. As opposed to the assumption behind unitary household models where 
preferences (or decision making) of the household is often proxied by that of the preferences of the head of the 
household, in this study we assume joint decision making by the two spouses and hence income, wealth or food 
security of the household is determined by the characteristics of both the head of the household and of the 
spouse, in combination with other household and community characteristics including district fixed effects. We 
estimate a series of an ordinary least squares (OLS) model relating well-being outcomes of the household with 
the aspirations of the household head and of the spouse and a wide range of other potential determinants. Yet, 
our purpose remains to see if aspirations of the two spouses, given other factors, are strong correlates of well-
being outcomes, without necessarily claiming causal relations. This is because regression results might still be 
confounded by unobserved household-specific heterogeneity which we could not account for since we only have 
cross-sectional observations on the main variables of interest (e.g. aspirations and food (in)security indicators). 
                                                          
67 When the unit of analysis the individual level (e.g. if “y” is subjective well-being), A and I respectively denote the 
aspirations status and other characteristics of the individual. All other variables remain the same. 
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Yet, as Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue, “correlation can sometimes provide pretty good evidence of a causal 
relation” (p.113). 
 
5.4.1. Aspirations and income and consumption expenditure  
Based on a review of existing studies, we have discussed the various correlates of income or poverty and food 
(in)security in rural Ethiopia. None of the existing studies however examine the potential effect of aspirations on 
well-being outcomes, and this study contributes to filling the gap. Recall that we have shown in a bivariate 
context that aspirations and well-being outcomes are positively correlated. Beginning with this section, we 
examine if that relationship holds and whether the correlation is statistically significant after controlling for other 
potential determinants.   
  
To begin with, Table 5.8 presents a summary of the main results from OLS68 estimations relating annual per-
capita income and monthly consumption expenditure with different determinants using various specifications. 
Since it is likely that the aspirations of the household head and the spouse are correlated, we control for that 
effect using the interaction term of the aspirations index of the two spouses (see result columns 1 & 3). Thus, 
after controlling for other factors, we find that the aspirations index of the household head is positively and 
significantly associated with the logarithms of per-capita household income (columns 1 & 2) and monthly 
consumption expenditure (columns 3 & 4).69 According to these results (columns 1 and 2), holding all other 
independent variables constant, a standard deviation increase in the aspirations index70 of the household head is 
associated with a (0.139 × 0.61) = 0.085 to (0.149 × 0.61) = 0.091 points increase in the logarithm of annual 
income per-capita. This is about (0.085/7.65) = 1.1 to (0.091/7.65) = 1.2 percent increase over the mean annual 
income per-capita. Similarly, according to columns 3 and 4, a standard deviation increase in the aspirations index 
of the household head is associated with a (0.134 × 0.495) = 0.066 to (0.147 × 0.495) = 0.073 points increase in 
the logarithm of monthly consumption expenditure per-capita. This is about (0.066/6.22) = 1.1 to (0.073/6.22) 
= 1.2 percent increase over the mean monthly per-capita expenditure. Surprisingly, results (columns 1-3) suggest 
that, the aspirations of the spouse of the household head do not seem to be statistically significantly correlated 
with per capita income or expenditure. While column 4 seems to indicate that the aspirations of the spouse of 
the household head are negatively associated with the per-capita consumption expenditure, the result is not 
robust for it loses its statistical significance when we control for the interactions term of the aspirations index of 
the two spouses. Further, in order to check if other results would hold in a unitary household model framework, 
we drop the aspirations index and other characteristics of the spouse of the household head from subsequent 
estimations (see columns 5 and 6) and instead control for the gender of the household head. Results suggest that 
the aspirations index of the household head remain positively and significantly associated with per-capita 
household income or consumption expenditure. Moreover, it is important to note the robustness of the overall 
                                                          
68 The data was also fitted to a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR), but the main results did not change. 
69
 The mean and standard deviation of the logarithms of per-capita income and expenditure are (7.65 and 0.896) and 6.22 
and 0.495, respectively.  
70
 The mean and standard deviation of the aspirations index of the household head are 0.158 and 0.61, respectively. 
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results even when we control for the change71 in per capita income or expenditure in the past (i.e. between 2006 
and 2010), which is likely to influence both present income and aspirations, and the corresponding interactions 
term with the aspirations index.    
 
Table 5.8. Correlates of annual income per capita (in log.) and monthly household consumption expenditure per 
capita (in log.)72 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
INC_pc1 INC_pc2 EXP_pc1 EXP_pc2 INC_pc3 EXP_pc3 
Aspirations Head 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.13*** 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Aspirations Spouse 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.07* 
  
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Aspirations(Head*Spouse) 0.02 
 
-0.04 
   
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
   Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 304 304 304 304 376 376 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.41 0.41 0.52 0.37 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Note: For the full set of results showing all control variables, refer to the Appendix, Table A5. 1. 
 
 
In addition, consistent with the existing studies, we find that other household characteristics including wealth 
indicators such as the value of asset holdings, livestock holdings, and size of agricultural land holdings are all 
strongly positively associated with per capita income or consumption expenditure (Table A5. 1). We also find 
that education level of the household head is positively and strongly associated with household per capita income 
or consumption expenditure. In contrast, large family size seems to negatively affect household per-capita 
income and consumption expenditure. Female household headship is also negatively associated with per-capita 
income. Among the community characteristics proxied by the average distance to- asphalt road, markets and 
micro finance institution (MFI), we only find average distance to MFI to be negatively and strongly associated 
with annual income per capita. However, we fail to find evidence of any statistically significant correlations 
between household income or expenditure and the incidence of negative shocks such as illness of the household 
head or spouse, livestock diseases, large increases in input prices, death or loss of livestock, or illness of other 
family member. This may suggest that the study households are insured against these shocks, which is in line 
with other studies in rural Ethiopia such as Asfaw and von Braun (2004), Porter (2012) and Yilma et al (2014).  
 
5.4.2. Aspirations and food security  
Income and food security may have common determinants, but the two are conceptually distinct. In fact, while 
income may determine household’s economic access to food, it by no means guarantees household food security 
for the latter requires availability, utilization, and stability of food at all times. In this section, we examine if 
aspirations are also strong correlates of food security, given other factors that determine each of the four pillars 
of household food security. Following the existing literature and their availability in the data, we use per-capita 
                                                          
71
 Results remain unchanged when we control for actual level of per capita income or expenditure in 2006 and 2010 instead 
of the change. Results with actual level of past outcomes are not reported but they are available upon request.   
72 Female headed households drop out from the analysis (column 1-4) when we consider the characteristics of both the 
household head and the spouse 
 109 
 
calorie consumption, FCS, HDDS and HFIAS as measures of food (in)security. Table 5.9 presents a summary of 
the main correlates of food (in)security. Results suggest that aspirations are indeed strongly associated with 
household food (in)security. For example, according to column 1, a standard deviation increase in the aspirations 
index of the household head is associated with a (422.4 × 0.61) = 257.7 calories per-capita per-day increase in 
household consumption. This is roughly an (257.7/2997) = 8.6 percent increase over the mean calories 
consumption per-capita per-day. Similarly, according to columns 2 to 4 respectively, a standard deviation increase 
in the aspirations index of the household head is associated with a (4.5 × 0.61) = 2.75 points increase in FCS, a 
(0.36 × 0.61) = 0.22 points increase in HDDS, and a (0.34 × 0.61) = 0.21 points decrease in HFIAS (recall that 
unlike other indicators, HFIAS actually measures food insecurity)73. In reference to the corresponding mean 
outcomes, these are roughly a (2.75/71.4) = 3.9 percent increase in FCS, a (0.22/8.68) = 2.5 percent increase in 
HDDS, and a (0.21/0.48) = 44 percent decrease in HFIAS. While the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for 
the aspirations index of the household head slightly decline when we ignore the characteristics of the spouse of 
the household head (columns 5-8), the correlation remains statistically significant in three out of the four 
indicators of household food (in)security. This perhaps underlines the importance of controlling for the 
aspirations and other characteristics of the spouse of the household head even though the coefficient estimates 
of the spouse’s aspirations index are not themselves statistically significant (columns 1-4). Doing so is further 
supported by not only the theory but also the statistical evidence of the spouse’s education as a statistically 
significant correlate of FCS and HDDS (column 2 and 3).   
 
Table 5.9. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with food (in)security 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
pc_Calorie FCS HDDS HFIAS pc_Calorie_H FCS_H HDDS_H HFIAS_H 
Aspirations Head 422.38*** 4.50** 0.36** -0.34** 364.38*** 2.82 0.28** -0.35** 
 
(129.72) (1.81) (0.15) (0.16) (123.54) (1.98) (0.13) (0.16) 
Aspirations Spouse -183.02 -0.88 -0.07 -0.00 
    
 
(122.89) (1.76) (0.13) (0.29) 
    Aspirations(Head × Spouse) -82.35 -4.96*** -0.12 0.18 
    
 
(92.69) (1.52) (0.13) (0.19) 
    Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations            302 302 302 302 374 374 374 375 
R2 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Note: For the full set of results showing all control variables, refer to the Appendix, Table A5. 2. 
 
 
The strong correlations between aspirations and food security indicators should be put into context, as explained 
next. Aspirations may affect food security through different channels. First, aspirations may improve households’ 
forward-looking behavior and motivate them to reduce risk by diversifying their livelihood strategies (e.g. by 
engaging in non-farm income generating activities) which may lead to improved food security (e.g. through 
improved purchasing power or economic access). Secondly, aspirations may motivate households to reduce their 
risk aversion and encourage them to invest in agricultural innovations, which are major determinants of 
                                                          
73 Female headed households drop out from the analysis (column 1-4) when we consider the characteristics of both the 
household head and the spouse. Thus, the corresponding mean values (for columns 1-4) of per-capita calorie consumption, 
FCS, HDDS, and HFIAS are respectively 2997, 71.4, 8.68, and 0.48. The corresponding mean values for the full sample 
regardless of household headship are 3040, 70.5, 8.6, and 0.49. 
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agricultural productivity which in turn may determine some aspects of food security (such as food availability and 
stability). Thirdly, farming in Ethiopia is a labor intensive sector and productivity may depend on the physical 
fitness of farm labor, which in turn is determined by the health status and consumption of foods that provide the 
necessary nutrients and adequate calories. In this context, aspirations may motivate households to consume more 
diversified and dietary foods and to make other investments that would improve health and nutrition status 
leading to at least one aspect of food security (e.g. utilisation). Despite the wide range of control variables 
including income growth in the past (i.e. between 2006 and 2010), this study does not establish causal inference. 
However, the findings provide suggestive evidence that higher aspirations may lead to improved food security.  
Moving on to other results (Table A5. 2), we find that resource endowments such as annual household income, 
assets, livestock holdings and relative wealth status (i.e. belonging to the higher wealth quintiles) are positively 
correlated with some of the food security indicators (columns 1-8). Besides having education level higher than 8th 
grade, engagement of the spouse of the household head in non-farm income generating activities tends to 
improve the household’s dietary diversity (column 3). Further, negative shocks such as illness of the household 
head or the spouse and large increases in input prices are negatively associated with food security (column 3 and 
4). Remoteness of the household from the market and asphalt road is also negatively associated with food 
security (columns 2, 3, 6 & 7), which is consistent with the findings of other studies such as Abay and Hirvonen 
(2016) who report that proximity to food markets improves consumption of more diverse diets and better child 
nutrition outcomes in northern Ethiopia. Surprisingly, however, results suggest that remoteness of the household 
from MFI and health center, and the incidence of illness of a household member other than the head and spouse 
are positively correlated with some of the indicators of food security (columns 2, 6 & 8). Lastly, results also 
suggest that female headed households are more likely to be food insecure (columns 6 & 7). 
5.4.3. Aspirations and subjective well-being  
Unlike the objective measures of well-being outcomes such as income or food security, subjective measures such 
as satisfaction in life may not be necessarily dependent upon own outcomes. Just like aspirations, they are partly 
driven by one’s relative economic position in a society and understanding their correlates may provide strong 
policy implications, e.g. with respect to economic inequality. For example, as we have seen in the descriptive 
statistics of this study (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2), the annual income per-capita and the wealth status of study 
households have, on average, increased between 2006 and 2014. However, in terms of subjective well-being, the 
share of people who thought they were “worse than others” has nearly doubled from 13.7 percent in 2006 to 
24.8 percent in 2014 while the share of those who thought they were “not different from others” has declined 
from 72 percent to 53 percent during the same period (Figure 5.3a). At first sight, this may seem like income 
inequality has also increased over the years despite the observed average income growth among the sample 
households. If that was the case, it might be natural to expect such inequality would trigger changes in subjective 
well-being. However, changes in subjective well-being may not necessarily happen in isolation from the 
individual’s beliefs, aspirations and future expectations. Thus, in this section, we examine if there is any strong 
correlations between aspirations and future expectations and subjective well-being. Subjective well-being in this 
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case is measured in terms of having ‘best life’ and ‘happy life’ by referring to a 10-step ladder where top of the 
ladder represents ‘best/happy life’ and bottom of the ladder represents ‘worst/miserable life.’ In the regressions, 
we also control for a wide range of other factors that might potentially determine well-being outcomes. To 
control for the relative economic position of the household in the community, we include indicators of the 
wealth quintile group and the income quintile group to which the individual’s household belongs, in addition to 
the household’s actual income and wealth. Regression results associated with the spouse and the household head 
are separately summarised in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11, respectively.    
 
According to Table 5.10, neither aspirations nor expectations of the spouse of the household head seem to be 
strongly associated with either measures of subjective well-being. For household heads, in contrast, Table 5.11 
shows that there is a positive and strong correlation between higher aspirations and higher subjective well-being 
(columns 1 - 4) and between higher expectations and higher subjective well-being (columns 5-8)74. Further, the 
coefficient estimate of the aspirations and expectations indicators remain statistically significant even after 
controlling for other internal (psychological) factors75 including the individual’s locus of control, self-esteem, 
perception on the causes of poverty, openness to change, envy, trust in others, exposure to media and 
information and travel experience outside the village (columns 2, 4, 6 & 8) (Table A5. 4). Yet, contrary to our 
findings, Knight and Gunatilaka (2012) in rural China and Stutzer  (2004) in Switzerland find some evidence of 
“hedonic treadmill”- that happiness is positively associated with income but negatively associated with 
aspirations to income for people adapt their aspirations in response to changes in income. Our interpretation of 
the findings in this study, however, is that the average per-capita income or wealth among sample households 
has increased between 2006 and 2014. This may mean that these positive changes may have given rise to 
increased hopes, aspirations and expectations. Since aspirations and expectations are also formed based on what 
is perceived to be achievable, and in this case the recent experience indicates continuous average growth in 
income and wealth between 2006 and 2014, they are likely to positively affect happiness or satisfaction in life. 
Further, despite some improvements in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates, the corresponding results 
remain qualitatively the same when we drop, from the regressions, the two indicators of the household’s relative 
wealth and income position in the society (results not shown). Perhaps, this may further indicate that aspirations 
and expectations can be independent sources of higher subjective well-being among household heads.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74 Note: about 90 percent of household heads are males and the remaining are females who are either widow or divorcee 
75
 While internal factors are likely to be correlated to each other, each of the correlation coefficients amongst the indicators 
used in this study is far less than 0.6, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. Correlation coefficients are reported 
in the appendix in Table A5. 5 
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Table 5.10. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with wives’ life satisfaction and/or happiness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BestA1 BestA2 HappyA1 HappyA2 BestE1 BestE2 HappyE1 HappyE2 
Aspirations Spouse -0.32* -0.16 0.16 0.16 
    
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) 
    Expectations Spouse 
    
-0.15 0.03 0.16 0.17 
     
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) 
Internal factors No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
R2 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For the full set of results showing all control variables, refer to the Appendix, Table A5. 3. 
 
Table 5.11. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with life satisfaction and/or happiness of the household 
head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BestA1 BestA2 HappyA1 HappyA2 BestE1 BestE2 HappyE1 HappyE2 
Aspirations Head 0.24* 0.29** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
    
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
    Expectations Head 
    
0.27 0.37** 0.27 0.34** 
     
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Internal factors No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 374 374 373 373 374 374 373 373 
R2 0.30 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.20 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: For the full set of results showing all control variables, refer to the Appendix, Table A5. 4. 
 
 
The relationship between life satisfaction and current income, and life satisfaction and relative income is 
inconclusive in the literature. For example, Easterlin (1995) concludes that “…within a country at a given time, 
those at higher incomes are, on average, happier. However, raising the incomes of all does not increase the 
happiness of all. This is because the material norms on which judgments of well-being are based increase in the 
same proportion as the actual income of the society” (p.44). Accordingly, as can be seen in Table A5. 4, we find 
that the relative per-capita income and the relative wealth status of the household (both measured in terms of 
quintile group that the household belongs to) are positively and strongly associated with subjective well-being of 
the household head, and this is true in all specifications (columns 1 – 8). However, we fail to find a statistically 
strong correlations between actual per-capita income and the two measures of subjective well-being, and 
between actual household wealth and subjective well-being measured in terms of happiness (Table A5. 3 and 
Table A5. 4). If any, Table A5. 4, column 8 suggests that happiness and actual income per capita are negatively 
and statistically significantly associated. Our findings are in line with Easterlin’s (1995) conclusion. On the other 
hand, based on a review of existing studies, Helliwell et al (2012) argue that absolute income is important for 
subjective well-being in poor countries while comparative income is rather the most important in richer 
countries. This contradicts not only our findings, but also partly others’ such as Alem’s (2014) who, based on 
panel data from urban Ethiopia, also finds that happiness increases with relative income. But contrary to our 
findings, Alem (2014) in urban Ethiopia and Kinght and Gunatilaka (2012) in rural China find that happiness 
increases with actual income.  
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Among other characteristics, we find that family size of the household is positively and strongly associated with 
subjective well-being of the household head (Table A5. 4, columns 1 and 5). This perhaps could be associated 
with the support the household could enjoy from the potential labor pool, particularly as the household head 
ages. In line with this, Conzo et al (2015) also find a strong relationship between subjective well-being of the 
household head and family size in rural Ethiopia. Having some level of education and having experienced large 
increases in input prices are negatively and statistically significantly associated with subjective well-being of the 
household head and this is true for all specifications (Table A5. 4). On the other hand, when we consider wives, 
the incidence of negative shocks such as large increase in input prices, illness of the household head or the 
spouse, and death or loss of livestock, and remoteness of the market are negatively and statistically significantly 
associated with subjective well-being (Table A5. 3). In addition, we also find that own participation in off-farm 
income generating activities is negatively and strongly associated with subjective well-being of the spouse of the 
household head. This could be because wives engage in such activities not necessarily out of preference but 
rather out of the household’s needs for additional income. Putting this into context, traditionally wives in rural 
Ethiopia are mainly responsible for in-house chores and other household production that may include working 
on own farm. Hence, any deviation from this kind of ‘culture’ or the burden of having additional responsibilities 
may negatively affect their subjective well-being or satisfaction in life. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
This Chapter empirically examines if aspirations are important correlates of well-being outcomes in rural 
Ethiopia. We establish robust evidence by employing several objective as well as subjective measures of well-
being outcomes including income and expenditure, multi-dimensional food security indicators, and satisfaction 
in life or subjective well-being. Descriptive statistics suggest that individuals with high aspirations have on 
average higher income or wealth by comparison to those with low aspirations and the difference is statistically 
significant. Similarly, across different food security categories, the share of people with low-aspirations increases 
as we move from the most food secure to the extremely food insecure categories, and this is true for most of the 
indicators. Cross-tabulation of subjective well-being (using indicators of life satisfaction and/or happiness) with 
aspirations however turns in mixed evidence that the relationship is positive among household heads while in 
contrast the relationship is negative among their spouses.  
 
We use regressions to relate each well-being outcome against the aspirations indicator and other potential drivers 
including human capital, the household’s access to: natural capital, physical capital, financial capital, roads, 
markets and other services. To account for the unobserved factors common to all residents in each study site, we 
control for district fixed effects. The main finding of the study, which is robust across outcome indicators and 
specifications, is that the aspirations of the household head are important predictors of household well-being in 
rural Ethiopia. On the other hand, while we fail to find a statistically significant effect of the aspirations of the 
spouse, their inclusion in the regressions along with other characteristics of the spouse, increases the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimates for the aspirations of the household head. This perhaps indirectly underscores the 
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importance of the spouse’s contribution to the household decision making and the corresponding well-being 
outcomes. Regarding outcome indicators measured at individual level such as satisfaction in life or happiness, we 
also find positive and strong effect of aspirations and future expectations of the household head. In contrast, for 
the spouse of the household head, aspirations and expectations do not seem to be strongly correlated with 
subjective well-being.  
 
Despite the cross-sectional nature of the data used in this study, which is the major limitation for unobserved 
household characteristics might still affect both the aspirations and the well-being outcomes or the possibility of 
reverse causation, the robustness of findings across various indicators suggest that aspirations are indeed strong 
determinants of well-being outcomes in rural Ethiopia. Yet, it is important to note that we have controlled for 
the district fixed effects, the present as well as past income and wealth levels or their changes, other 
psychological factors and a wide range of other factors which might affect both the aspirations and the present 
level outcome indicators. This perhaps would help minimize the influence of the error term that would result 
from unobserved heterogeneity. Further, we had also established in the preceding chapters that aspirations are 
also strongly correlated with the adoption of agricultural innovations and risk taking behavior which are all 
underlying determinants of household income or wealth and food security. Therefore, based on these findings, 
we conclude that targeting the determinants of aspirations may be a useful policy strategy to improving well-
being outcomes in rural Ethiopia. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The persistence of poverty in some parts of the society across the globe inspired recent studies in development 
economics to embrace the use of multidisciplinary tools and concepts to better understand the situation of the 
poor. This thesis employs one of the recent conceptual tools, the aspirations-failure framework, which links the 
situation of the poor and their (under)investment behavior to low aspirations (or aspirations failure). The thesis 
uses individual and household level data collected in rural Ethiopia to understand how aspirations are formed 
and how they are correlated with various outcomes. Aspirations were elicited in reference to income, wealth, 
education and social status. Based on the standardized indices of the four indicators as well as their aggregate 
index Chapter 2 examines the social drivers of aspirations. Analysis of the data suggest that, besides own 
outcomes such as income or wealth and other characteristics of the household, the average achievements of 
“relevant others” drives aspirations, confirming the theory that aspirations are socially determined. Results by 
gender suggest that the effect of social interactions on aspirations is statistically strong only for females. The 
evidence further shows that the effect of social interactions on aspirations is particularly larger and statistically 
stronger when the reference group is wider and the people that comprise the reference group are richer than the 
individual or richer than the village average. This may also be referred to as motivations externality. 
 
One of the channels in which aspirations may affect behavior is indirectly through their effect on risk aversion. 
Chapter 2 also examines the effect of aspirations on risk preferences. Risk preferences were elicited using lottery 
choices where the outcomes were determined by coin toss. According to the theory, aspirations (or aspirations-
gap (AG)) affect forward looking behavior (which may include minimized risk aversion) non-linearly. Chapter 2 
econometrically confirms that is actually the case. For example, results suggest that a standard deviation increase 
in the AG level is associated with a 0.21 standard deviations reduction in risk aversion. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of the square term of the AG index confirms the hypothesized non-linear 
effect of the AG on risk behavior. Based on alternative specifications, results suggest that individuals with 
narrow AG are associated with risk aversion that is 0.22 to 0.41 standard deviations higher than those with 
moderate AG. The corresponding risk aversion of those with large AG is 0.26 to 0.31 standard deviations higher 
than those with moderate AG. Results also indicate that the effect of AG on risk preferences is stronger for 
women. Chapter 2 further tests robustness of these findings using matching estimators and the overall results 
confirm that moderate AG indeed enhances risk-taking (or relaxes risk aversion), implying that an aspirations 
level which is “large enough to incentive but not so large to induce frustrations” (Genicot and Ray, 2014) may 
help minimize risk aversion.  
 
Social interactions may not only result in aspirations, but may also generate knowledge externalities. Accordingly, 
Chapter 3 examines the existence of social learning in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia. To overcome 
identification challenges that may arise from endogenous network formation, simultaneity or reflection bias, the 
study relies on a specially designed and collected social networks data where social networks were exogenously 
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assigned using a ‘random matching within sample’ procedure. The study also benefits from the semi-panel nature 
of the data and the exogenous intervention in the past that reached only some of the households in the sample. 
Using econometric strategies that help isolate social learning from that of correlated and contextual effects, the 
study finds strong evidence of network externalities in the adoption of row-planting and also in farm 
productivity.  
 
Despite such evidence of social learning, some people tend to be more innovative than others, given the same 
resource constraints. One of the major explanations that comes out of the social psychology and related 
literature is that beliefs or the sense of control individuals have over their life shape their preferences, such as 
their aspirations. Hence the difference in aspirations among people may explain the observed differences in their 
behavior, for instance the adoption or non-adoption of agricultural innovations. This needs empirical test, 
however. Further, aspirations are assumed to influence such behavior directly through motivations and indirectly 
through their effect on risk attitude which is a widely established determinant of innovations. Chapter 4 
examines the direct motivation effects of aspirations (or AG) on the adoption of agricultural innovations such as 
improved seed, fertilizers, chemicals, and row-planting. The study conducts plot level and household level 
analysis. Results suggest that having narrow or very large aspirations-gap is strongly associated with low level of 
innovativeness and low adoption of inorganic fertilizers. According to the econometric estimates, for example, a 
household with narrow or very-large AG is associated with lower use of fertilizers by about 105kg/ha, on 
average, than an otherwise similar household with moderate level of AG. These findings are in line with the 
theory which suggests that moderate aspirations motivate future-oriented behavior. The findings are also in line 
with other empirical studies such as Bernard et al. (2014) and Ghosal et al. (2013) which find strong impacts of 
aspirations on savings, increased demand for credit and other forward-looking behaviors. The findings of 
Chapter 4 have strong policy implications for the adoption of innovations is widely recognized as a key for 
sustainable development and improved rural livelihoods as in the context of this thesis. 
 
The main goal of the thesis is ultimately to try to understand the well-being implications of aspirations by 
examining their interactions with the underlying factors (such as the adoption of agricultural innovations) as well 
as their interactions with the well-being outcomes themselves. To examine the latter, Chapter 5 uses various 
outcome indicators including income and consumption expenditure, various triangulating measures of food 
security, and subjective well-being defined in terms of life satisfaction and happiness. In nearly all outcome 
indicators, the study finds suggestive evidence that aspirations particularly that of the household head, are 
important predictors of household well-being in rural Ethiopia. Some of the econometric estimates, for example, 
suggest that a standard deviation increase in the aspirations index of the household head is associated, on 
average, with an 8.6 percent increase in daily calories consumption per-capita, a 3.9 percent increase in food 
consumption score (FCS), a 2.5 percent increase in household dietary diversity score (HDDS), a 44 percent 
reduction in household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS), and about 1.2 percent increase over the mean 
income or consumption expenditure per-capita of the household.  
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This thesis is not without limitations, however, and the three major ones deserve mentioning. The first one is 
associated with measurement error. While individuals aspire to achieve different things in life, some of which are 
quantifiable while others not, and more important to some than to others, the four indicators used to measure 
aspirations may not capture the whole concept of aspirations. But, it is believed that these four indicators are 
correlated with a broad array of life targets and hence could serve as a strong proxy to measuring aspirations. 
Second, with the intention of having lagged observations which are crucial for identification, the survey which 
this thesis mainly relies upon covered an existing sample of farm households who had been interviewed by other 
organization in the past. Since the original survey used a mix of purposive and random sampling procedures 
from study sites which have high agricultural potential, the external validity of the study might be limited. Most 
of the findings of the thesis, however, are in line with the theory and a few other empirical studies that used 
larger samples. Third, while this thesis benefits from the availability and use of lagged observations of other 
explanatory variables, which are key to partially tackle issues related to reverse causation and other identification 
challenges, the main variable of interest (i.e. aspirations) is observed only once (i.e. in the latest survey). Yet, since 
aspirations evolve over time in light of new experiences, choices and information, the thesis could not capture 
such dynamics and hence the corresponding interactions effect of aspirations with other outcomes. Some of the 
results in this thesis may suffer from such limitations and hence the coefficient estimates may tend to be under- 
or overstated. Yet, it is worth noting that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical test of 
the aspirations failure framework in terms of adoption of agricultural innovations and the various dimensions of 
food security.  
 
Given those caveats, the overall findings of the thesis clearly demonstrate that beyond the resource-related 
deprivations, psychological constraints such as low aspirations also play a role in rural households’ decision-
making in Ethiopia, with consequences on well-being outcomes. Targeting the determinants of aspirations may 
therefore be a useful policy strategy in the context of farm households in Ethiopia. This is because moderately 
raised aspirations may also help improve the effectiveness of other policies aimed at improving the adoption of 
agricultural innovations and well-being outcomes. The implementation of such strategy may rely on social 
networks, for social interactions may not only help amplify motivation effects or help broaden the ‘aspirations 
window’ of the poor and particularly that of women, they may also help generate knowledge spill overs such as 
the adoption of agricultural innovations. The policy relevance of findings in this thesis could be emphasised in 
the words of Bandura (2009), who states that “failure to address the psychosocial determinants of human 
behavior is often the weakest link in social policy initiatives. Simply providing ready access to resources does not 
mean that people will take advantage of them” (p. 505). Further, the key messages of this thesis can be seen as 
support for the recent call of the World Bank for a new set of development approaches, “viewing people more 
fully and recognizing that a combination of psychological and social forces affects their perception, cognition, 
decisions, and behaviors”, as formulated in the world development report of 2015. 
 
 118 
 
 
As the saying goes, “a picture is worth a thousand words:” 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Unknown, downloaded from Facebook. 
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APPENDICES 
Table A2. 1. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations: RG - All 
 (Using average outcome of all in the reference group)# 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
Peers' Ave. income(ln) 0.00 -0.02 
     
             
 
(0.07) (0.04) 
     
             
Peers' Ave. V.assets (ln) 
  
-0.01 -0.05 
   
             
   
(0.06) (0.04) 
   
             
Peers' Ave. S.status (ln) 
    
0.15 0.10 
 
             
     
(0.11) (0.08) 
 
             
Peers' Ave. ch.education  
      
0.02 0.00    
       
(0.05) (0.04)    
Network size 0.09*** 0.03* 0.03 0.01 0.02*** 0.01** 0.10* 0.12**  
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06)    
Male+ 0.42*** 0.16** 0.56*** 0.32*** 0.05** 0.01 0.48*** 0.54**  
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18) (0.23)    
Age in years 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.34*** 0.06    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.08)    
Square of age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.04** 0.00 0.06*** 0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.02 -0.00    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.21** 0.01 0.18*** 0.06 0.02* -0.00 0.61* 0.27    
 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.22)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.20*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.20    
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.13)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) -0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 -0.31 -0.07    
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.18)    
Dist. asphalt road (minutes)(ln) 0.06 0.02 -0.09** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.04    
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.14)    
Increased input prices+ 0.02 -0.14* 0.08 0.09 -0.06** 0.01 0.46 0.02    
 
(0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.43) (0.30)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.15 -0.05 -0.43** -0.08 0.05 0.04 0.50 0.36    
 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.19) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.50) (0.51)    
Illness of head/spouse+ -0.00 0.10 -0.07 0.19 -0.05 -0.04*** -0.46 -0.35    
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.16) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.72) (0.69)    
Illness of other family+ -0.24** -0.08 -0.30* -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.26 0.45    
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.36) (0.48)    
Self-esteem 
 
0.02 
 
0.20*** 
 
-0.03 
 
0.03    
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.34)    
Subj. welbeing 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.06** 
 
0.01 
 
0.07    
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.12)    
Discount factor 
 
0.02 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
0.17*** 
  
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.06)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
 
0.89*** 
     
             
  
(0.04) 
     
             
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.72*** 
   
             
    
(0.05) 
   
             
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.35*** 
 
             
      
(0.09) 
 
             
Present ch.education  
       
0.34*** 
        
(0.08)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ 0.28* -0.26** -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.87*** -1.08*** 
 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.33) (0.26)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.21** -0.13 0.09 0.01 -0.07* -0.05** -1.75*** -1.83*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) (0.29) (0.24)    
Constant 7.87*** 1.59** 10.05*** 4.08*** 3.77*** 2.60*** 4.73* 10.71*** 
 
(0.84) (0.69) (1.20) (1.20) (0.41) (0.62) (2.66) (2.04)    
Observations 635 633 635 633 635 633 635 633    
R-squared 0.213 0.579 0.263 0.586 0.092 0.393 0.13 0.262 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators 
were controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, FTC, nearest input dealer; dummies for 
experience of shocks including too much rain/flood, and livestock diseases; and internal traits such as locus of control, trust in others, 
and two indicators of risk preferences.  +Binary
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Table A2. 2. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations: RG - richer  
(Using average outcome of those who are richer than the respondent)# 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
         Ave. of Peers' above Ave. income(ln) 0.606*** 0.082** 
     
             
 
(0.048) (0.035) 
     
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. V.assets (ln) 
 
0.493*** 0.000 
   
             
   
(0.085) (0.075) 
   
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. S.status (ln) 
   
0.586*** -0.033 
 
             
     
(0.154) (0.112) 
 
             
Ave. of Peers' above Ave. ch.education  
     
0.266*** -0.198**  
       
(0.077) (0.078)    
Network size 0.047 0.008 0.033 0.019 0.018*** 0.013* 0.190 0.135    
 
(0.029) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.120) (0.102)    
Male+ 0.398*** 0.208** 0.578*** 0.360*** 0.028* 0.013 0.564** 0.665**  
 
(0.107) (0.081) (0.098) (0.102) (0.015) (0.020) (0.284) (0.282)    
Age in years 0.016 0.015 0.008 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.272*** 0.005    
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.103) (0.079)    
Square of age -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.000    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)    
Education level 0.016 0.001 0.028* 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.031 0.004    
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.058) (0.049)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.186** 0.046 0.151** 0.076 0.008 -0.001 0.622 0.327    
 
(0.076) (0.055) (0.060) (0.075) (0.015) (0.015) (0.385) (0.293)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.107*** 0.012 0.142*** 0.043* 0.005 -0.005 -0.088 -0.246    
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.011) (0.015) (0.174) (0.184)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 0.064* 0.050 -0.062 -0.008 0.028** 0.009 -0.240 -0.062    
 
(0.039) (0.047) (0.070) (0.056) (0.013) (0.021) (0.292) (0.265)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.233** -0.097 -0.334* -0.123 0.062 0.060* 0.550 0.690    
 
(0.098) (0.073) (0.189) (0.126) (0.045) (0.032) (0.703) (0.725)    
Illness of other family+ -0.134 -0.015 -0.268* -0.102 -0.032 -0.047 -0.008 0.582    
 
(0.126) (0.106) (0.153) (0.113) (0.045) (0.044) (0.340) (0.475)    
Locus of control 
 
0.196** 
 
0.165 
 
0.005 
 
0.791    
  
(0.086) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.480)    
Self-esteem 
 
0.045 
 
0.173** 
 
-0.022 
 
0.085    
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.453)    
Discount factor 
 
0.014 
 
0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
0.174**  
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.084)    
Risk_lottery 
 
-0.009 
 
0.053 
 
-0.021* 
 
-0.232*   
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.127)    
Risk_Market 
 
0.026 
 
-0.031 
 
0.026 
 
0.349*   
  
(0.018) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.199)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
 
0.773*** 
     
             
  
(0.078) 
     
             
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.723*** 
   
             
    
(0.061) 
   
             
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.408*** 
 
             
      
(0.122) 
 
             
Present ch.education  
       
0.531*** 
        
(0.137)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.085 -0.264*** -0.059 -0.107 -0.026 -0.023 -1.032*** -1.355*** 
 
(0.058) (0.086) (0.140) (0.121) (0.035) (0.023) (0.384) (0.344)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.053 -0.157** 0.046 0.006 -0.094** -0.053** -2.036*** -2.187*** 
 
(0.071) (0.075) (0.130) (0.144) (0.046) (0.024) (0.280) (0.189)    
Constant 2.346*** 1.630** 4.315*** 3.443*** 1.795*** 3.014*** 3.969 13.663*** 
 
(0.543) (0.806) (1.511) (1.269) (0.583) (0.294) (3.148) (3.177)    
Observations 510 508 481 481 476 474 456 455    
R-squared 0.309 0.496 0.303 0.518 0.177 0.380 0.166 0.297 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were 
controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, asphalt road, FTC, nearest input dealer; dummies for 
experience of shocks including too much rain/flood, increased input prices, illness of household head/spouse, and livestock diseases; and 
internal traits such as trust in others and subjective well-being. +Binary 
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Table A2. 3. The effect of social interactions on aspirations: RG - Networks 
(Social networks as reference group) # 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
Asp. Av. Asp. Av. Asp. Av. Asp. ab. Av. Asp. ab. Av. Asp. ab. Av. 
Peers' Ave. Asp.index -0.030 -0.025 -0.047 
  
             
 
(0.090) (0.083) (0.075) 
  
             
Av. of Peers' above av.Aspindex 
   
0.436*** 0.425*** 0.370*** 
    
(0.058) (0.054) (0.043)    
Network size 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.027* 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)    
Male+ 0.190*** 0.151*** 0.079 0.087** 0.078** 0.058    
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.057) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)    
Age in years 0.025* 0.023* 0.009 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.008    
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Square of age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Education level 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.019** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.008**  
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.099** 0.084* 0.007 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.031    
 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.012 0.026 0.016 -0.010    
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 0.017 0.029 0.037 0.039** 0.044*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)    
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln) -0.024 -0.039 -0.059 -0.050*** -0.056*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)    
Illness of head/spouse+ 0.027 0.026 0.078 -0.094** -0.093** -0.055    
 
(0.089) (0.085) (0.093) (0.046) (0.044) (0.042)    
Illness of other family+ -0.169** -0.129* -0.102* -0.029 -0.030 -0.002    
 
(0.066) (0.078) (0.061) (0.055) (0.063) (0.062)    
ILC index 
 
0.167** 0.106* 
 
0.094** 0.080**  
  
(0.067) (0.064) 
 
(0.041) (0.040)    
Trust index 
 
0.039*** 0.037*** 
 
0.010 0.014    
  
(0.013) (0.014) 
 
(0.020) (0.015)    
Subj. welbeing 
 
0.077*** 0.015 
 
0.044*** -0.000    
  
(0.023) (0.023) 
 
(0.015) (0.018)    
Risk_lottery 
 
-0.011 -0.021 
 
-0.012 -0.015    
  
(0.017) (0.016) 
 
(0.008) (0.010)    
Risk_Market 
 
0.016 0.026 
 
0.013* 0.017*   
  
(0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.008) (0.009)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.230*** 
  
0.073*** 
   
(0.020) 
  
(0.026)    
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.050* 
  
0.034    
   
(0.027) 
  
(0.022)    
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.181*** 
  
0.142*** 
   
(0.037) 
  
(0.054)    
Present ch.education  
  
0.018** 
  
0.024*** 
   
(0.007) 
  
(0.007)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.165** -0.190*** -0.322*** -0.060 -0.070 -0.120**  
 
(0.078) (0.073) (0.062) (0.067) (0.065) (0.053)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.103* -0.133*** -0.198*** -0.018 -0.028 -0.049    
 
(0.054) (0.051) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.043)    
Constant -2.050*** -1.819*** -4.528*** -1.470*** -1.415*** -2.544*** 
 
(0.310) (0.317) (0.567) (0.252) (0.275) (0.343)    
Observations 635 633 633 519 518 518    
R-squared 0.196 0.238 0.328 0.418 0.431 0.492 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were 
controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, asphalt road, nearest input dealer; dummies for 
experience of shocks including too much rain/flood, increased input prices, livestock diseases, and death/ loss of livestock; and internal 
traits such as self-esteem and discount factor (or time preference). +Binary 
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Table A2. 4. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations: RG – village, all  
(Using average outcome of all in the reference group) # 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
         Vill. ave. income(ln) 0.000*** 0.000** 
     
            
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
     
             
Vill. ave. v.assets(ln) 
  
0.000** 0.000* 
   
             
   
(0.00) (0.00) 
   
             
Vill. ave. s.status(ln) 
    
0.010*** 0.007*** 
 
             
     
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
             
Vill. ave. ch.education 
      
0.131 0.130    
       
(0.15) (0.16)    
Male+ 0.482*** 0.179** 0.598*** 0.345*** 0.063** 0.014 0.496*** 0.510**  
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18) (0.21)    
Age in years 0.022 0.015 -0.000 -0.007 0.002 0.000 0.303*** 0.045    
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.07)    
Square of age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.001    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.040*** 0.005 0.065*** 0.014 0.007** 0.001 0.027 -0.006    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.225** 0.022 0.205*** 0.071 -0.006 -0.020 0.574** 0.221    
 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.21)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.201*** 0.016 0.248*** 0.045** 0.020 0.013 0.046 -0.157    
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) -0.033 0.003 -0.113* 0.008 0.027*** 0.013 -0.259 -0.030    
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.18)    
Dist. asphalt road (minutes)(ln) 0.046 0.025 -0.098** -0.012 -0.006 -0.004 0.134 0.100    
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.16)    
Increased input prices+ 0.038 -0.130* 0.040 0.074 -0.060** 0.001 0.553 0.094    
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.16) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.46) (0.33)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.166 -0.054 -0.431*** -0.102 0.050 0.033 0.553 0.397    
 
(0.12) (0.07) (0.17) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.49) (0.49)    
Illness of head/spouse+ -0.023 0.089 -0.041 0.201* -0.058** -0.055*** -0.469 -0.336    
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.71) (0.69)    
Illness of other family+ -0.234*** -0.076 -0.260* -0.069 -0.002 -0.053 -0.239 0.435    
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.35) (0.45)    
Locus of control 
 
0.122* 
 
0.099 
 
0.014 
 
0.707*   
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.39)    
Self-esteem 
 
0.017 
 
0.213*** 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.024    
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.34)    
Subj. welbeing 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.065*** 
 
0.009 
 
0.061    
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.13)    
Risk_lottery 
 
0.008 
 
0.028 
 
-0.016* 
 
-0.167    
  
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.12)    
Risk_Market 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.018 
 
0.019 
 
0.254*   
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.15)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
 
0.890*** 
     
             
  
(0.04) 
     
             
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.724*** 
   
             
    
(0.05) 
   
             
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.355*** 
 
             
      
(0.08) 
 
             
Present ch.education 
       
0.329*** 
        
(0.07)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.020 -0.383*** -0.055 -0.141* -0.043* -0.031 -1.015** -1.297*** 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.44) (0.36)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.056 -0.191** 0.078 -0.007 -0.064** -0.056*** -1.868*** -2.061*** 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.33) (0.32)    
Constant 7.879*** 1.285* 9.403*** 3.179*** 3.694*** 2.542*** 4.980* 10.399*** 
 
(0.51) (0.66) (0.88) (0.84) (0.21) (0.36) (2.73) (2.32)    
         Observations 665 663 665 663 665 663 665 663    
R-squared 0.222 0.592 0.285 0.604 0.081 0.390 0.121 0.248 
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were 
controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, nearest input dealer, FTC; dummies for experience of 
shocks including too much rain/flood, livestock diseases; and internal traits such as trust in others, and discount factor. +Binary  
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Table A2. 5. The effect of social interactions on each dimension of aspirations: RG – village, richer  
(Using average outcome of those who are richer than the village average) # 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Inc1 Inc2 Assets1 Assets2 Status1 Status2 Educ1 Educ2 
Mean outcome above village average 
        
Income(ln) 0.566*** 0.204** 
     
             
 
(0.09) (0.08) 
     
             
Value of assets(ln) 
  
0.338*** 0.145* 
   
             
   
(0.09) (0.08) 
   
             
Social status(ln) 
    
0.502** 0.075 
 
             
     
(0.25) (0.20) 
 
             
Children’s .education 
      
-2.991 -5.946    
       
(4.07) (4.92)    
Male+ 0.481*** 0.182** 0.604*** 0.348*** 0.059** 0.013 0.499*** 0.541**  
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18) (0.21)    
Age in years 0.021 0.015 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.000 0.300*** 0.034    
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.06)    
Square of age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.040*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.014 0.007*** 0.002 0.025 -0.007    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.232** 0.025 0.209*** 0.072 0.001 -0.015 0.581** 0.229    
 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.20)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.201*** 0.017 0.245*** 0.044** 0.017 0.011 0.050 -0.151    
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.12)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) -0.026 0.005 -0.107 0.009 0.025*** 0.011 -0.253 -0.016    
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.18)    
Dist. asphalt road (minutes)(ln) 0.037 0.022 -0.096** -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.091 0.023    
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.12)    
Increased input prices+ 0.043 -0.126* 0.038 0.074 -0.061** 0.001 0.573 0.138    
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.16) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.47) (0.33)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.189 -0.063 -0.455*** -0.110 0.052* 0.028 0.536 0.368    
 
(0.12) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.50) (0.51)    
Illness of head/spouse+ -0.025 0.088 -0.020 0.207* -0.056* -0.051*** -0.514 -0.409    
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.71) (0.67)    
Illness of other family+ -0.197*** -0.065 -0.238* -0.064 -0.003 -0.048 -0.168 0.542    
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.35) (0.46)    
Self-esteem 
 
0.010 
 
0.213*** 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.084    
 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.33)    
Subj. welbeing 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.064*** 
 
0.010 
 
0.044    
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.13)    
Risk_lottery 
 
0.006 
 
0.027 
 
-0.016* 
 
-0.175    
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.11)    
Risk_Market 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.017 
 
0.020 
 
0.259*   
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.15)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
 
0.887*** 
     
             
  
(0.04) 
     
             
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.721*** 
   
             
    
(0.05) 
   
             
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.356*** 
 
             
      
(0.09) 
 
             
Present ch.education 
       
0.339*** 
        
(0.08)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.006 -0.377*** -0.056 -0.139* -0.039 -0.026 -0.602 -0.682    
 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.57) (0.50)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.042 -0.196** 0.052 -0.019 -0.083* -0.074*** -1.592*** -1.647*** 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.30) (0.20)    
Constant 1.958 -0.835 5.507*** 1.592 2.074* 2.613*** 12.902 25.298**  
 
(1.29) (0.87) (1.62) (1.05) (1.11) (0.64) (9.72) (12.16)    
Observations 665 663 665 663 665 663 665 663    
R-squared 0.231 0.593 0.290 0.604 0.079 0.386 0.122 0.252    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were 
controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, FTC, nearest input dealer; dummies for experience of 
shocks including too much rain/flood, livestock diseases; and internal traits such as trust in others, locus of control, discount factor. 
+Binary  
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Table A2. 6. The effect of social interactions on aspirations: RG – village, all and richer 
(Based on average outcome of all in the reference group as well as those with more than village average)# 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
AvAsp1 AvAsp2 AvAsp3 AbovAv1 AbovAv2 AbovAv3 
Village ave. Asp. Index 0.32 0.24 0.08 
  
             
 
(0.29) (0.33) (0.30) 
  
             
Mean of Aspindex Above village av 
   
0.54*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 
    
(0.10) (0.14) (0.13)    
Male+ 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.09 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.10    
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)    
Age in years 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Square of age -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00** -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.10** 0.08* 0.00 0.09** 0.08* 0.00    
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.02    
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)    
Illness of other family+ -0.15** -0.12 -0.09 -0.14** -0.11 -0.08    
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)    
Locus of control 
 
0.18*** 0.12* 
 
0.19*** 0.12*   
  
(0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.07) (0.07)    
Trust 
 
0.03*** 0.03** 
 
0.03** 0.03**  
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01)    
Subj. welbeing 
 
0.07*** 0.01 
 
0.07*** 0.01    
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    
Risk_lottery 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
-0.01 -0.02    
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    
Risk_Market 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
0.01 0.02    
 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.24*** 
  
0.23*** 
   
(0.02) 
  
(0.02)    
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.04 
  
0.04    
   
(0.03) 
  
(0.03)    
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
  
0.20*** 
  
0.19*** 
   
(0.04) 
  
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
  
0.02*** 
  
0.02*** 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.01)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.14** -0.17*** -0.31*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.30*** 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.10** -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
Constant -1.90*** -1.67*** -4.48*** -2.12*** -1.87*** -4.54*** 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.52) (0.25) (0.26) (0.53)    
Observations 665 663 663 665 663 663    
R-squared 0.193 0.236 0.331 0.208 0.247 0.340    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were 
controlled but the coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, asphalt road, nearest input dealer, coop office, FTC; ; 
dummies for experience of shocks including too much rain/flood, livestock diseases; death/loss of livestock, increased input prices, 
illness of household head/spouse; and internal traits such as self-esteem, and discount factor. +Binary  
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Table A2. 7. The effect of social interactions on aspirations (IV estimates)  
(Using average outcome of all in the reference group)# 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6    
Village ave. Asp. Index 0.70* 0.76* 0.79** 0.98*** 0.81** 0.59*   
 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34)    
Male 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.11*   
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
Age in years 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Square of age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
HH size 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.07*   
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
Dependency ratio -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.08    
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01    
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.02    
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.03 0.04* 0.04* 0.04** 0.05**  
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07*   
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Illness of other family 
  
-0.13*** -0.10** -0.10** -0.09**  
   
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)    
Locus of control 
   
0.18*** 0.16*** 0.11*   
    
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
Trust index 
   
0.03** 0.04*** 0.03*   
    
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    
Risk_composite 
   
-0.00 -0.01 -0.00    
    
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Real PC expenditure2014(ln) 
    
0.14***              
     
(0.03)              
Value of assets_14(ln) 
    
0.04              
     
(0.02)              
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.22*** 
      
(0.02)    
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.04    
      
(0.02)    
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
     
0.20*** 
      
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
     
0.02**  
      
(0.01)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo -0.07* -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.29*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)    
Adaa-Lume 0.01 -0.03 -0.07* -0.10** -0.16*** -0.17*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
Constant -1.71*** -1.84*** -1.88*** -1.77*** -2.52*** -4.33*** 
 
(0.28) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.28) (0.54)    
Observations 649 649 649 647 647 647    
r2 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.32    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the coefficients were not 
statistically significant: distance to- market, asphalt road, nearest input dealer, FTC; dummies for experience of shocks including too much 
rain/flood, livestock diseases; death/loss of livestock, increased input prices, illness of household head/spouse; and discount factor. 
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Table A2. 8. The effect of social interactions on aspirations across gender (IV estimates) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
r2f r3f r4f r5f r2m r3m r4m r5m    
Village ave. Asp. Index 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.45*** 0.87*** 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.04    
 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.27) (1.00) (0.89) (0.91) (0.87)    
Age in years 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Square of age -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
HH size 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.16** -0.04 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.23*** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)    
Dependency ratio -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.15* -0.16 -0.19* -0.07    
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)    
Land in ha_2006 (ln) 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03    
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)    
Value of assets_2006 (ln) 0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 0.01 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.04    
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04** 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05    
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)    
Dist. FTC (minutes)(ln) -0.10* -0.10** -0.10** -0.11** 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01    
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Livestock diseases+ 
 
0.02 0.01 -0.05 
 
-0.16 -0.12 -0.18*   
  
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)    
Illness of other family+ 
 
-0.17** -0.15*** -0.12** 
 
-0.07 -0.05 -0.06    
  
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06)    
Locus of control 
  
0.26*** 0.19** 
  
0.02 -0.06    
   
(0.07) (0.07) 
  
(0.11) (0.12)    
Trust index 
  
0.00 0.01 
  
0.08** 0.07**  
   
(0.03) (0.02) 
  
(0.03) (0.03)    
Discount factor 
  
0.05*** 0.05*** 
  
-0.01 -0.01    
   
(0.02) (0.02) 
  
(0.02) (0.02)    
Risk_composite 
  
-0.00 -0.00 
  
0.00 0.00    
   
(0.01) (0.01) 
  
(0.01) (0.01)    
Present income(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.18*** 
   
0.24*** 
    
(0.06) 
   
(0.04)    
Present v.assets(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.02 
   
0.05    
    
(0.04) 
   
(0.04)    
Present s.status(ln) (perceived) 
   
0.19*** 
   
0.18*** 
    
(0.05) 
   
(0.04)    
Present ch.education 
   
0.02*** 
   
0.01    
    
(0.01) 
   
(0.01)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.2*** -0.18 -0.21** -0.22** -0.36*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.03 -0.06 -0.13* -0.2*** -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.17*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)    
Constant -1.5*** -1.58*** -1.42*** -3.4*** -1.9*** -1.8*** -1.7*** -4.71*** 
 
(0.38) (0.37) (0.33) (0.53) (0.59) (0.60) (0.61) (1.01)    
Observations 332 332 332 332 317 317 315 315    
r2 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.33    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the 
coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, asphalt road, nearest input dealer; dummies for experience of 
shocks including too much rain/flood, death/loss of livestock, increased input prices, illness of household head/spouse. 
+Binary 
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Table A2. 9. The effect of aspirations-gap on risk aversion 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
Lottery1 Lottery2 Market1 Market2 Lottery3 Lottery4 Market3 Market4    
Asp.Gap index 0.21* 0.18 0.08 0.05 
   
             
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
   
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap~x -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
   
             
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
    
-0.47** -0.49** -0.37* -0.38*   
     
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
    
-0.65*** -0.62*** -0.36** -0.32*   
     
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)    
Male+ 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)    
Age in years 0.07** 0.07** 0.05 0.05 0.07** 0.07** 0.05 0.05    
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Square of age -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00*   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level -0.01 -0.00 -0.04*** -0.04** -0.01 -0.00 -0.04*** -0.04**  
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
HH size 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.10    
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)    
Dependency ratio -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04    
 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30)    
Land in ha_2014 (ln) 0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.02 -0.01    
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)    
Relative wealth status 0.09 0.05 -0.19 -0.24 0.15 0.12 -0.15 -0.20    
 
(0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)    
Too much rain or flood+ -0.52** -0.51** -0.11 -0.11 -0.56** -0.55** -0.14 -0.13    
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)    
Livestock diseases+ 0.00 -0.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.07 -0.07 -0.23 -0.24    
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21)    
Increased input prices+ 0.52** 0.48** 0.50*** 0.47** 0.48** 0.44** 0.47** 0.44**  
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.14    
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18)    
Illness of head/spouse+ 0.21 0.31 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.03 0.13    
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)    
Illness of other family+ -0.18 -0.18 -0.36* -0.36* -0.16 -0.15 -0.35* -0.35*   
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)    
Average value of others' assets (ln) 0.22 0.04 -0.10 -0.35 0.23 0.06 -0.09 -0.33    
 
(0.30) (0.35) (0.27) (0.32) (0.29) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31)    
Average landholdings of others' -0.23 -0.33* 0.05 -0.07 -0.22 -0.30 0.06 -0.06    
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.20** 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.19** 
 
0.18*** 
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.07)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.01 
 
0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
0.03    
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.06)    
Dist. Micro finance (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.20* 
 
-0.19* 
 
-0.20*   
  
(0.11) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.10)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.40 -0.16 -0.35 -0.06 -0.44* -0.20 -0.37 -0.08    
 
(0.27) (0.31) (0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.42 -0.24 -0.40 -0.13 -0.47 -0.28 -0.43 -0.16    
 
(0.30) (0.37) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29) (0.36) (0.28) (0.34)    
Constant -0.50 1.40 2.78 5.42 -0.18 1.72 2.92 5.54    
 
(3.13) (3.79) (2.91) (3.50) (3.05) (3.65) (2.86) (3.45)    
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666    
r2 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  +Binary 
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Table A2. 10. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
DisFact11 DisFact12 DisFact21 DisFact22    
Asp.Gap index 0.35** 0.38** 
 
             
 
(0.16) (0.16) 
 
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap index -0.04** -0.04** 
 
             
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
  
0.32 0.35    
   
(0.27) (0.27)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
  
0.15 0.14    
   
(0.20) (0.20)    
Risk (composite index) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04    
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Risk*Asp.Gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01    
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Male+ -0.22 -0.22 -0.18 -0.18    
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)    
Age in years 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04    
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    
Square of age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
HH size -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02    
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)    
Dependency ratio -0.26 -0.31 -0.26 -0.31    
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)    
Land in ha_2014 (ln) -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06    
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)    
Relative wealth status 0.62* 0.64* 0.55 0.57    
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35)    
Too much rain or flood+ -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18    
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)    
Livestock diseases+ 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.39    
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)    
Increased input prices+ -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.06    
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ 0.47* 0.45* 0.46* 0.44*   
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)    
Illness of head/spouse+ 0.51* 0.41 0.48 0.38    
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)    
Illness of other family+ -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05    
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)    
Average value of others' assets (ln) 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10    
 
(0.36) (0.40) (0.36) (0.40)    
Average landholdings of others' -0.40* -0.34 -0.38* -0.33    
 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.21** 
 
-0.20**  
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.09)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.09 
 
0.10    
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.08)    
Dist. Micro finance (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.12 
 
0.12    
  
(0.11) 
 
(0.11)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.08    
 
(0.30) (0.33) (0.30) (0.33)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.50    
 
(0.35) (0.41) (0.35) (0.41)    
Constant -0.75 -0.82 -0.98 -1.03    
 
(3.73) (4.33) (3.74) (4.34)    
Observations 666 666 666 666    
r2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary 
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Table A2. 11. The effect of aspirations-gap on risk aversion across gender 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 
LotteryF1 MarketF1 LotteryF2 MarketF2 LotteryM1 MarketM1 LotteryM2 MarketM2    
         Asp.Gap index 0.37* 0.20 
  
0.12 -0.03 
 
            
 
(0.20) (0.18) 
  
(0.14) (0.13) 
 
             
Squ.of Asp.Gap index -0.05** -0.02 
  
-0.01 -0.00 
 
             
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
             
Wide Asp.Gap 
  
-0.37 -0.47 
  
-0.60** -0.36    
   
(0.38) (0.34) 
  
(0.24) (0.24)    
Narrow Asp.Gap 
  
-0.62** -0.52** 
  
-0.70*** -0.21    
   
(0.29) (0.26) 
  
(0.22) (0.21)    
Age in years 0.09** 0.07 0.10** 0.07 0.08* 0.11** 0.08* 0.11**  
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)    
Square of age -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.08*** -0.03 -0.08*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
HH size -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02    
 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25)    
Dependency ratio -0.54 -0.03 -0.62 -0.07 0.81 0.45 0.88* 0.47    
 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.50) (0.43) (0.48) (0.43)    
Land in ha_2014 (ln) 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.09 -0.04 0.12 -0.03    
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)    
Relative wealth 0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.65** 0.09 -0.61**  
 
(0.38) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.31) (0.39) (0.30)    
Too much rain or flood+ -0.62* -0.09 -0.66* -0.15 -0.36 -0.08 -0.36 -0.09    
 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)    
Livestock diseases+ 0.06 -0.26 0.06 -0.29 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09    
 
(0.35) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29)    
Increased input prices+ 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.68** 0.75*** 0.69** 0.73*** 
 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ -0.26 -0.16 -0.23 -0.13 0.28 0.43 0.34 0.44    
 
(0.30) (0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28)    
Illness of head/spouse+ 0.30 -0.17 0.26 -0.16 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.39    
 
(0.35) (0.31) (0.36) (0.31) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27)    
Illness of other family+ -0.18 -0.25 -0.13 -0.19 -0.29 -0.62** -0.31 -0.64**  
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25)    
Average value of others' assets (ln) 0.49 -0.03 0.47 -0.03 -0.36 -0.69 -0.34 -0.63    
 
(0.51) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.43) (0.46) (0.42)    
Average landholdings of others' -0.26 0.02 -0.24 0.03 -0.40 -0.14 -0.35 -0.11    
 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.24** 0.27*** 0.25** 0.28*** 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.14 -0.04    
 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)    
Dist. Micro finance (minutes)(ln) -0.10 -0.19 -0.13 -0.21 -0.23 -0.17 -0.23 -0.17    
 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.93** -0.73* -0.96** -0.76* 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.48    
 
(0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38)    
Adaa-Lume+ -1.03* -0.63 -0.99* -0.60 0.45 0.25 0.37 0.17    
 
(0.53) (0.51) (0.52) (0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.52) (0.48)    
Constant -3.58 1.66 -2.51 2.29 5.68 8.34* 5.79 7.86*   
 
(5.41) (5.20) (5.35) (5.15) (5.12) (4.74) (4.96) (4.63)    
         Observations 342 342 342 342 324 324 324 324    
r2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.15    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary 
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Table A2. 12. The effect of aspirations-gap on time discounting across gender 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
DisFactF1 DisFactF2 DisFactM1 DisFactM2    
     Asp.Gap index 0.48* 
 
0.19             
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.24)              
Squ.of Asp.Gap index -0.01 
 
-0.06***              
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02)              
Wide Asp.Gap+ 
 
0.61 
 
0.18    
  
(0.50) 
 
(0.36)    
Narrow Asp.Gap+ 
 
0.63* 
 
-0.16    
  
(0.32) 
 
(0.29)    
Risk (composite index) 0.10** 0.05 -0.04 0.01    
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
Risk*Asp.Gap -0.06* 0.01 0.03 -0.02    
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
Age in years 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.09    
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)    
Square of age -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education level 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.07**  
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
HH size 0.23 0.28 -0.25 -0.24    
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.31) (0.32)    
Dependency ratio -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.24    
 
(0.54) (0.53) (0.57) (0.58)    
Land in ha_2014 (ln) -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05    
 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17)    
Relative wealth 0.80** 0.67* 0.37 0.25    
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.56) (0.57)    
Too much rain or flood+ -0.28 -0.23 -0.01 -0.04    
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35)    
Livestock diseases+ 0.40 0.42 0.35 0.35    
 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.41) (0.41)    
Increased input prices+ -0.15 -0.03 0.05 0.04    
 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)    
Death/ loss of livestock+ 0.37 0.29 0.70** 0.67*   
 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)    
Illness of head/spouse+ 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.44    
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)    
Illness of other family+ -0.10 -0.20 -0.03 -0.01    
 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.39)    
Average value of others' assets (ln) 0.34 0.32 -0.16 -0.21    
 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.61) (0.60)    
Average landholdings of others' -0.33 -0.31 -0.38 -0.31    
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.32)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) -0.27** -0.24** -0.16 -0.15    
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)    
Dist. coop office (minutes)(ln) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09    
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)    
Dist. Micro finance (minutes)(ln) 0.27* 0.29* -0.03 -0.06    
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.19    
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.49 0.44 0.58 0.57    
 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62)    
Constant -4.68 -4.48 1.91 2.46    
 
(6.03) (6.02) (6.50) (6.50)    
     Observations 342 342 324 324    
r2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07    
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. + Binary 
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Table A2. 13. Balancing test 
 Unmatched Mean  %reduct  t-test V(T)/ 
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t| V(C) 
Male+ U .62376 .46341 32.5 
 
2.99 0.003 . 
 
M .63636 .61158 5.0 84.5 0.36 0.721 . 
         Age in years U 45.47 46.415 -7.3 
 
-0.67 0.506 0.93 
 
M 45.51 45.35 1.2 83.0 0.09 0.930 0.98 
         Square of age U 2229.3 2328.8 -7.8 
 
-0.70 0.486 0.82 
 
M 2230.6 2219.6 0.9 89.0 0.06 0.951 0.87 
         Education U 4.1287 3.6876 11.7 
 
1.05 0.296 0.83 
 
M 4.1515 4.171 -0.5 95.6 -0.04 0.972 0.79 
         HH size U 1.8563 1.8666 -2.6 
 
-0.25 0.801 1.26 
 
M 1.8601 1.8661 -1.5 41.5 -0.11 0.915 1.22 
         Dependency ratio U .38671 .39077 -1.9 
 
-0.18 0.856 1.07 
 
M .38515 .39247 -3.5 -80.4 -0.24 0.808 1.08 
         Land in ha_2014 (ln) U .43152 .5587 -14.8 
 
-1.46 0.146 1.40 
 
M .42566 .45481 -3.4 77.1 -0.23 0.818 1.21 
         V.of assets_2014 (ln) U 9.1886 9.5118 -27.6 
 
-2.68 0.008 1.28 
 
M 9.2295 9.2655 -3.1 88.9 -0.21 0.835 0.96 
         Dist. market 
(minutes)(ln) U 3.9873 3.8238 18.8 
 
1.68 0.093 0.81 
 
M 3.9911 4.0088 -2.0 89.1 -0.15 0.879 0.94 
         Dist. coop office 
(minutes)(ln) U 3.2376 3.11 13.5 
 
1.25 0.211 0.99 
 
M 3.2738 3.2625 1.2 91.2 0.09 0.931 0.99 
         Dist. micro-finance 
(minutes)(ln) U 4.3421 4.3254 2.6 
 
0.23 0.816 0.87 
 
M 4.3387 4.3501 -1.7 32.0 -0.12 0.902 0.93 
         Too much rain or 
flood+ U .10891 .0784 10.5 
 
1.02 0.306 . 
 
M .11111 .11016 0.3 96.9 0.02 0.983 . 
         Livestock diseases+ U .11881 .0784 13.5 
 
1.35 0.178 . 
 
M .12121 .10905 4.1 69.9 0.27 0.790 . 
         Increased input 
prices+ U .14851 .0993 14.9 
 
1.48 0.140 . 
 
M .15152 .14199 2.9 80.6 0.19 0.851 . 
         Death/ loss of 
livestock+ U .06931 .10105 -11.4 
 
-1.00 0.319 . 
 
M .07071 .07596 -1.9 83.4 -0.14 0.888 . 
         Illness of 
head/spouse+ U .09901 .08885 3.5 
 
0.33 0.743 . 
 
M .10101 .08396 5.8 -67.8 0.41 0.681 . 
         Illness of other 
family+ U .08911 .09756 -2.9 
 
-0.27 0.791 . 
 
M .09091 .08588 1.7 40.5 0.12 0.902 . 
         Village average 
livestock holdings U 8.2467 8.2183 1.8 
 
0.17 0.864 1.01 
 
M 8.2516 8.255 -0.2 88.0 -0.02 0.988 0.90 
         Hettosa-Tiyyo+ U .28713 .32692 -8.6 
 
-0.79 0.430 . 
 
M .28283 .29001 -1.6 82.0 -0.11 0.912 . 
         Adaa-Lume+ U .35644 .33392 4.7 
 
0.44 0.660 . 
 
M .35354 .35403 -0.1 97.8 -0.01 0.994 . 
* if variance ratio outside [0.67; 1.48] for U and [0.67; 1.49] for M 
 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %Var 
         Unmatched 0.058 32.36 0.040 10.6 9.5 63.2* 0.98 0 
Matched 0.002 0.68 1.000 2.1 1.7 11.7 1.22 0 
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2] 
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Table A2. 14. Some statistical tests of validity of the instrumental variables  
(a) Test of relevance  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
Av. pa(village)Asp. of Others’(avpa_aspO)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Av. pa. Suj.wellbeing_life ladder (2006)|   .1323546   .0146828     9.01   0.000     .1035216    .1611876 
Av. pa. Suj.wellbeing_compared to others|   .1587981   .0409877     3.87   0.000     .0783093     .239287 
Av. pa_father’s role in institutions  |  -.0984704   .0082981   -11.87   0.000    -.1147656   -.0821753 
Male+     |   .0023229   .0061436     0.38   0.705    -.0097414    .0143872 
Age in years   |    .000859    .001467     0.59   0.558    -.0020218    .0037399 
Square of age   |  -8.95e-06   .0000147    -0.61   0.544    -.0000379      .00002 
Education    |  -.0025291   .0007931    -3.19   0.001    -.0040866   -.0009717 
Land in ha_2006(ln)   |  -.0039661   .0042436    -0.93   0.350    -.0122994    .0043671 
V.of assets_2006(ln)  |  -.0025567   .0028467    -0.90   0.369    -.0081469    .0030334 
Too much rain or flood+  |  -.0045306   .0095225    -0.48   0.634    -.0232302    .0141691 
Livestock diseases+   |  -.0365511   .0095653    -3.82   0.000    -.0553348   -.0177675 
Large increases in input prices+  |  -.0004645   .0092878    -0.05   0.960    -.0187032    .0177742 
Death or loss of livestock+   |   .0045059   .0101111     0.45   0.656    -.0153496    .0243613 
Illness of head/spouse+   |  -.0018514   .0077537    -0.24   0.811    -.0170775    .0133748 
Illness of other family member+  |  -.0096447   .0089525    -1.08   0.282    -.0272251    .0079357 
Hettosa-Tiyyo+   |   .1046634   .0104249    10.04   0.000     .0841917    .1251351 
Adaa-Lume+   |   .0355502   .0094982     3.74   0.000     .0168984     .054202 
Constant     |   .4940375   .0946188     5.22   0.000     .3082317    .6798432 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(b) Falsification test 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |               Robust 
Aspirations  index             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+----------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Av. pa. Suj.wellbeing_life ladder (2006)|   .0753665   .1461738     0.52   0.606    -.2116795    .3624126 
Av. pa. Suj.wellbeing_compared to others|   .2446056   .2700207     0.91   0.365    -.2856423    .7748534 
Av. pa_father’s role in institutions    |  -.0906903   .0728579    -1.24   0.214    -.2337636     .052383 
Male+    |   .2395989   .0505462     4.74   0.000     .1403398     .338858 
Age in years   |   .0175402   .0124545     1.41   0.160     -.006917    .0419975 
Square of age    |   -.000129    .000123    -1.05   0.295    -.0003706    .0001126 
Education    |    .033464   .0074052     4.52   0.000     .0189223    .0480058 
Land in ha_2006(ln)   |   .0988868   .0363311     2.72   0.007     .0275422    .1702313 
V.of assets_2006(ln)  |    .092758   .0245879     3.77   0.000     .0444739     .141042 
Too much rain or flood+  |  -.0192617   .0966317    -0.20   0.842    -.2090203    .1704969 
Livestock diseases+   |  -.0614505   .0773065    -0.79   0.427    -.2132597    .0903587 
Large increases in input prices+ |   .0021689   .0937402     0.02   0.982    -.1819116    .1862495 
Death or loss of livestock+  |   -.057196   .0647993    -0.88   0.378    -.1844443    .0700523 
Illness of head/spouse+  |   .0190184   .0993325     0.19   0.848    -.1760439    .2140807 
Illness of other family member+ |  -.1451515   .0735098    -1.97   0.049     -.289505    -.000798 
Hettosa-Tiyyo+    |  -.0215225   .1012868    -0.21   0.832    -.2204225    .1773775 
Adaa-Lume+   |  -.0130574   .0818046    -0.16   0.873    -.1736997    .1475848 
Constant     |  -.9194455   .7643331    -1.20   0.229     -2.42039    .5814989 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary 
(c) Formal tests of instrument validity 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Adjusted      Partial       Robust 
      Variable |   R-sq.       R-sq.        R-sq.      F(3,626)   Prob > F 
  -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
   avpa_aspO   |  0.3422      0.3191       0.2702       69.8683    0.0000 
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Shea's partial R-squared 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
               |     Shea's             Shea's 
      Variable |  Partial R-sq.   Adj. Partial R-sq. 
  -------------+------------------------------------ 
     avpa_aspO |     0.2702             0.2458 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Minimum eigenvalue statistic = 77.2641      
  Critical Values                      # of endogenous regressors:    1 
  Ho: Instruments are weak             # of excluded instruments:     3 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                     |    5%     10%     20%     30% 
  2SLS relative bias                 |  13.91    9.08    6.46    5.39 
  -----------------------------------+--------------------------------- 
                                     |   10%     15%     20%     25% 
  2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald test  |  22.30   12.83    9.54    7.80 
  LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test  |   6.46    4.36    3.69    3.32 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tests of endogeneity 
  Ho: variables are exogenous 
  Robust score chi2(1)            =  1.39878  (p = 0.2369) 
  Robust regression F(1,627)      =  1.35711  (p = 0.2445) 
                 estat overid     
  Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
  Score chi2(2)          =  .031337  (p = 0.9845)  
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Table A3. 1. Determinants of learning links (using random matching within network data) 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i discusses farming or business matters with j, 0 otherwise)  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
 
ALL MALE FEMALE HH_HEAD1 HH_HEAD2    
Same iddir+ 0.34*** 0.21* 0.41** 0.27** 0.26**  
 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)    
Help when in need+ 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.69*** 0.62*** 0.60*** 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)    
Related(blood/marriage)+ 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.67*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
 
(0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)    
Meeting frequency 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Geo.dist.(i,j)(ln)  -0.11** -0.15** -0.12 -0.11 -0.10    
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)    
Radio listening (frequency) 0.00 0.00*** -0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Tv watching(frequency) 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Diff. gender dummies -0.12 -0.90*** -0.22 -0.61*** -0.41*** 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16)    
Diff. of age (i,j) 0.01*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.00 0.01    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
Diff. educ (i,j) 0.02 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Diff. no. of men 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.05    
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
Diff. land size -0.04* -0.06* 0.02 -0.05 -0.05    
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
Diff. treatment status 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08    
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)    
Sum gender dummies 0.47*** 0.00 0.00 
 
0.46*** 
 
(0.08) (.) (.) 
 
(0.16)    
Sum of age (i,j) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 
-0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00)    
Sum of educ (i,j) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 
-0.01    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01)    
Sum no. of men 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
 
0.01    
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
(0.04)    
Sum of land size 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 
0.04    
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.03)    
Sum treatment status 0.09 0.13 0.06 
 
0.14*   
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
 
(0.08)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + 0.05 0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.17    
 
(0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.18) (0.19)    
Adaa-Lume+ 0.08 -0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.07    
 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18)    
Constant -2.63*** -1.45*** -2.58*** -1.55*** -2.43*** 
 
(0.40) (0.53) (0.74) (0.31) (0.55)    
      Observations 2339 1285 1054 1402 1402    
Log lik. -878.66 -530.65 -302.75 -601.37 -584.79    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at individual and match’s level for columns 1-3, and at 
individual and household level for columns 4-5). +Binary outcome. Other controls include same religion, same ethnicity, frequency of 
travel to nearest town, having plots nearby, the sum and difference of household size (neither of which are significant).  
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Table A3. 2. Determinants of learning links (using self-reported networks) 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i discusses farming or business matters with j, 0 otherwise)  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
ALL MALE FEMALE HH_HEAD    
     Same gender+ 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.38*** 0.51*** 
 
(0.11) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16)    
Same age (diff<5 years) + 0.25*** 0.21 0.23** 0.25*   
 
(0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.14)    
Close family+ 0.49*** 0.39** 0.46*** 0.47*** 
 
(0.11) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17)    
Distant family+ 0.40*** 0.39 0.45*** 0.56**  
 
(0.14) (0.27) (0.15) (0.27)    
Same iddir+ 0.34*** -0.04 0.36*** 0.08    
 
(0.11) (0.23) (0.14) (0.19)    
Same village+ 0.04 0.59* -0.21 0.44    
 
(0.20) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28)    
Same kebele+ -0.02 0.42 -0.19 0.32    
 
(0.27) (0.36) (0.36) (0.33)    
Farmer+  0.64*** 0.94*** 0.25* 0.94*** 
 
(0.10) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15)    
Meet less than 1/week+ 0.58*** 0.67** 0.45** 0.66*** 
 
(0.17) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24)    
Help when in need+  0.34 0.98** 0.03 1.19*** 
 
(0.33) (0.48) (0.38) (0.45)    
Max of age from i & j  0.01* -0.02** 0.01 -0.01*   
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Education 1-4(dummy) 0.18 0.36 -0.06 0.48*   
 
(0.15) (0.30) (0.20) (0.28)    
Education 5-8(dummy)  0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.02    
 
(0.15) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23)    
Education 8+(dummy) 0.20 -0.23 0.15 -0.06    
 
(0.19) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27)    
Radio listening (frequency) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Tv watching(frequency) 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Travel to town(freq) 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Size of own land (ha)(ln) 0.07** 0.15** 0.06 0.13**  
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + -0.24 0.05 -0.28 0.09    
 
(0.17) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23)    
Adaa-Lume+ -0.36** 0.20 -0.60*** 0.16    
 
(0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20)    
Constant -2.29*** -2.16*** -0.93 -2.47*** 
 
(0.47) (0.81) (0.65) (0.74)    
     Observations 2565 1270 1295 1400    
Log lik. -1233.60 -362.57 -772.19 -436.31    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at individual and household level). +Binary outcome. 
Other controls include same religion and same ethnicity (neither of which are statistically significant).   
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Table A3. 3. The effect of social network structure on the probability of adopting row-planting 
(Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 
(1) (2)    
 
HH_HEADN1 HH_HEADN2    
   Discussion on farming/business+ 0.25** 0.22**  
 
(0.11) (0.11)    
Help when in need+ -0.18* -0.16    
 
(0.10) (0.10)    
Related (blood/marriage) + -0.06 -0.06    
 
(0.14) (0.14)    
Meeting frequency -0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Geo.dist.(i,j)(ln) -0.14** -0.13**  
 
(0.06) (0.06)    
Having plots nearby 0.04 0.07    
 
(0.17) (0.17)    
Radio listening (frequency) 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Tv watching(frequency) 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Travel to town(freq) -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Diff. gender dummies 0.05 0.04    
 
(0.09) (0.09)    
Diff. of age (i,j) -0.01* -0.01    
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Diff. educ (i,j) 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.01) (0.01)    
Diff. land size 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03)    
Diff. treatment status 0.14** 0.12*   
 
(0.06) (0.07)    
Sum gender dummies -0.18* -0.17*   
 
(0.09) (0.09)    
Sum of age (i,j) -0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00)    
Sum of educ (i,j) 0.02 0.01    
 
(0.01) (0.01)    
Sum of land size 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03)    
Sum treatment status 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07)    
Dist. to MFI (minu~) 
 
-0.00*   
  
(0.00)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo -2.36*** -2.26*** 
 
(0.18) (0.19)    
Adaa-Lume -2.95*** -2.71*** 
 
(0.19) (0.21)    
Constant 1.79*** 2.21*** 
 
(0.45) (0.44)    
   Other controls≠ No Yes 
Observations 1402 1402    
Log lik. -567.88 -557.93    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary outcome 
≠Note: the following controls were included but the coefficients were not statistically significant: same religion, same ethnicity, same 
iddir, sum and difference of men household members, and average distance in minutes to: asphalt road, market, district town, coop office, 
the nearest input dealer, farmer training center. 
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Table A3. 4. The effect of social learning on the adoption of row planting 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
HH_Head1 HH_Head2 ALL1 ALL2    
Average value of peers’ characteristics 
   
             
Change in Yield 2006-2010 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Share of treated 0.67* 0.49 0.86* 0.40    
 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.47) (0.52)    
Household characteristics     
Education 5-8(dummy) 0.43 0.38 0.44* 0.44    
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)    
Tv watching(frequency) 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Size of own land (ha)(ln) 0.63*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)    
Treated+   0.57*** 0.51** 0.56*** 0.52*** 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) -0.33 
 
-0.69*   
  
(0.26) 
 
(0.39)    
Dist. district town (minutes)(ln) -0.16 
 
3.83**  
  
(1.06) 
 
(1.60)    
Dist. MFI (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.88 
 
-5.27*** 
  
(1.06) 
 
(1.68)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + -2.43*** -2.32*** -2.03*** -1.80*** 
 
(0.40) (0.45) (0.46) (0.51)    
Adaa-Lume+ -3.33*** -2.68*** -3.32*** -2.33*** 
 
(0.39) (0.53) (0.44) (0.65)    
Constant -1.23 5.34 -0.35 13.07**  
 
(2.87) (3.92) (3.46) (5.46)    
     Other controls≠ Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 348 348    
Log lik. -140.10 -135.29 -137.24 -129.51    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary outcome 
≠Note: the following controls were included but the coefficients were not statistically significant: networks’ characteristics (average: age, 
household size, value of productive assets, value of consumer durables, livestock holdings, land holdings); own household characteristics 
(dummy for female household head, age and square of age of the household head, dummies for education of the household head (1st-
4th) grade and 8+ grade, frequency of listening to a radio, dummy whether the household head engaged in business or wage labor, 
household size, distance in minutes to: asphalt road,  coop office, the nearest input dealer, farmer training center). 
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Table A3. 5. The effect of social learning on the adoption of row-planting 
 (Dependent variable: 1 if i adopts row planting, 0 otherwise) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
HH_Head3 HH_Head4 ALL3 ALL4    
     Average value of peers’ characteristics 
Change in ave. yield (2010-2014) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Share of treated 0.91** 0.68 0.89* 0.42    
 
(0.43) (0.42) (0.49) (0.53)    
Network size 0.32 0.27 0.03 0.03    
 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.17) (0.17)    
Network-size sq. -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00    
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)    
Household characteristics     
Education 5-8(dummy) 0.41 0.39 0.48* 0.47*   
 
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28)    
Tv watching(frequency) 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Size of own land (ha)(ln) 0.63*** 0.70*** 0.61*** 0.68*** 
 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)    
Treated+   0.59*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)    
Dist. market (minutes)(ln) -0.34 
 
-0.66*   
  
(0.26) 
 
(0.38)    
Dist. district town (minutes)(ln) -0.20 
 
3.46**  
  
(1.07) 
 
(1.58)    
Dist. MFI (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.77 
 
-5.01*** 
  
(1.09) 
 
(1.66)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + -2.79*** -2.50*** -2.45*** -1.95*** 
 
(0.41) (0.47) (0.44) (0.50)    
Adaa-Lume+ -3.52*** -2.88*** -3.32*** -2.35*** 
 
(0.43) (0.54) (0.47) (0.65)    
Constant -2.25 4.37 -2.39 11.41**  
 
(2.93) (3.87) (3.40) (5.30)    
     Other controls≠ Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 348 348    
Log lik. -138.10 -133.50 -139.20 -130.54    
Standard errors (clustered at household and village level) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary outcome 
≠Note: the following controls were included but the coefficients were not statistically significant: networks’ characteristics (average: age, 
household size, value of productive assets, value of consumer durables, livestock holdings, land holdings); own household characteristics 
(dummy for female household head, age and square of age of the household head, dummies for education of the household head (1st-
4th) grade and 8+ grade, frequency of listening to a radio, dummy whether the household head engaged in business or wage labor, 
household size, distance in minutes to: asphalt road,  coop office, the nearest input dealer, farmer training center). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 151 
 
 
 
Table A4. 1. Determinants of farmer innovativeness 
 
 (Dependent variable: Innovation index, count outcome)† 
  (1) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NEGBIN1 NEGBIN2 CONTFUN1 NEGBIN3 NEGBIN4 NEGBIN5 
Low aspirations+ -0.22*** -0.10 -0.24 
   
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.41) 
   Narrow asp. gap+ 
   
0.35*** 0.36*** 
 
    
(0.10) (0.08) 
 Large Asp-gap+ 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.31*** 
    
(0.13) 
 
(0.11) 
Female hh head+ 
 
-0.10 -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 
  
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age of hh head 
 
-0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Square of age 
 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education hh head 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH size 
 
-0.03* -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total land holdings (ha) 
 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Past beneficiary+ 
 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 
  
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Negative shock+ 
 
-0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Impatience 
 
0.03 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 0.03* 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk aversion 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Credit use+ 
 
0.12* 0.13* 0.13* 0.13* 0.12* 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Value of assets(ln) 
 
0.10** 0.08 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
  
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Market (minutes)(ln) 
 
0.05 0.05 0.07* 0.07* 0.06 
  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Coop office (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.09** -0.09** -0.08* -0.08** -0.08* 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Input dealer (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
FTC (minutes) (ln) 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Road (minutes)(ln) 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bakko-Sire+ -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo + 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Error 
  
0.15 
   
   
(0.42) 
   Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.60*** 0.78 0.94 0.32 0.31 0.61*** 
 (0.12) (0.69) (1.06) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) 
lnalpha -1.52*** -1.73***  -1.89*** -1.89*** -1.79*** 
 (0.19) (0.22)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) 
Observations 377 375 375 `375 375 375 
Wald chi2 91.81 107.94 123.55 131.69 131.25 122.05 
Log likelihood -949.76  -930.32 -959.26 -920.23 -920.23 -926.38 
Note: +Binary. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4. 2. The effect of narrow/large aspirations-gap on the use of improved seed, herbicides/pesticides, 
fertilizer, and row-planting techniques 
(Dependent variables: dummies for use of: improved seed, row-planting, herbicides, and fertilizer)† 
(Endogenous switching model with full information maximum likelihood) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
 i.seeds i.seeds Row-plant Row-plant Herbicides Herbicides Fertilizers Fertilizers 
Narrow/large-gap 0.45 0.47 0.30 0.22 -0.21 -0.18 -0.88*** -0.75**  
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)    
Female hh head+ 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.53*** 0.49** -0.03 -0.01    
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)    
Age hh head -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06** -0.04 0.04 0.04    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Square of age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education of hh head 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
HH size 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.04* 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.05    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)    
Livestock holdings(TLU) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Value of assets (ln) 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.09* 0.08 0.12*** 0.11** 0.12** 0.08    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)    
Plot size (ha)  0.53*** 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.74*** 0.76*** 1.14*** 1.21*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22)    
Past beneficiary+ 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.24** 0.27** 0.23* 0.24**  
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)    
Negative shock+ 0.13 0.14* 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.09    
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)    
Impatience 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.03    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Risk aversion -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Low fertile+ 0.05 0.07 -0.19 -0.18 -0.06 -0.03 0.29* 0.33*   
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)    
Med. fertile+ -0.06 -0.03 -0.17 -0.18* -0.19* -0.19* 0.16 0.16    
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)    
Dist.(<1 minute) + -0.29 -0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.34 -0.43 -0.84 -0.96*   
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.47) (0.48) (0.40) (0.41) (0.53) (0.54)    
Dist.( 1-30 min) + 0.19 0.22 0.72 0.76* -0.21 -0.29 -0.08 -0.13    
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.45) (0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.51) (0.52)    
Dist.(31-60 min) + 0.17 0.20 0.69 0.74 -0.24 -0.26 0.03 -0.02    
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.46) (0.47) (0.39) (0.40) (0.54) (0.54)    
Maize+ 1.34*** 1.34*** 2.52*** 2.57*** -2.26*** -2.29*** -0.53*** -0.54*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)    
Wheat+ 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.63*** 0.66*** -0.00 0.01 0.33* 0.34*   
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)    
Micro-financ (minutes)(ln)  -0.07  -0.07  -0.28***  -0.27**  
  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.11)    
Market (minutes)(ln)  -0.01  0.04  0.07  -0.05    
  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)    
Coop office (minutes)(ln)  -0.21***  0.01  -0.04  0.04    
  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)    
Input dealer (minutes)(ln)  0.06  -0.14**  0.16***  0.03    
  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)    
FTC (minutes)(ln)  0.23***  -0.13*  0.03  -0.08    
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)    
Road (minutes)(ln)  -0.00  -0.00  0.02  -0.00    
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)    
Bakko-Sire+ 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.96*** 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.07 -0.15    
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.00 -0.01 0.24* 0.27* 0.39** 0.30*   
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)    
_cons -3.35*** -3.19*** -4.24*** -2.97*** 1.33 1.63 0.06 1.57    
 (0.69) (0.83) (0.93) (1.07) (0.83) (1.00) (0.95) (1.14)    
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Table A4.2. continued       
Switch part (dep var: Narrow/large-Asp.gap)                   
Father's involvement in coop -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.29*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)    
Female hh head+ 0.48** 0.58** 0.51** 0.57** 0.46* 0.54** 0.44* 0.52**  
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)    
Age hh head -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Square of age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Education of hh head -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)    
HH size -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)    
Livestock holdings(TLU) 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Value of assets (ln) 0.17*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.13**  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)    
Plot size (ha) 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01    
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)    
Past beneficiary+ 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.46*** 0.34*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)    
Negative shock+ 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.09    
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)    
Impatience -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)    
Risk aversion -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Low fertile+ -0.13 -0.19 -0.14 -0.20 -0.13 -0.19 -0.12 -0.17    
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)    
Med. fertile+ 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.06    
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)    
Dist.(<1 minute) + 0.55* 0.59* 0.60* 0.64** 0.61* 0.65** 0.59* 0.63*   
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32)    
Dist.( 1-30 min) + 0.50* 0.58** 0.55** 0.63** 0.56** 0.65** 0.54** 0.63**  
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)    
Dist.(31-60 min) + 0.64** 0.75** 0.66** 0.78** 0.67** 0.79*** 0.65** 0.75**  
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)    
Maize+ -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16    
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)    
Wheat+ 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11    
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)    
Micro-financ (minutes)(ln)  0.21**  0.21**  0.21**  0.21**  
  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)    
Market (minutes)(ln)  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02    
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)    
Coop office (minutes)(ln)  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.12*   
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)    
Input dealer (minutes)(ln)  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11    
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)    
FTC (minutes)(ln)  -0.36***  -0.38***  -0.38***  -0.38*** 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)    
Road (minutes)(ln)  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.10*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)    
Bakko-Sire+ 0.59*** 0.75*** 0.57*** 0.72*** 0.56*** 0.70*** 0.53*** 0.66*** 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)    
Hettosa-Tiyyo + 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)    
_cons 0.37 0.90 0.22 0.82 0.20 0.77 0.28 0.82    
 (0.91) (1.09) (0.90) (1.10) (0.91) (1.10) (0.90) (1.10)    
rho -0.39** -0.37** -0.26 -0.24 -0.01** 0.02 0.49** 0.42** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) 
Wald chi2 559*** 596*** 708*** 734*** 618*** 656*** 343*** 375*** 
Observations 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595    
Note: +Binary. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4. 3. Determinants of the intensity of fertilizer use (by crop type) 
 (Endogenous treatment-effects model with maximum likelihood)† 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Teff1 Teff2 Maize1 Maize2 Wheat1 Wheat2 
OLS Endog.Te. OLS Endog.Te. OLS Endog.Te. 
Narrow/large asp.gap+ -3.03 -67.32** 8.42 14.52 8.22 -13.07 
 
(9.28) (30.25) (10.02) (36.65) (14.56) (20.22) 
Female hh head+ -23.06* -0.39 -6.22 2.23 15.90 16.27 
 
(13.36) (16.76) (11.66) (13.00) (14.83) (15.76) 
Age of hh head -2.52 -0.48 0.08 0.09 -0.21 -0.05 
 
(1.97) (0.06) (1.61) (1.60) (2.19) (2.11) 
Square of age 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education hh head 0.64 0.37 0.82 0.02 1.65 1.87 
 
(1.13) (0.03) (1.31) (1.33) (1.21) (1.22) 
HH size 1.76 -0.08 0.10 0.03 0.48 0.49 
 
(2.09) (0.06) (1.62) (1.69) (1.92) (1.94) 
Livestock(TLU) -0.81 -1.03 1.53 1.61 1.62 1.89** 
 
(0.88) (0.84) (0.97) (0.99) (1.00) (0.96) 
Value of assets(ln) 8.63** 9.18** 11.16** 11.39** 1.43 1.45 
 
(3.41) (3.75) (5.03) (0.11) (3.64) (3.37) 
Past beneficiary+ 1.08 0.38* 5.94 5.44 3.05 2.65 
 
(7.91) (8.93) (7.35) (7.66) (8.90) (9.13) 
Negative shock+ -3.19 0.28 1.02 3.30 -13.51* -8.22 
 
(7.32) (8.53) (6.92) (0.26) (7.90) (7.71) 
Impatience 0.00 -1.18 1.04 -0.03 -2.06 -2.69 
 
(1.91) (0.06) (2.22) (0.07) (2.13) (2.11) 
Risk aversion 1.20 -0.90 1.29 -0.03 1.15 1.25 
 
(1.48) (0.04) (1.33) (1.45) (1.49) (1.52) 
Land size with Teff (ha) -2.88 -4.26 
    
 
(4.70) (5.73) 
    Land size with Maize (ha) 
  
-11.23*** -11.17*** 
  
   
(3.69) (3.57) 
  Land size with Wheat (ha) 
    
-0.98 -0.69 
     
(2.87) (2.89) 
Micro-financ (minutes)(ln) 13.85** 0.04 -1.79 0.32 7.85 8.75 
 
(5.61) (0.18) (5.11) (0.22) (7.50) (7.58) 
Market (minutes)(ln) 3.17 0.11 -1.09 -1.86 -5.44 -6.72 
 
(4.22) (0.14) (3.86) (4.11) (4.82) (4.63) 
Coop office (minutes)(ln) 2.04 0.19 -4.48 -4.45 0.65 -2.30 
 
(4.36) (4.99) (4.33) (0.16) (4.25) (3.92) 
Input dealer (minutes)(ln) -11.46** -0.08 -4.33 -5.37 2.35 2.15 
 
(5.35) (0.15) (5.66) (0.16) (5.30) (5.27) 
FTC (minutes) (ln) -2.34 -0.39** 13.00*** 13.59** 3.30 5.48 
 
(4.76) (6.20) (4.86) (0.17) (5.29) (5.15) 
Road (minutes)(ln) 3.09 2.77 0.35 -0.13** -2.62 -3.23 
 
(1.90) (1.83) (1.74) (0.06) (2.13) (2.09) 
Bakko-Sire+ -106.24*** 0.10 231.50*** 0.10 -117.09*** -110.84*** 
 
(11.56) (12.46) (12.67) (13.17) (24.39) (25.42) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo + -74.76*** -68.69*** 45.44*** 0.42 -52.91*** -50.64*** 
 
(15.21) (0.53) (10.71) (0.34) (10.76) (10.30) 
Constant 108.66* 140.94** -107.02* -107.51* 113.62 121.71* 
 (63.33) (67.83) (63.54) (61.67) (73.78) (73.30) 
Switch part (dep var: Narrow/large-Asp.gap)     
Mother's involvement in Kebele 
 
0.46*** 
   
0.44** 
  
(0.13) 
  
(0.23) 
Father's involvement in Coop 
   
-0.38***  
 
   
(0.14)  
 Female hh head+ -17.95  0.59  0.17 
 
 (0.42)  (0.58)  (0.51) 
Age of hh head  0.01  -0.03  -0.10 
 
 (1.93)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Square of age  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 155 
 
 
Table A4.3 continued       
Education hh head  -0.01  0.50  -0.01 
 
 (1.20)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
HH size  0.45  -0.24  -0.18*** 
 
 (2.47)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Livestock(TLU)  0.00  -0.00  0.01 
 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Value of assets(ln)  0.13  0.13  0.13 
 
 (0.10)  (5.39)  (0.11) 
Past beneficiary+  8.38  0.12  0.48* 
 
 (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.29) 
Negative shock+  4.39  0.20  -0.10 
 
 (0.24)  (7.42)  (0.28) 
Impatience  -0.04  0.90  0.03 
 
 (2.11)  (2.33)  (0.08) 
Risk aversion  -0.09**  1.17  -0.05 
 
 (1.83)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Land size with Teff (ha)  -0.05  
 
 
 
 
 (0.15)  
 
 
 Land size with Maize (ha)  
 
 0.37  
 
 
 
 
 (0.26)  
 Land size with Wheat (ha)   
 
 
 
 0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.21) 
Micro-finance (minutes) (ln)  13.59**  -1.79  0.36* 
 
 (5.89)  (5.79)  (0.20) 
Market (minutes)(ln)  4.86  0.03  0.03 
 
 (4.96)  (0.17)  (0.16) 
Coop office (minutes)(ln)  4.74  0.01  0.03 
 
 (0.17)  (4.42)  (0.13) 
Input dealer (minutes)(ln)  -13.24**  -0.23  -0.17 
 
 (5.71)  (6.08)  (0.16) 
FTC (minutes) (ln)  -8.80  -0.16  -0.48*** 
 
 (0.18)  (5.47)  (0.17) 
Road (minutes)(ln)  -0.08  0.61  -0.25 
 
 (0.06)  (1.78)  (0.16) 
Bakko-Sire+  -102.30***  228.97***  6.50*** 
 
 (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.67) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo +  0.20  45.26***  0.05 
 
 (17.79)  (11.43)  (0.43) 
Constant  0.39  0.58  3.32 
  (1.88)  (2.06)  (2.42) 
athrho(Constant)  0.86**  -0.05  0.30** 
  (0.44)  (0.34)  (0.15) 
lnsigma(Constant)  3.99***  3.93***  3.92*** 
  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
Wald chi2  260.66  1762.43  102.46 
Log lik. -1165.9 -1140.42 -1308.63 -1275.79 -1203.38 -1167.53 
r2 0.53  0.8  0.3  
Observations 220 200 246 223 225 208 
Note: +Binary. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4. 4. Determinants of intensity of fertilizer use, household level 
 (Endogenous treatment-effects model with maximum likelihood, Endog.Te.)† 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
OLS Endog.Te. Endog.Te. Endog.Te. 
Narrow/large asp.gap+ 8.11 -104.79*** -105.35*** -106.43*** 
 
(10.81) (23.86) (22.09) (22.26) 
Female hh head+ -6.59 2.44 2.49 2.57 
 
(12.58) (0.31) (12.78) (12.80) 
Age of hh head 2.74 3.06 3.06 3.06 
 
(2.06) (2.30) (2.30) (0.04) 
Square of age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Education of hh head 1.55 1.45 1.45 1.44 
 
(1.26) (1.42) (1.42) (0.03) 
HH size -1.23 -2.65 -2.65 -2.67 
 
(2.09) (2.29) (2.29) (0.04) 
Total land holdings (ha) -9.76*** -9.33*** -9.33*** 0.00 
 
(2.83) (3.14) (3.15) (3.15) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) 3.71*** 3.93*** 3.94*** 3.94*** 
 
(1.17) (1.22) (1.22) (0.02) 
Value of assets(ln) 12.70*** 0.15* 16.61*** 0.15* 
 
(3.68) (0.08) (4.18) (4.19) 
Past beneficiary+ 4.18 0.34* 12.37 0.38** 
 
(8.01) (9.65) (9.59) (0.17) 
Negative shock+ 0.82 0.20 5.13 5.17 
 
(8.51) (10.08) (10.07) (10.09) 
Impatience -2.12 -0.11** -3.27 -0.11** 
 
(2.29) (0.05) (2.57) (2.58) 
Risk aversion 0.06 -1.16 -1.17 -0.07** 
 
(1.49) (0.03) (1.78) (1.79) 
Micro-finance (minutes)(ln) -2.45 0.04 0.83 0.02 
 
(7.48) (7.89) (7.92) (7.93) 
Market (minutes)(ln) -1.75 -1.85 -1.85 0.06 
 
(4.43) (4.93) (4.93) (4.94) 
Coop office (minutes)(ln) 4.59 7.32 7.34 0.06 
 
(4.17) (4.69) (4.69) (0.11) 
Input dealer (minutes)(ln) 1.00 -2.04 -2.05 -2.08 
 
(4.39) (0.11) (4.81) (0.11) 
FTC (minutes) (ln) 1.65 -0.10 -2.34 -0.12 
 
(4.84) (0.11) (5.50) (5.52) 
Road (minutes)(ln) -0.11 -2.06 -2.07 -0.14** 
 
(1.67) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) 
Bakko-Sire+ 80.21*** 0.45* 87.90*** 0.48* 
 
(13.30) (0.26) (14.42) (0.26) 
Hitossa-Tiyo+ -36.60*** 0.26 -26.22*** -26.12*** 
 
(7.82) (0.23) (9.68) (0.22) 
Constant -38.48 20.13 20.42 20.98 
 
(72.99) (77.54) (77.56) (77.72) 
    
Father's involvement in coop 
 
-0.12 -0.15* -0.16* 
  
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Father's involvement in religious group 
  
0.38** 0.37** 
   
(0.16) (0.16) 
Ratio of inc. growth(2006/2010) 
 
-0.00 -0.00 
 
  
(0.00) (0.00) 
 Female hh head+ 0.49 0.53* 0.54* 
 
 (12.74) (0.32) (0.32) 
Age of hh head  0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
 (0.04) (0.04) (2.30) 
Square of age  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Education hh head  0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (1.42) 
HH size  -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
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Table A4.4. continued     
 
 (0.04) (0.04) (2.30) 
Total land holdings (ha)  0.00 -0.00 -9.33*** 
 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Livestock holdings (TLU)  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (1.22) 
Value of assets(ln)  16.59*** 0.15* 16.65*** 
 
 (4.17) (0.08) (0.08) 
Past beneficiary+  12.33 0.37** 12.45 
 
 (0.18) (0.17) (9.62) 
Negative shock+  5.11 0.19 0.19 
 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Impatience  -3.26 -0.11** -3.28 
 
 (2.57) (0.05) (0.05) 
Risk aversion  -0.05 -0.07** -1.18 
 
 (1.79) (0.03) (0.03) 
Micro-finance (minutes)(ln)  0.81 0.02 0.86 
 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Market (minutes)(ln)  0.06 0.06 -1.85 
 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Coop office (minutes)(ln)  0.06 0.06 7.36 
 
 (0.11) (0.11) (4.70) 
Input dealer (minutes)(ln)  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 
 (4.81) (0.11) (4.81) 
FTC (minutes)(ln)  -2.32 -0.12 -2.38 
 
 (5.52) (0.10) (0.10) 
Road (minutes)(ln)  -0.16** -0.13** -2.09 
 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bakko-Sire+  87.86*** 0.46* 87.98*** 
 
 (14.44) (0.27) (14.45) 
Hitossa-Tiyo+  -26.27*** 0.25 0.27 
 
 (9.69) (0.23) (9.71) 
Constatnt  -1.06 -1.11 -1.09 
  (1.49) (1.48) (1.48) 
athrho (constant)  1.21*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
lnsigma (constatnt)  4.35*** 4.36*** 4.36*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 352 352 352 352 
Wald chi2  185.03 187.64 186.92 
Log lik. -1983.62 -2102.51 -2100.63 -2100.91 
r2 0.38    
Note: +Binary. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4. 5. Correlation of aspirations and psychosocial indicators 
 (Dependent variable: Aspirations index)† 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
SE LC OC E T SW PP ALL 
Self-esteem 0.17** 
      
0.12 
 
(0.08) 
      
(0.09) 
Locus of control 
 
0.07 
     
-0.10 
  
(0.11) 
     
(0.12) 
Openness to change 
  
0.08 
    
0.06 
   
(0.06) 
    
(0.07) 
Envy 
   
-0.00 
   
-0.01 
    
(0.03) 
   
(0.03) 
Trust 
    
0.09*** 
  
0.09*** 
     
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
Subjective well-being 
     
0.08*** 
 
0.09*** 
      
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
Poverty caused by external 
factors  
    
-0.13 -0.12 
   
 
    
(0.10) (0.09) 
Female hh head+ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age of hh head -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Square of age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education hh head 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH size 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Total land holdings (ha) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Value of assets(ln) 0.07** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Negative shock+ -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mean of others’ asset holdings (ln) -2.49 -2.75 -3.26 -3.14 -2.57 -2.90 -2.62 -2.10 
 
(4.87) (4.52) (4.70) (4.67) (4.44) (4.61) (4.72) (5.00) 
Mean of others’ income growth 
(2010-2014 ) 0.59 0.77 0.82 0.74 0.49 1.00 0.94 0.92 
 
(0.90) (0.94) (0.95) (0.94) (0.91) (0.93) (0.96) (0.94) 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 39.67 43.88 52.31 50.28 40.98 46.59 41.87 33.65 
 
(79.03) (73.41) (76.34) (75.79) (72.01) (74.76) (76.56) (81.09) 
         Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.33 
 Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary. 
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Table A4. 6. Correlation of expectations and psychosocial indicators 
 (Dependent variable: Expectations index) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
SE LC OC E T SW PP ALL 
Self-esteem 0.22*** 
      
0.11 
 
(0.07) 
      
(0.09) 
Locus of control 
 
0.26*** 
     
0.20** 
  
(0.08) 
     
(0.10) 
Openness to change 
  
-0.05 
    
-0.09 
   
(0.05) 
    
(0.06) 
Envy 
   
-0.03 
   
-0.01 
    
(0.03) 
   
(0.03) 
Trust 
    
0.12*** 
  
0.10** 
     
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
Subjective well-being 
     
0.08** 
 
0.10*** 
      
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
Perception on causes of 
poverty as external 
      
-0.17** 0.01 
       
(0.07) (0.09) 
Female hh head+ 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age of hh head -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Square of age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education hh head 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total land holdings (ha) 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Livestock holdings (TLU) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Value of assets (ln) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Negative shock+ -0.10* -0.12* -0.11* -0.11* -0.09 -0.10* -0.13** -0.08 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mean of others’ asset holdings 
(ln) -6.54 -5.88 -7.29 -7.76 -6.61 -7.12 -6.71 -4.88 
 
(9.99) (9.44) (9.52) (9.46) (9.24) (9.59) (9.79) (9.30) 
Mean of others’ income growth 
(2010-2014 ) -2.94* -2.64* -2.80* -2.61* -3.09** -2.48 -2.51 -2.75* 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 104.28 93.62 116.37 124.11 105.40 113.91 107.24 77.46 
 
(162.02) (153.16) (154.39) (153.45) (149.92) (155.50) (158.75) (150.86) 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.42 
 Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. +Binary.  
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Table A5. 1. Correlates of annual income per capita (in log.) and monthly household consumption 
expenditure per capita (in log.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) # 
 
INC_pc1 INC_pc2 EXP_pc1 EXP_pc2 INC_pc3 EXP_pc3 
Aspirations Head 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.13*** 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Aspirations Spouse 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.07* 
  
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Aspirations(Head*Spouse) 0.02 
 
-0.04 
   
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
   Aspirat.*INChange(2006-10) -0.00 
     
 
(0.00) 
     Aspirat.*ChangeExpen(2006-10) 
  
-0.00 
   
   
(0.00) 
   Female hh head+ 
    
-0.49** 0.03 
     
(0.19) (0.07) 
HH head Age31-50+ -0.14 -0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.17 
 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
HH head Age above51+ -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 0.11 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Spouse Age31-50+ -0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.10 
  
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
  Spouse Age above51+ 0.06 0.07 0.19** 0.19** 
  
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
  Head education: 0-4+ 0.26*** 0.27*** -0.06 -0.04 0.19** -0.02 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
Head education: 5-8+ 0.15* 0.15* 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
Head education: above 8+ 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.07 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Spouse education: 0-4+ -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
  
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
  Spouse education: 5-8+ 0.09 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 
  
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
  Spouse education: above 8+ 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.14 
  
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) 
  HH size(ln) -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.54*** -0.52*** -0.67*** -0.48*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.07) 
Dependency ratio 0.00 0.02 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.12 
 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.29) (0.12) 
Off-farm income+ 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.06 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Change in Income (2006-10) -0.00 
   
-0.00 
 
 
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
 Value of assets 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
Change in PC Expenditure (2006-10) 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
   
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
Livestock holding(TLU) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land in ha(ln) 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.08 0.07 0.44*** 0.09* 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 
Too much rain or flood+ 0.16 0.17* 0.16 0.16 0.19* 0.15* 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
Micro-finance. (minutes) (ln) -0.10* -0.10* 0.03 0.03 -0.10* 0.03 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Bakko-Sire+ -0.13 -0.15 -0.16** -0.15** -0.05 -0.14** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.61*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 
Constant 7.98*** 8.02*** 6.23*** 6.14*** 7.09*** 6.02*** 
 
(0.47) (0.48) (0.30) (0.30) (0.74) (0.28) 
Observations 304 304 301 304 375 372 
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.41 0.41 0.52 0.37 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the 
coefficients were not statistically significant: distance to- market, and asphalt road; dummies for experience of shocks including 
livestock diseases, death/loss of livestock, increased input prices, illness of household head/spouse, and illness of other family 
member. +Binary. Note: Female-headed households drop out from the analysis (column 1-4) when we consider the 
characteristics of both the household head and the spouse. This is true for tables A5.1 and A5.2.  
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Table A5. 2. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with food (in)security 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
pc_Calorie FCS HDDS HFIAS pc_Calorie_H FCS_H HDDS_H HFIAS_H 
Aspirations Head 422.38*** 4.50** 0.36** -0.34** 364.38*** 2.82 0.28** -0.35** 
 
(129.72) (1.81) (0.15) (0.16) (123.54) (1.98) (0.13) (0.16) 
Aspirations Spouse -183.02 -0.88 -0.07 -0.00 
    
 
(122.89) (1.76) (0.13) (0.29) 
    Aspirations(Head*Spouse) -82.35 -4.96*** -0.12 0.18 
    
 
(92.69) (1.52) (0.13) (0.19) 
    Aspirat.*INChange(2006-10) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female hh head+ 
    
6.39 -6.08* -0.57** 0.09 
     
(254.72) (3.35) (0.24) (0.33) 
HH head Age31-50+ -170.90 -2.87 -0.49 -0.59 65.69 -1.15 -0.28 -0.19 
 
(306.19) (5.72) (0.38) (0.76) (245.55) (4.18) (0.30) (0.58) 
HH head Age above51+ -267.57 -4.38 -0.62 -0.76 -48.14 -2.25 -0.48 -0.46 
 
(337.34) (6.05) (0.40) (0.69) (258.40) (4.24) (0.32) (0.52) 
Spouse Age31-50+ 103.65 1.93 0.10 0.14 
    
 
(205.33) (2.97) (0.24) (0.26) 
    Spouse Age above51+ -92.47 3.67 0.46 -0.33 
    
 
(272.30) (3.76) (0.32) (0.34) 
    Head education: 0-4+ -106.28 -5.99** -0.51** -0.16 107.32 -4.92* -0.46** 0.10 
 
(209.68) (2.97) (0.22) (0.48) (191.58) (2.67) (0.20) (0.34) 
Head education: 5-8+ -113.99 0.16 -0.09 -0.70* 70.13 0.45 -0.13 -0.35 
 
(199.53) (2.64) (0.21) (0.42) (184.86) (2.42) (0.19) (0.28) 
Head education: above 8+ 13.05 0.82 -0.24 -0.60 3.21 0.58 -0.24 -0.15 
 
(237.26) (3.28) (0.24) (0.41) (256.19) (2.83) (0.21) (0.38) 
Spouse education: 0-4+ 199.23 2.64 0.10 0.46 
    
 
(167.94) (2.59) (0.20) (0.46) 
    Spouse education: 5-8+ -274.66 1.36 0.21 0.42 
    
 
(201.28) (2.99) (0.22) (0.38) 
    Spouse education: above 8+ 154.56 8.61** 0.62** 0.37 
    
 
(308.88) (4.15) (0.31) (0.34) 
    HH size(ln) -991.32*** 5.78* 0.78*** 0.68 -1,372.61*** 6.49** 0.74*** 0.40 
 
(256.25) (3.25) (0.28) (0.49) (258.99) (2.67) (0.23) (0.34) 
HH head in business/wage+ -334.85** -2.95 0.02 -0.12 
    
 
(152.56) (2.32) (0.16) (0.28) 
    Spouse in business/wage+ 159.60 2.41 0.31* 0.32 
    
 
(171.65) (2.24) (0.17) (0.38) 
    Change in Incom (2006-10) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Income per-adult equiv. (ln) 0.05 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.03 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Value of assets (ln) -77.23 0.07 0.15* -0.20 -30.53 0.77 0.19*** -0.21* 
 
(71.11) (1.00) (0.08) (0.13) (66.91) (0.87) (0.07) (0.13) 
Livestock holding(TLU) 58.02*** 0.50** 0.01 0.00 47.09*** 0.30 -0.00 0.01 
 
(17.00) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (16.51) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) 
Too much rain or flood+ 594.27* 6.63** 0.38 0.08 493.57* 5.58* 0.49** 0.12 
 
(356.11) (3.18) (0.25) (0.88) (275.17) (2.89) (0.20) (0.67) 
Increased input prices -79.46 -2.35 -0.14 1.22** 96.41 -2.89 -0.06 0.70 
 
(224.08) (3.36) (0.21) (0.59) (211.23) (3.09) (0.20) (0.52) 
Illness of other family 484.20** 4.60 0.47** 0.33 294.93 4.61 0.35* 0.39 
 
(237.91) (3.21) (0.22) (0.64) (214.57) (2.90) (0.20) (0.58) 
Road (minutes)(ln) -80.96** 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -42.34 0.29 0.01 0.04 
 
(39.38) (0.42) (0.03) (0.04) (38.46) (0.45) (0.03) (0.04) 
Market(minutes)(ln) -53.17 -2.85*** -0.28*** -0.05 -71.33 -2.66*** -0.25*** -0.04 
 
(81.56) (1.06) (0.08) (0.12) (82.39) (0.97) (0.07) (0.10) 
Micro-finance (minutes)(ln) 63.99 2.47* 0.12 -0.13 159.08 2.09 0.09 -0.28* 
 
(111.41) (1.43) (0.12) (0.14) (101.01) (1.31) (0.10) (0.14) 
Health center(minutes)(ln) 166.19 3.34*** 0.15 -0.11 68.41 2.67** 0.09 -0.10 
 
(103.22) (1.23) (0.10) (0.09) (89.27) (1.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4,286.7*** 37.71*** 6.01*** 2.42 4,343.51*** 32.54*** 5.97*** 3.49** 
 
(928.07) (14.15) (1.05) (1.76) (948.31) (11.76) (0.88) (1.62) 
Observations 302 302 302 302 374 374 374 375 
R-squared 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.16 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the coefficients were not 
statistically significant: size of land holdings, dependency ratio, access to off-farm income, distance to- market, and asphalt road; dummies for 
experience of shocks including livestock diseases, illness of household head/spouse, and death/loss of livestock. +Binary. 
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Table A5. 3. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with wives’ life satisfaction and/or happiness  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BestA1 BestA2 HappyA1 HappyA2 BestE1 BestE2 HappyE1 HappyE2 
Aspirations Spouse -0.32* -0.16 0.16 0.16 
    
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) 
    Expectations Spouse 
    
-0.15 0.03 0.16 0.17 
     
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) 
Spouse Age31-50+ -0.05 -0.05 0.35 0.31 -0.11 -0.08 0.37 0.33 
 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) 
Spouse Age above51+ -0.47 -0.54 0.26 0.31 -0.58 -0.58 0.33 0.38 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) 
Spouse education: 0-4+ 0.09 0.17 0.08 -0.07 0.08 0.18 0.09 -0.06 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) 
Spouse education: 5-8+ 0.09 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.35 0.17 
 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) 
Spouse education: above 8+ 0.33 0.49 0.13 -0.01 0.30 0.45 0.11 -0.05 
 
(0.36) (0.35) (0.38) (0.41) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39) (0.41) 
HH size(ln) 0.71* 0.48 0.48 0.06 0.69* 0.45 0.47 0.04 
 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) 
Spouse in business/wage+ -0.90*** -0.85*** -1.06*** -0.94*** -0.90*** -0.86*** -1.07*** -0.95*** 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Change in Incom (2006-10) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Income per-adult equiv.(ln) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expenditue quintile 0.18** 0.20** 0.09 0.12 0.19** 0.20** 0.09 0.12 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Wealth quintile 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.17 -0.01 0.02 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Value of assets (ln) -0.08 -0.12 0.11 0.03 -0.11 -0.13 0.12 0.04 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Livestock holding(TLU) 0.05 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05* 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Increased input prices+ -1.04*** -0.79*** -0.36 -0.17 -1.04*** -0.77*** -0.35 -0.16 
 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.38) (0.40) (0.22) (0.24) (0.38) (0.40) 
Death or loss of livestock+ -0.61** -0.57* 0.15 0.12 -0.59** -0.56* 0.14 0.10 
 
(0.27) (0.30) (0.43) (0.43) (0.28) (0.30) (0.43) (0.44) 
Illness of head/spouse+ -0.42 -0.27 -0.81* -0.75 -0.41 -0.25 -0.81* -0.75 
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.48) (0.47) (0.39) (0.38) (0.48) (0.47) 
Market(minutes)(ln) -0.26** -0.27** -0.20* -0.22* -0.26** -0.27** -0.20* -0.22* 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Perceptions on causes of poverty 0.87*** 
 
0.99*** 
 
0.91*** 
 
0.98*** 
  
(0.26) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.29) 
Openness to change 
 
0.17 
 
0.70*** 
 
0.15 
 
0.72*** 
  
(0.26) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.21) 
Exposure to media and information 0.12 
 
0.25 
 
0.12 
 
0.25 
  
(0.19) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.16) 
Travel outside residence 
 
0.15 
 
0.53*** 
 
0.14 
 
0.53*** 
  
(0.23) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.19) 
Bakko-Sire+ 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.46 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.44 
 
(0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (0.35) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36) (0.35) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo+ -0.30 -0.34 -0.25 -0.34 -0.30 -0.34 -0.25 -0.34 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) 
Constant 6.55*** 7.04*** 5.87*** 6.99*** 6.85*** 7.23*** 5.79*** 6.92*** 
 
(1.55) (1.53) (1.59) (1.63) (1.57) (1.54) (1.59) (1.63) 
Observations 302 302 301 301 302 302 301 301 
R-squared 0.24 0.28 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.26 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the 
coefficients were not statistically significant: size of land holdings, livestock holdings, dependency ratio, distance to- asphalt 
road, micro-finance; dummies for experience of shocks including too much rain/flood, livestock diseases, illness of family 
member other than household head/spouse; and other internal traits such as locus of control, self-esteem, trust in others, 
envy/competitiveness.  +Binary. 
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Table A5. 4. Correlation of aspirations and other factors with life satisfaction and/or happiness of the 
household head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BestA1 BestA2 HappyA1 HappyA2 BestE1 BestE2 HappyE1 HappyE2 
Aspirations Head 0.24* 0.29** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
    
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
    Expectations Head 
    
0.27 0.37** 0.27 0.34** 
     
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
HH head Age31-50 -0.26 -0.09 0.20 0.35 -0.21 -0.03 0.29 0.43 
 
(0.40) (0.35) (0.46) (0.47) (0.39) (0.34) (0.45) (0.46) 
HH head Age above51 -0.53 -0.35 -0.00 0.26 -0.48 -0.28 0.10 0.35 
 
(0.42) (0.39) (0.49) (0.50) (0.41) (0.38) (0.48) (0.50) 
Head education: 0-4 0.06 -0.03 -0.32 -0.52* 0.02 -0.10 -0.38 -0.59** 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) 
Head education: 5-8 -0.43* -0.48* -0.30 -0.51* -0.49** -0.55** -0.33 -0.56* 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.29) 
Head education: 8+ -0.67** -0.75*** -0.61* -0.86*** -0.75*** -0.85*** -0.65** -0.92*** 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.33) (0.32) 
HH size(ln) 0.61** 0.42 0.34 0.07 0.59** 0.37 0.37 0.06 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) 
HH head in business/wage -0.17 -0.15 -0.35 -0.28 -0.17 -0.13 -0.34 -0.25 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
Change in Incom (2006-10) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Income per-adult equiv.(ln) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expenditue quintile 0.18** 0.13* 0.22*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.12 0.22*** 0.17** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Wealth quintile 0.27** 0.30** 0.32** 0.37*** 0.27** 0.31** 0.33** 0.38*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Value of assets (ln) 0.22* 0.16 -0.01 -0.08 0.22** 0.17 -0.01 -0.08 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Increased input prices -0.70*** -0.51* -1.16*** -1.08*** -0.68** -0.46 -1.14*** -1.04*** 
 
(0.26) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) (0.26) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) 
Road (minutes)(ln) 0.04 0.04 0.11* 0.11** 0.05 0.05 0.11* 0.12** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Market(minutes)(ln) 0.13 0.20** -0.14 -0.10 0.14 0.22** -0.12 -0.08 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Micro-finance (minutes)(ln) 0.29** 0.23* 0.08 0.05 0.30** 0.23* 0.08 0.05 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
Perceptions on causes of poverty 0.73*** 
 
0.36 
 
0.71** 
 
0.34 
  
(0.28) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.34) 
Trust 
 
-0.24** 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.26** 
 
-0.16 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.12) 
Exposure to media and information 0.18 
 
0.50** 
 
0.19 
 
0.51** 
  
(0.16) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.20) 
Travel outside residence 
 
0.22 
 
-0.02 
 
0.19 
 
-0.04 
  
(0.19) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.23) 
Bakko-Sire 0.95*** 0.98*** 0.25 0.35 1.02*** 1.07*** 0.35 0.45 
 
(0.29) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) 
Hettosa-Tiyyo 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.02 -0.08 0.76*** 0.79*** 0.04 -0.05 
 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) 
Constant -0.75 -0.08 5.57*** 6.54*** -0.82 -0.14 5.29*** 6.31*** 
 
(1.14) (1.19) (1.30) (1.31) (1.13) (1.19) (1.27) (1.29) 
         Observations 373 373 372 372 373 373 372 372 
R-squared 0.30 0.34 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.21 0.24 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. #Note: the following indicators were controlled but the 
coefficients were not statistically significant: size of land holdings, dependency ratio; dummies for experience of shocks 
including too much rain/flood, livestock diseases, illness of household head/spouse, illness of other family member; and other 
internal traits such as locus of control, self-esteem, attitude to change, envy/competitiveness.  +Binary. 
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Table A5. 5. Pairwise correlation amongst internal (or psychosocial) indicators 
 
Aspindex LCi SEi OCi Ei Ti SWi TPi Ri 
          Aspindex 1.0000 
        LCi 0.2253 1.0000 
       SEi 0.2639 0.5859 1.0000 
      OCi 0.1242 0.2223 0.2894 1.0000 
     Ei 0.0422 -0.0668 -0.0879 0.2014 1.0000 
    Ti 0.1337 0.2038 0.1973 0.0358 -0.0431 1.0000 
   SWi 0.2559 0.0300 0.0846 0.0575 0.0244 -0.1500 1.0000 
  TPi 0.0383 0.0505 0.1183 0.1593 0.1036 0.1321 0.0377 1.0000 
 Ri 0.0228 0.0892 0.0378 -0.0471 -0.0245 0.1594 -0.0254 -0.0411 1.0000 
Note: the indicators denote standardized indices of: the aspirations index (Aspindex), internal locus of control (LCi), self-
esteem (SEi), openness to change (OCi), Envy/competitiveness (Ei), trust in others (Ti), subjective well-being (SWi), discount 
factor/time preference (TPi), risk preference (Ri). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 1. Propensity score distribution by “treatment” status 
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